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Abstract
In our daily lives, people or devices frequently need to learn their location for many
reasons as some services depend on the absolute location or the proximity. The outcomes
of positioning systems can have critical eﬀects e.g., on military, emergency. Thus, the
security of these systems is quite important. In this thesis, we concentrate on many
security aspects of position in cryptography.
The ﬁrst part of this thesis focuses on the theory of distance bounding. A distance
bounding protocol is a two-party authentication protocol between a prover and a veri-
ﬁer which considers the distance of the prover as a part of his/her credential. It aims
to defeat threats by malicious provers who try to convince that they are closer to the
veriﬁer or adversaries which seek to impersonate a far-away prover. In this direction, we
ﬁrst study the optimal security bounds that a distance bounding protocol can achieve.
We consider the optimal security bounds when we add some random delays in the dis-
tance computation and let the prover involve distance computation. Then, we focus on
solving the eﬃciency problem of public-key distance bounding because the public-key
cryptography requires much more computations than the symmetric-key cryptography.
We construct two generic protocols (one without privacy, one with) which require fewer
computations on the prover side compared to the existing protocols while keeping the
highest security level. Then, we describe a new security model involving a tamper-
resistant hardware. This model is called the secure hardware model (SHM). We deﬁne
an all-in-one security model which covers all the threats of distance bounding and an
appropriate privacy notion for SHM.
The second part of this thesis is to ﬁll the gap between the distance bounding and
its real-world applications. We ﬁrst consider contactless access control. We deﬁne an
integrated security and privacy model for access control using distance bounding (DB)
to defeat relay attacks. We show how a secure DB protocol can be converted to a se-
cure contactless access control protocol. Regarding privacy (i.e., keeping anonymity in
a strong sense to an active adversary), we show that the conversion does not always
preserve privacy, but it is possible to study it on a case by case basis. Then, we consider
contactless payment systems. We design an adversarial model and deﬁne formally the
contactless payment security against malicious cards and malicious terminals. Accord-
ingly, we design a contactless payment protocol and show its security in our security
model.
The last part of this thesis focuses on positioning. We consider two problems related
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to positioning systems: localization and proof of location. In localization, a user aims
to ﬁnd its position by using a wireless network. In proof of location, a user wants
to prove his/her position e.g., to have access to a system or authorize itself. We ﬁrst
formally deﬁne the problem of localization and construct a formal security model. We
describe algorithms and protocols for localization which are secure in our model. Proof
of location has been considered formally by Chandran et al. in CRYPTO 2009 and it
was proved that achieving security is not possible in the vanilla model. By integrating
the localization and the secure hardware model, we obtain a model where we can achieve
proof of location.
Keywords: Distance Bounding, Localization, Secure Positioning, Access Control, Con-
tactless Payment, Proof of Location, Relay Attack, Position-based cryptography, RFID,
NFC
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Re´sume´
Dans la vie quotidienne, les gens ou les appareils connecte´s ont souvent besoin de
connaˆıtre leur position pour de multiples raisons, car certains services de´pendent de
l’emplacement absolu ou de la proximite´ . Les re´sultats des syste`mes de positionnement
peuvent avoir des eﬀets critiques, par exemple, pour l’arme´e ou les services d’urgence. La
se´curite´ de ces syste`mes est donc importante. Dans cette the`se, nous nous concentrons
sur de nombreux aspects de la se´curite´ lie´e a` la position en cryptographie.
La premie`re partie de cette the`se se concentre sur la the´orie de protocoles de´limiteurs
de distance. Un protocole de´limiteur de distance est un protocole d’authentiﬁcation entre
un prouveur et un ve´riﬁcateur qui conside`re la distance du prouveur comme faisant
une partie de ses identiﬁants. Dans ce sens, nous e´tudions d’abord les limites de la
se´curite´ optimale qu’un protocole de´limiteur de distance peut atteindre. Ensuite, nous
nous concentrons sur la re´solution du proble`me d’eﬃcacite´ des protocoles de´limiteurs de
distance par cle´ publique car la cryptographie a` cle´ publique ne´cessite beaucoup plus
de calculs que la cryptographie a` cle´ syme´trique. Nous construisons deux protocoles
ge´ne´riques qui ne´cessitent moins de calculs du coˆte´ du prouveur que dans les protocoles
existants, tout en conservant le plus haut niveau de se´curite´. Ensuite, nous de´crivons un
nouveau mode`le de se´curite´ impliquant un mate´riel inviolable. Ce mode`le est appele´ le
mode`le mate´riel se´curise´. Nous de´ﬁnissons un mode`le de se´curite´ tout-en-un qui couvre
toutes les menaces de de´limiteur de distance et une notion de conﬁdentialite´ approprie´e
pour le mode`le mate´riel se´curise´.
La deuxie`me partie comble le fosse´ entre le protocole de´limiteur de distance et ses
applications dans le monde re´el. Nous conside´rons d’abord le controˆle d’acce`s sans
contact. Nous de´ﬁnissons un mode`le inte´gre´ de se´curite´ et de conﬁdentialite´ pour le
controˆle d’acce`s en utilisant le de´limiteur de distance pour vaincre les attaques de relais.
Nous montrons comment un protocole de´limiteur de distance se´curise´ peut eˆtre converti
en un protocole se´curise´ de controˆle d’acce`s sans contact. En ce qui concerne la vie
sphe`re prive´e, nous montrons que la conversion ne la pre´serve pas toujours, mais qu’il
est possible de l’e´tudier au cas par cas. Ensuite, nous conside´rons les syste`mes de
paiement sans contact. Nous concevons un mode`le de se´curite´ pour le paiement sans
contact contre les cartes et les terminaux malveillants. En conse´quence, nous concevons
un protocole de paiement sans contact et montrons sa se´curite´ dans notre mode`le.
La dernie`re partie porte sur le positionnement. Nous conside´rons deux proble`mes lie´s
aux syste`mes de positionnement : la localisation et la preuve de localisation. Pour la
vii
Re´sume´
localisation, un utilisateur vise a` trouver sa position en utilisant un re´seau sans ﬁl. Pour
la preuve de localisation, un utilisateur veut prouver sa position, par exemple, avoir acce`s
a` un syste`me ou s’authentiﬁer. Nous de´ﬁnissons d’abord formellement le proble`me de la
localisation et construisons un mode`le de se´curite´ formel. Nous de´crivons des algorithmes
et des protocoles de localisation se´curise´s dans notre . La preuve de localisation a e´te´
prouve´ que la re´alisation de la se´curite´ n’est pas possible dans le mode`le standard. En
inte´grant la localisation et le mode`le mate´riel se´curise´, nous obtenons un mode`le ou` nous
pouvons obtenir une preuve de localisation.
viii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The importance of position in cryptography shows up out of necessity with the technolo-
gical developments of contactless systems and intelligent systems related to navigation.
The typical objectives related to position can be categorized as: localization which is
determining current location of a device, secure positioning which is proving one’s own
position to an authority, and proximity proofs which is proving an upper bound on the
distance from a device. In this thesis, we deﬁne and construct systems that provide
security with respect to each of these objectives.
Proof of Proximity: In the proof of proximity, there exist two parties where one
party (the prover) proves its distance from the other party and the other party (the
veriﬁer) veriﬁes the proof. All contactless authentication protocols such as contactless
payment (e.g. NFC), access control in a building, remote keyless system (e.g. car keys)
require proximity proofs to defeat the relay attack. In the relay attack, a malicious party
intends to impersonate a party (e.g., a smart card) during the authentication process by
extending the transmission range of the signals. In Figure 1.1, we illustrate an example
attack scenario. Using the proof of proximity, the party who veriﬁes this authentication
process (the veriﬁer) can check if the party (the prover) is out of range (i.e., far-away
from the veriﬁer) during the authentication process. Beyond the relay attack, the proof
of proximity is necessary for the following attacks as well:
Maﬁa Fraud (MiM) [Des88]: A man-in-the-middle (MiM) adversary between a veriﬁer
and a far-away honest prover makes the veriﬁer accept the access of the prover as in
Figure 1.1. In a MiM attack, the adversary can do more than just relaying (e.g., replace
messages).
There are also threats by malicious provers:
Distance Fraud (DF): A malicious far-away prover tries to prove that he is close enough
to the veriﬁer to make the veriﬁer accept.
Distance Hijacking (DH) [CRSCˇ12]: A far-away malicious prover takes advantage of
some honest and active provers who are close to the veriﬁer to make the veriﬁer grant
privileges to the far-away prover.
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   
   
   
Doctor Adversaries Database
Figure 1.1 – The adversaries retrieve inform-
ation from a hospital database by relaying
the messages between the database reader
and the doctor’s card. Here, the doctor is
far-away from the database. Arrows show
receiving or sending messages.
   
           
Adversary
Colleagues of the adversary
Company
Home of adversary
Figure 1.2 – The adversary who is an
employee of the company accesses to
the door of the company which shows
that he arrived at work although he is
at home. Here, the adversary can use
one of his colleagues who is just next
to the door. Arrows show receiving or
sending messages.
Terrorist fraud (TF) [Des88]: A far-away malicious prover, with the help of an ad-
versary, tries to make the veriﬁer accept the access of the prover.
Figure 1.2 shows an attack scenario for DH. The same scenario is valid for DF and
TF as well.
The most promising solution for the proof of proximity is distance bounding (DB).
Distance bounding was ﬁrst introduced by Brands and Chaum [BC93]. It was inspired
from Beth and Desmedt [BD91] who suggested to use time of ﬂight of messages to detect
relay attacks. In DB, the veriﬁer generally veriﬁes if the prover is in a range by computing
the round-trip time of sending a challenge and receiving a response (they are generally
1 or 2 bit(s)) in many rounds. In the end, if too many rounds have too long round trip
times or too many incorrect responses, the veriﬁer rejects because it implies that the
prover is out of range. DB’s security is based on the fact that the communication speed
cannot be faster than the speed of light.
Localization and Secure Positioning: Localization and secure positioning have
the same setup consisting of many bases whose physical location is known and a user.
However, the parties in this setup have completely diﬀerent objectives. In localization
setup, the user does not know his/her location and wants to obtain his/her physical
location by getting help from bases. The adversarial intention in a localization setup is
to make the user obtain a wrong location. In secure positioning setup, each party knows
his/her own location but the bases want to be convinced there is a party at the claimed
location by the user. The aim of an adversary in secure positioning is proving that there
is a user at a location even though no one is there.
We can see in many real world examples that the security of localization and secure
positioning is important. For example, consider the autonomous cars which can navigate
without human involvement by using their sensors and algorithms. One important issue
regarding the autonomous cars is the security of their systems. What if have these cars
had insecure localization systems that can easily be fooled or mislead? In this case, they
may not arrive where they are supposed to arrive, they may enter an area that they
2
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A
B
C
d1
d2 d3
Figure 1.3 – Trilateration Method. A, B and C are the known locations, d1,d2 and d3
are the distances from the unknown location (red point) to A, B and C, respectively.
normally should not enter such as a ﬁeld, a schoolyard, a hospital area and possibly
damage them.
Another example is related to secure positioning. The electronic tagging is used for
people who have been sentenced for electronic monitoring. These systems should be
secure so that they cannot be fooled by the prisoners or their accomplices who want to
change their place.
The notions localization and secure positioning have completely diﬀerent objectives
but they use the similar algorithms such as triangulation and trilateration. In this
thesis, we propose secure protocols and algorithms for these objectives using trilateration.
One of the reason for choosing this technique is its accuracy as it is not aﬀected by
environmental changes as triangulation [TI10] algorithms. The other reason is that it
requires proof of proximity which is also a part of this thesis. The trilateration algorithm,
as it can be seen in 1.3, outputs the intersection of circles whose radius is the distance
between the known location and unknown one. In general, in the localization setup,
the user computes his/her distances to locations of bases and obtain its location using
the trilateration algorithm and in the secure-positioning setup, the bases computes the
distance of the user from their own location in order to see that the output of the
trilateration algorithm is the same as the claimed one.
We see that the attacks of proof of proximity (MiM, DF, DH and TF) also aﬀect
the security of localization and secure positioning protocols using trilateration method.
For example, consider the localization setup. A MiM adversary can execute a MiM
attack during the distance computation and make the user believe that it is closer to
the location of a base. So, the trilateration algorithm outputs a wrong location. Let’s
also consider the secure positioning problem. The user claims that (s)he is at a location
and execute one of the attacks DF, DH or TF and makes some bases compute wrong
distances so that the trilateration algorithm outputs the claimed location.
Consequently, the implications of position in cryptography can be seen in three no-
tions: localization, secure positioning and proximity proof. Securely realizing them is
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not possible without secure distance computation. The existing solution for this is dis-
tance bounding. Therefore, in this thesis, we ﬁrst focus on distance bounding and then
suggest solutions for localization and secure positioning.
Outline of the Thesis
This thesis consists of three parts, where the ﬁrst part is related to the theory of dis-
tance bounding, the second part is about integration of distance bounding in speciﬁc
applications, and the last part is about localization problems. Before starting all these
parts, we ﬁrst give in Chapter 2 the existing security model for distance bounding and
some other useful security deﬁnitions which are used in the following chapters.
Part I gives original contributions to the theory of distance bounding. In Chapter 3,
we study how introducing random delays and having the prover to measure time can
improve optimal protocols. Then, in Chapter 4, we concentrate on constructing eﬃcient
and secure public-key distance bounding protocols. In this direction, we construct the
most eﬃcient public-key DB protocols comparing with the other protocols with the same
level or lower level of security. In Chapter 5, we study a distance bounding protocol based
on secure hardware to make full TF security is achievable.
In Part II, we aim to construct application speciﬁc security models and protocols on
top of distance bounding. Therefore, in Chapter 6, we develop a security model for
contactless access control and show how to achieve security and privacy with using only
distance bounding protocols. Similarly, in Chapter 7, we provide a security model for
contactless payment systems. We also analyze the security of the existing contactless
payment protocol that we use in our daily lives.
Part III includes solutions for the problems related to positioning. In Chapter 8, we
formalize the localization problem and provide a security deﬁnition. We also propose
localization protocols and prove their security formally. Using the security model of
localization and the distance bounding based on a secure hardware model from Chapter
5, we develop a model called proof of location for secure positioning in Chapter 9.
Personal Bibliography
Below is the list of publications that were published during this thesis. Entries in bold
are included in this thesis.
[1] Handan Kılınc¸ and Alptekin Ku¨pc¸u¨. Optimally eﬃcient multi-party fair exchange
and fair secure multi-party computation. In: Nyberg K. (eds) Topics in Cryptology
— CT-RSA 2015. CT-RSA 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9048.
Springer, Cham
[2] Handan Kılınc¸ and Serge Vaudenay. Optimal Proximity Proofs Re-
visited. In: Malkin T., Kolesnikov V., Lewko A., Polychronakis M.
(eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2015. Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9092. Springer, Cham
4
Introduction
[3] Handan Kılınc¸ and Alptekin Ku¨pc¸u¨. Eﬃciently Making Secure Two-Party Com-
putation Fair. In: Grossklags J., Preneel B. (eds) Financial Cryptography and
Data Security. FC 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9603. Springer,
Berlin, Heidelberg
[4] Handan Kılınc¸ and Serge Vaudenay. Eﬃcient Public-Key Distance
Bounding Protocol. In: Cheon J., Takagi T. (eds) Advances in Crypto-
logy – ASIACRYPT 2016. ASIACRYPT 2016. Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, vol 10032. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
[5] Handan Kılınc¸ and Serge Vaudenay. Contactless Access Control Based
on Distance Bounding. In: Nguyen P., Zhou J. (eds) Information
Security. ISC 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10599.
Springer, Cham
[6] Handan Kılınc¸ and Serge Vaudenay. Formal Analysis of Distance
Bounding with Secure Hardware. In: Preneel B., Vercauteren F. (eds)
Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2018. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol 10892. Springer, Cham
[7] Handan Kılınc¸ and Serge Vaudenay. Secure Contactless Payment. In:
Susilo W., Yang G. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP
2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10946. Springer, Cham
5

Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
We let sk and pk denote a secret key and public key, respectively. We show the owner
by using a subscript: e.g., (skP,pkP) is the secret/public pair of a party P. We denote
by s a symmetric key.
We denote the location of a party I by locI. We use d(I,J) as a metric which gives
the distance between locations locI and locJ. I is called close to J, if d(I,J)≤ B and far
from J, if d(I,J)> B where B is a common distance bound.
An encryption scheme is a tuple (Enc,Dec) where Enc is the encryption algorithm and
Dec is the decryption algorithm. Similarly, a signature scheme is a tuple (Sign,Verify)
where Sign is the signing algorithm and Verify is the veriﬁcation algorithm. The subscript
used on these algorithm speciﬁes the key: e.g. Encsk(M) is encryption of message M with
the key sk.
We let Γi denote a game and pi denote the probability that an adversary succeeds Γi
where i ∈ {0,1,2, ...}. We also give some special names to some games (e.g., Game(.)).
If the game outputs 1, we say the game is won: e.g. Game(.) = 1. If it is 0, the game is
not won.
Pr[E] is used to deﬁne the probability of an event E.
A function negl(x) : N→ R is negligible, if for every positive polynomial poly(.), there
exists a positive integer N such that for all x > N, |negl(x)|< 1poly(x) .
 is used as a security parameter.
2.2 Distance Bounding
We ﬁrst deﬁne formally a distance-bounding protocol. We have two types of it: public-
key distance bounding [BC93, HPO13, GOR14a, Vau15c, Vau15a, Vau15d, KV16,
ABG+17] and symmetric distance bounding [BMV13a, BMV15, BMV13b, Vau13, FO13,
BV14].
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Deﬁnition 2.1 (Public-key DB Protocol [Vau15c]). A public key distance-bounding pro-
tocol is a two-party probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) protocol and it consists of a tuple
(KP,KV ,V,P,B). Here, KP and KV are the key generation algorithms of P and V , respect-
ively. The output of KP is a secret/public key pair (skP,pkP) and similarly the output of
KV is a secret/public key pair (skV ,pkV ). P is the proving algorithm, V is the verifying
algorithm where the inputs of P and V are from KP and KV . B is the distance bound.
P(skP,pkP,pkV ) and V (skV ,pkV ) interact with each other. At the end of the protocol,
V (skV ,pkV ) outputs a ﬁnal message OutV ∈ {0,1} and has pkP as a private output. If
OutV = 1, then V accepts. If OutV = 0, then V rejects.
Correctness: A public-key DB protocol is correct if and only if under the honest
execution, whenever a veriﬁer instance V and a close (to V ) prover instance P run the
protocol, then V always outputs OutV = 1 and pkP.
Remark that Deﬁnition 2.1 combines identiﬁcation with DB: pkP is not an input of
the algorithm V , but it is an output. So, V learns the identity of P during the protocol.
Now, we give the deﬁnition of symmetric DB. It is very similar to the deﬁnition of
public-key DB.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Symmetric DB Protocol [BV14]). A symmetric distance-bounding pro-
tocol is a two-party PPT protocol and it consists of a tuple (K ,V,P,B). Here, K is the key
generation algorithm, P is the proving algorithm and V is the verifying algorithm. The
inputs of P and V is the output s of K . B is the distance bound. P(s) and V (s) interact
with each other. At the end of the protocol, V (s) outputs a ﬁnal message OutV ∈ {0,1}.
If OutV = 1, then V accepts. If OutV = 0, then V rejects.
Correctness: A symmetric DB protocol is correct if and only if under honest execution,
whenever a veriﬁer instance V and a close (to V ) prover instance P run the protocol,
then V always outputs OutV = 1.
The DB protocols in this thesis follow the common structure deﬁned by Boureanu and
Vaudenay [BV14]. The DB protocols in common structure have some phases, where one
of them corresponds to the phase of distance computation (challenge phase). Identify-
ing DB protocols based on this structure makes the protocol descriptions, the security
deﬁnitions and the security proofs easy to explain.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Common Structure [BV14]). A DB protocol (K ,V,P,B) (or
(KP,KV ,V,P,B)) based on the common structure with parameters (n,numc,numr) con-
sists of three phases which are ‘initialization phase’, ‘veriﬁcation phase’ and between
them ‘challenge phase’. Here, numc is the cardinality of the challenge set, numr is the
cardinality of the response set and n is the number of rounds in the challenge phase. In
the challenge phase, the veriﬁer sends challenges to the prover and receives responses
from the prover. Here, the veriﬁer measures the elapsed time between sending the chal-
lenge and receiving the response in each round. Time is not used otherwise and provers
do not measure time. If the elapsed time is less than what needed for information to
travel in a distance 2B, the response is called on time.
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We now give another structure which is a variation of the common structure.
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Canonical Structure [Vau15c]). A symmetric DB protocol (K ,V,P,B)
follows the canonical structure, if there exist an initialization/challenge/veriﬁcation
phases, P does not use s during the initialization phase, V does not use s at all ex-
cept for computing the ﬁnal OutV , and the veriﬁcation phase is not interactive.
In real life, the channel is noisy. So, the challenges or responses do not always arrive
correctly [HK05, CHKM06, KAK+08, KAK+09, SP07], even though no adversary exists.
This means that in a noisy environment, the condition which is the number of correct
responses has to be equal to n can cause false negatives. To overcome this, we give a
deﬁnition τ-completeness.
Deﬁnition 2.5 (τ-complete [BV14]). A DB protocol (K ,V,P,B) based on the common
structure with parameters (n,τ,numc,numr) is called τ-complete when the algorithm V
outputs OutV = 1 if and only if at least τ-rounds have correct and on-time responses in
the challenge phase.
When we set up τ, we should consider the noise tolerance of the channel. Here,
we assume that each round in a challenge phase is corrupted with probability pnoise.
Therefore, the probability of τ-completeness in the case of a close-by honest prover is
Tail(n,τ,1− pnoise) [BV14, BMV13b, BMV15] where:
Tail(n,τ,ρ) =
n
∑
i=τ
(
n
i
)
ρi(1−ρ)n−i (2.1)
Accordingly, the probability of failure is negligible in terms of n when τn < c< 1− pnoise
for some constant c due to the Chernoﬀ-Hoeﬀding bound [Che52, Hoe63].
We note that we assume τ= n in the next chapters, except Chapter 3, for the sake of
clarity. Depending on pnoise, this assumption can change for all protocols given in this
thesis.
2.2.1 Security of Distance Bounding
The security formalism in DB started by Avoine et al. [ABK+09, ABK+11]. Then, the
ﬁrst complete model was introduced by Du¨rholz et al. [DFKO11] where the threat mod-
els are deﬁned according to the number of tainted time critical phase. The SKI model
by Boureanu et al. [BMV13a, BMV13b, BMV15] is another formal model which includes
a clear communication model between parties in DB. The last model BV model [BV14]
by Boureanu and Vaudenay is a more natural multi-party security model. In this
thesis, we use the security and the communication model (BMV model) by Boureanu et
al. [BMV13a, BMV15, BMV13b]. The details of the model are as follows:
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Adversarial and Communication Model: In the DB model, we have parties called
provers (P), a veriﬁer (V ) and other actors. Each party has instances and each instance
I has its own location locI. The communication between two instances I and J takes
time which depends on the distance between I and J. The parties have common notions
of time, time-unit, and measurable distance. The communication follows the laws of
physics, e.g., communication cannot be faster than the speed of light (c). Namely, a
message sent by I at time t can arrive J at time t ′ ≥ t+ d(I,J)c . By abuse of notion, we
thus measure time with a distance unit (t ′ ≥ t+d(I,J)).
The veriﬁer is always honest and its instances always run the speciﬁed algorithm.
However, provers can be malicious. An instance of a malicious prover runs an arbitrary
algorithm. The honest instances cannot be run in parallel.
Without loss of generality, we say that the other actors are malicious. They may run
any algorithm. We assume that actors (adversaries) have very special hardware which
can intercept a message and change its destination without any delay. Similarly, they
can update a message and send it to any destination with this hardware without any
delay. So, if an instance I sends a message at time t1, and the adversary reads or updates
the message at time t2 and the adversary sends it to an instance J at time t3, then the
arrival time of the message to J is still lower bounded by t1 + d(I,J). However, the
adversary could send a message to J before seeing the one from I. Then, the adversary
blocks the delivery of the correct message. In this case, the message would arrive to J
before time t1 +d(I,J) but would be independent from the message sent by I as proven
in Fundamental Lemma (Lemma 2.7).
Adversaries can activate honest prover instances with some special signals. The special
signal Activate(P) activates the only activatable instance of P. After receiving this signal,
further activation signals are ignored by this instance. An instance can be terminated
by one of the following signals: Terminate(P) and Move(P, loc′). Terminate(P) terminates
the instance execution, but it remains “active”. The special signal Move(P, loc′) orders to
terminate and move the prover to loc′. It means that the instance becomes inactive and
that only one unused instance of P at location loc′ can be activated. The terminated
instance sends a special signal Go which, when received by this unused instance at
location loc′, will make it activatable (Go signals cannot be sent by malicious parties;
they are here only to enforce that a prover cannot move faster than a signal propagation).
After, it may receive another Activate(P) as a new instance of the same prover at location
loc′. These signals model the provers being at a single location and moving
(as inﬂuenced by the adversary) to run other instances. Besides, it models that
instances of the same prover cannot be run concurrently.
Deﬁnition 2.6 (DB experiment). An experiment exp for a distance-bounding protocol
with the tuple (K ,P,V,B) or (KP,KV ,P,V,B) is a setting (P,V,A) with several PPT
instances of participants, at some locations.
We denote by exp(V ) a distinguished experiment where we ﬁx a veriﬁer instance V
called the distinguished veriﬁer.
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Lemma 2.7 (Fundamental Lemma [BV14, Vau15d]). Consider an experiment where a
party V broadcasts a message c at time t to all other parties and waits for a response r.
The parties who are further than B are in a set Far and the others are in a set called
Close. We let E be an event in which V receives r no later than t+2B. We denote the
view of a party I just before seeing c (before t + d(V, I)) by ViewI. A message sent by
U is called independent if it is sent before t + d(V, I). If E happens, then there exists
an algorithm Alg(ViewClose,c,Other) → r. Here, ViewClose is the set of all ViewI where
I ∈ Close and Other is all independent messages from parties I ∈ Far.
The Fundamental Lemma states that a close-party cannot get online help from a
far-away party to respond correctly and on time.
Now, we explain the security deﬁnitions for distance fraud (DF), man-in-the-middle
(MiM) and distance hijacking (DH) from [Vau15c].
DF security captures security against a malicious and far away prover which does not
get any help from anyone else.
Deﬁnition 2.8 (Distance-Fraud Security in Public-key DB [Vau15c]). The game begins
by running the key setup algorithm KV (1) which outputs (skV ,pkV ). The game includes
instances of the veriﬁer including the distinguished one V and instances of an adversary.
Given pkV , the adversary (malicious prover) generates its key (skP,pkP) with an arbitrary
key setup algorithm K ∗(pkV ) (instead of KP). The adversary wins if V outputs OutV = 1,
POutV = pkP, and there is no participant close to V . A public-key DB protocol is DF-
secure, if for any such game, the adversary wins with negligible probability in the security
parameter .
The symmetric DB version is deﬁned in a very similar way.
Deﬁnition 2.9 (Distance-Fraud Security in Symmetric DB [Vau15c]). The game in-
cludes instances of the veriﬁer including the distinguished one V and instances of an
adversary. The adversary (malicious prover) generates its key s with an arbitrary key
setup algorithm K ∗ (instead of K ). The adversary wins if V outputs OutV = 1 and there
is no participant close to V . A symmetric DB protocol is DF-secure, if for any such
game, the adversary wins with negligible probability in the security parameter .
As we can see, a malicious and far-away prover can setup his key maliciously.
The other security deﬁnition to protect against malicious prover is distance hijacking.
Here, the malicious and far-away prover can get advantage of an honest prover without
the honest prover being aware of it. We use the DH-deﬁnition speciﬁed for the distance-
bounding protocol in the common structure (Deﬁnition 2.3) as it is easier to have security
proofs.
Deﬁnition 2.10 (Distance-Hijacking Security in Public-key DB [Vau15c]). The game
consists of instances of the veriﬁer, instances of a malicious prover P, and also instances
of an honest prover P′. A DB protocol (KP,KV ,V,P,B) having an initialization, a chal-
lenge and a veriﬁcation phases is DH-secure if for all PPT algorithms K ∗P and A, the
probability of P to win the following game is negligible in the security parameter .
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• The game generates secret/public keys of the honest prover and the veriﬁer:
KV (1)→ (skV ,pkV ), KP()→ (skP′ ,pkP′).
• Malicious prover P runs K ∗P (pkP′ ,pkV ) → (skP,pkP) and if pkP = pkP′, the game
aborts. Instances of P run an algorithm A(skP,pkP,pkV ,pkP′).
• P can interact with instances of the honest prover and the veriﬁer during the ini-
tialization phase and veriﬁcation phases concurrently.
• One instance of the honest prover and one instance of the veriﬁer V continue
interacting with each other in their challenge phase and P remains passive even
though it sees the exchanged messages.
The adversary wins if V outputs OutV = 1 and pkP.
Deﬁnition 2.11 (Distance-Hijacking Security in Symmetric DB [Vau15c]). The game
consists of instances of the veriﬁer, instances of a malicious prover P, and also instances
of an honest prover P′. A DB protocol (K ,V,P,B) having an initialization, a challenge
and a veriﬁcation phases is DH-secure if for all PPT algorithms K ∗ and A, the probability
of P to win the following game is negligible in the security parameter .
• The game generates the secret key of honest prover P′: K (1)→ s′.
• Malicious prover P runs K ∗ → s to generate the its secret key. Instances of P runs
A(s).
• P can interact with instances of the honest prover and the veriﬁer during the ini-
tialization phase and veriﬁcation phases concurrently.
• One instance of the honest prover and one instance of the veriﬁer V continue
interacting with each other in their challenge phase and P remains passive even
though it sees the exchanged messages.
The adversary wins if V outputs OutV = 1.
There exists also a weaker DH-security deﬁnition called one-time DH (OT-DH). It
can be deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 2.10 and 2.11 by changing the game setting with only
one instance of the veriﬁer and of the honest prover.
Now, we give the security deﬁnitions to achieve security against non-prover adversaries.
These deﬁnitions also cover impersonation fraud.
Deﬁnition 2.12 (MiM Security in Public-key DB [Vau15c]). The game begins by run-
ning the key setup algorithms KV (1) and KP(1) which output (skV ,pkV ) and (skP,pkP),
respectively. The adversary receives pkV and pkP. The game consists of instances of the
veriﬁer including the distinguished one V , instances of a prover P and instances of the
adversary. The adversary wins if V outputs OutV = 1, pkP, and there exists no instance
of prover P close to V . A public-key DB protocol is MiM-secure if for any such game,
the probability of an adversary to win is negligible in the security parameter .
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V (s) initialization phase P (s)
pick m ∈ {0,1}2n m−−−−−−−−−→ a= s⊕m
challenge phase
for i= 1 to n
pick ci ∈ {0,1}, start timeri ci−−−−−−−−−→ ri = a2i+ci−1
stop timeri
ri←−−−−−−−−−
veriﬁcation phase
a= s⊕m,
checktimeri ≤ 2B,ri =
a2i+ci−1
OutV−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 2.1 – OTDB
Deﬁnition 2.13 (MiM Security in Symmetric DB [Vau15c]). The game begins by run-
ning the key setup algorithm K (1) which outputs s. The game consists of instances of
the veriﬁer including the distinguished one V , instances of a prover P and instances of
the adversary. The adversary wins if V outputs OutV = 1 and there exists no instance
of prover P close to V . A symmetric DB protocol is MiM-secure if for any such game,
the probability of an adversary to win is negligible in the security parameter .
There exists also a weaker MiM-security deﬁnition called one-time MiM (OT-MiM).
It can be deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 2.12 and 2.13 by changing the game setting with only
one instance of the veriﬁer and of the prover.
In the next chapters, we give our DB protocols which are secure against MiM, DF
and DH adversaries. Some of these protocols are constructed on top of one-time secure
protocols. Therefore, we give an example of one-time secure symmetric DB protocol
OTDB by Vaudenay [Vau15c] which is a symmetric DB adapted from Hancke-Kuhn pro-
tocol [HK05]. The OTDB protocol follows the canonical structure (See Deﬁnition 2.4),
only requires one xor operation before the challenge phase on the prover side and it is
DF, OT-MiM and OT-DH secure [Vau15c].
OTDB (Figure 2.1): During the initialization phase, the veriﬁer picks a 2n-bit long
string m, where n is the number of rounds in the challenge phase, and sends it to the
prover. Then, the prover obtains a= s⊕m. In the challenge phase, in each round i, the
veriﬁer picks a challenge ci ∈ {0,1} and sends it to the prover. The prover responds each
challenge ci of the veriﬁer with a2i+ci−1. In each round i, the veriﬁer computes the round
trip time (timeri) of sending the challenge and receiving the response. At the end, the
veriﬁer checks whether all responses are correct (i.e., ci = a2i+ci−1) and all responses are
arrived on time (i.e., timeri ≤ 2B).
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2.2.2 Privacy in DB
In some applications of distance bounding such as access control, the privacy of the
prover becomes important. There are diﬀerent levels of privacy for DB depending on
the power of the adversary. Vaudenay [Vau07] identiﬁed these levels such as strong,
weak and narrow. We give below the HPVP-privacy game [HPVP11] and then describe
diﬀerent levels of privacy.
Deﬁnition 2.14 (HPVP Privacy Game [HPVP11]). The privacy game for a public-
key distance bounding DB = (KP,KV ,V,P,B) with a bit b ∈ {0,1} is the following: The
game runs the key setup algorithms KP(1) for a number t of provers and KV (1) for the
veriﬁer. Then, it lets the adversary A play the game PrivOb,A() with the following oracles
which are in O:
• CreateP(ID)→ Pi : It creates a new prover identity of ID and returns its identiﬁer
Pi.
• Launch()→ π : It launches a new protocol with a veriﬁer instance Vj and returns
the session identiﬁer π.
• Corrupt(Pi) : It returns the current state of Pi. Current state includes all values
in Pi’s current memory. It does not include volatile memory.
• DrawP(Pi,Pj)→ vtag : It draws either Pi (if b= 0) or draws Pj (if b= 1) and returns
the virtual tag reference vtag. If one of the provers had already been an input of
DrawP which outputted vtag′ and vtag′ has not been released yet, then it outputs /0.
• Free(vtag) : It releases vtag which means vtag can no longer be accessed.
• SendP(vtag,m)→ m′ : It sends the message m to the drawn prover and returns the
response m′ of the prover. If vtag was not drawn or was released, nothing happens.
• SendV(π,m) → m′ : It sends the message m to the veriﬁer in the session π and
returns the response m′ of the veriﬁer. If π was not launched, nothing happens.
• Result(π) → b′ : It returns a bit that shows if the session π is accepted by the
veriﬁer (i.e the message OutV ).
In the end of the game, the adversary outputs a bit b′′. If b′′ = b, then A wins.
Otherwise, it loses.
A DB protocol is strong private if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of winning
the privacy game is negligible in the security parameter , where the advantage is deﬁned
as follows:
Adv(PrivOb,A()) = |Pr[PrivO0,A() = 1]−Pr[PrivO1,A() = 1]|
We distinguish strong and weak privacy [Vau07]. The weak privacy game does not
include any ‘Corrupt’ oracle. The other kind of classiﬁcation is wide and narrow private.
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Wide privacy game is allowing to use the ‘Result’ oracle while the narrow privacy game
does not. In this thesis, we implicitly consider wide privacy by making OutV a public
message, which means we always obtain this bit without using ‘Result’ oracle.
2.3 Other Security Deﬁnitions
In this section, we give known security deﬁnitions and assumptions which we use in the
security proofs of our results in this thesis.
Deﬁnition 2.15 (Pseudo-Random Function (PRF)). Let fs : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}poly() be a
function where s is chosen uniformly at random from -bit strings and poly is a polyno-
mial and let F be a set of functions from {0,1}∗ to {0,1}poly(). We say fs is a PRF, if
for all PPT distinguishers D, the advantage as deﬁned below is at most negligible in :
Adv(PRF) = |Pr[D fs(.)(1) = 1]−Pr[DF(.)(1) = 1]|.
where F is chosen uniformly at random from F .
We give another security deﬁnition called circular PRF related to PRF. The notion
of circular-keying in pseudorandom functions introduced by Boureanu et al. [BMV15,
BMV13b]. Circular-keying PRF has an extra assumption to the PRF ( fs)s∈GF(q) to
handle reuse of a ﬁxed s outside of a PRF instance fs.
Deﬁnition 2.16 (Circular PRF [BV14]). Let be s,n1,n2 and q some parameters. An
oracle Os˜,F is deﬁned as Os˜,F(y,L,A,B) = A ·L(s˜)+B ·F(y), using dot product over GF(q),
given L : {0,1}s → GF(q)n1, F : {0,1}∗ → GF(q)n2, A ∈ GF(q)n1, B ∈ GF(q)n2 and s˜ ∈
GF(q). We assume that L is taken from a set of functions with polynomially bounded
representation. Let ( fs)s∈GF(q) be a family of functions from {0,1}∗ to {0,1}n2. The
family f is a circular-PRF, if for all PPT distinguishers D, the advantage as deﬁned
below is at most negligible in :
Adv(C-PRF) = |Pr[D fs(.)(1) = 1]−Pr[DOs˜,F (.,.,.,.)(1) = 1]|
Additionally, we require two conditions on the list of queries:
• for any pair of queries (y,L,A,B) and (y′,L′,A′,B′), if y= y′, then L = L′.
• for any y, if (y,L,Ai,Bi), i = 1,2, ..., t is the list of queries using this value y, then
for all λ1,λ2, ...,λt ∈ GF(q)
t
∑
i=1
λiBi = 0 ⇒
t
∑
i=1
λiAi = 0
over the GF(q)-vector space GF(q)n2 and GF(q)n1.
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Now, we deﬁne the Gap Diﬃe Hellman (GDH) problem which is basically the Com-
putational Diﬃe-Helman (CDH) problem with the access of a Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman
(DDH) oracle.
Deﬁnition 2.17 (Gap Diﬃe-Hellman (GDH) [OP01]). Let G be a cyclic group of order
p ∈ {0,1} and g ∈G be a generator. We have the following problems:
• CDH: Given g,X ,Y ∈G compute Z = gloggX .loggY .
• DDH: Given g,X ,Y,Z ∈ G, decide if Z = gloggX .loggY or Z = gr where r ∈ Zp is a
random element.
The GDH problem is solving the CDH given (g,X ,Y ) with the help of a DDH oracle which
answers whether a given quadruple is a Diﬃe-Hellman quadruple.
We say that GDH problem is hard in group G, if for all PPT adversaries, the prob-
ability of solving the GDH problem is negligible in .
We give two security notions related to public-key encryption schemes. The ﬁrst one
is chosen-ciphertext attack security (IND-CCA) and the other one is the key-privacy
under chosen-plaintext attack (IK-CPA).
Deﬁnition 2.18 (IND-CCA). The IND-CCA game with bit b ∈ {0,1} for the public-
key encryption scheme (GenE ,Enc,Dec) as follows: The IND-CCA game generates a
secret/public key (sk,pk) from the key generation algorithm GenE(1). Then, the game
CCA
Dec(.)
b,A () starts:
• A receives pk.
• The adversary has access to the decryption oracle Dec(.) before receiving the chal-
lenge. Dec decrypts given ciphertext with sk.
• The adversary sends two messages m0,m1 and the game sends cb = Encpk(mb) as a
challenge.
• After sending the challenge, the adversary still has an access to the decryption
oracle Dec(.) but it is not allowed to query the challenge ciphertext cb.
• The game ends when A outputs a bit b′. It wins if b= b′.
The public-key encryption scheme (GenE ,Enc,Dec) is IND-CCA secure, if for all PPT
adversaries A, the following advantage is negligible in .
Adv(CCADecb,A ()) = |Pr[CCADec(.)0,A () = 1]−Pr[CCADec(.)1,A () = 1]|
Deﬁnition 2.19 (IK-CPA [BBDP01]). The IK-CPA game with bit b ∈ {0,1} for the
public-key encryption scheme (GenE ,Enc,Dec) as follows: The IK-CPA game generates
two secret/public key pairs (sk0,pk0) and (sk1,pk1) from the key generation algorithm
GenE(1). Then, the game IK-CPAb,A() starts:
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• A receives pk0 and pk1.
• The adversary sends a message m and the game sends c=Encpkb(m) as a challenge.
• The game ends when A outputs a bit b′. It wins if b= b′.
The public-key encryption scheme (GenE ,Enc,Dec) is IK-CPA secure, if for all PPT
adversaries A, the following advantage is negligible in .
Adv(IK-CPAb,A()) = |Pr[IK-CPA0,A() = 1]−Pr[IK-CPA1,A() = 1]|
We also deﬁne the security of existential-forgery chosen-message attack (EF-CMA)
for a signature scheme (GenS,Sign,Verify).
Deﬁnition 2.20 (EF-CMA). The EF-CMA game for the signature scheme
(GenS,Sign,Verify) is as follows: The EF-CMA game generates the secret/public key pair
(sk,pk) from the key generation algorithm GenS(1). Then, the game EF-CMA
Sign(.)
A ()
starts:
• A receives pk.
• The adversary has access to the signing oracle Sign(.). Sign signs a given message
with sk and adds the message to a list L.
• The game ends when A outputs a message and a signature pair (m,σ). It wins if
Verifypk(m,σ) outputs valid and m /∈ L.
The signature scheme (GenS,Sign,Verify) is EF-CMA secure, if for all PPT adversaries
A, Pr[EF-CMASign(.)A () = 1] is negligible in .
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Part I
Distance Bounding

Chapter 3
Optimal Proximity Proofs Revisited
Boureanu and Vaudenay [BV14] revise the threat models of distance bounding and
deﬁne a structure called common structure (Deﬁnition 2.3). They further analyze the
optimal security that we can achieve in this structure and proposed DBopt (with concrete
instances DB1, DB2, DB3) which reaches the optimal security bounds.
In this chapter, we deﬁne three more new structures: when the prover can register
the time of a challenge (Sync Structure), when the veriﬁer randomizes the sending time
of the challenge (Rand Structure), and the combined structure (SyncRand Structure).
Then, we identify the optimal security bounds against DF and MiM in our new structures
and improve the bounds showed by Boureanu and Vaudenay for the common structure.
Finally, we adapt the DBopt protocol according to our new structures and we get three
new distance bounding protocols. We compare the performance of the adapted protocols
with instances of DBopt and we see that we have a better eﬃciency in terms of number
of rounds. For instance, we can reduce the number of rounds in DB2 from 123 down to
5 with the same security.
The content of this chapter was published in ACNS15 [KV15].
3.1 Our Contribution
In a nutshell, we list our contributions as follows:
• We deﬁne three new structures for distance bounding protocols. The ﬁrst structure
is Sync Structure where the prover stores each challenge’s arrival time. The second
structure is Rand Structure where the veriﬁer sends each challenge in an arbitrary
time. Finally, the last structure is SyncRand Structure which is the combination
of the ﬁrst two structures.
• We show the optimal security bounds for each new structure. Compared to the
common structure [BV14], we obtain better security bounds as the additional prop-
erties on these structures decrease the eﬃciency of adversary’s attack strategies.
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• We adapt the DBopt protocol [BV14] with our new structures and obtain new
protocols DBoptSync, DBoptSyncRand and DBoptRand. We prove their security
against DF and MiM (DH and TF resistance are unchanged compared to DBopt
in the common structure). We reach the optimal security bounds for DF and MF
for all of them in their respective structure.
• We analyze the performance of adapted DBopt protocols and conclude that we
have a better eﬃciency than DBopt in the common structure in terms of number
of rounds.
We note that in this chapter, the deﬁnitions and results are the same for public-key
DB and symmetric DB but we give our results for symmetric DB.
Structure of the Chapter: In Section 3.2, we revise the optimal-security bounds for
MiM and DF by Boureanu and Vaudenay [BV14]. Then, in Section 3.3, we deﬁne our
new structures and show the optimal security bounds in them. In Section 3.4, we adapt
DBopt to these new structures. We conclude this chapter with a performance analysis
in terms of number of rounds in Section 3.5 and with a conclusion in Section 3.6.
3.2 Revised Security Deﬁnitions
In this section, we give optimal security bounds in a DB protocol following the common
structure by Boureanu and Vaudenay [BV14].
for i = 1 to n
Initialization Phase
Challenge Phase
Veriﬁcation Phase
V(K) P(K)
ci r
′
i
if 1numc >
1
numr
:
pick c′i, ﬁnd its response r
′
i
else: pick r′i
Figure 3.1 – Early-reply strategy of a DF adversary
Theorem 3.1 ([BV14]). For any PPT adversary playing the DF game in Deﬁnition 2.8
or 2.9 with a τ-complete DB protocol (Deﬁnition 2.5) following the common structure
(Deﬁnition 2.3) with parameters (n,numc,numr), the probability of success is bounded by
Tail(n,τ,max( 1numc ,
1
numr
)).
We recall that Tail is deﬁned in Equation (2.1).
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This is the optimal security bound that a DB protocol can reach against a distance
fraud. DB1 and DB3 protocols [BV14] which are instances of DBopt reach this bound.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is based on the early-reply strategy (See Figure 3.1). In this
strategy, depending on numc and numr, the malicious prover either guesses the challenge
sent by the veriﬁer before it receives or picks a random response in order to sent the
response earlier in each round i. If the prover guesses the challenge, the probability of
replying correctly at round i is 1numc and if it guesses the response the probability of
replying correctly at round i is 1numr in each round.
Theorem 3.2 ([BV14]). For any PPT adversary playing the MiM game in Deﬁni-
tion 2.12 or 2.13 with a τ-complete DB protocol (Deﬁnition 2.5) following the common
structure (Deﬁnition 2.3) with parameters (n,numc,numr), the probability of success is
bounded by Tail(n,τ,max( 1numc ,
1
numr
)).
This is the optimal security bound that a DB protocol can reach against a MiM
adversary. All instances of DBopt protocols [BV14] reach this bound.
pick c′i
Afor i = 1 to n
ri
Initialization Phase
Challenge Phase
Veriﬁcation Phase
V(K) P(K)
ci
c′i
ri
if c′i = ci
else: abort round i
Figure 3.2 – Pre-ask attack by a MiM-
adversary
pick r′i
Afor i = 1 to n
r′i
Initialization Phase
Challenge Phase
Veriﬁcation Phase
V(K) P(K)
ci ci
ri
Figure 3.3 – Post-ask attack by a MiM-
adversary
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is based on pre-ask and post-ask strategy (See Figure 3.2
and 3.3).
Both in pre-ask and post-ask (Figure 3.3), the adversary relays the messages between
the prover and the veriﬁer in the initialization and the veriﬁcation phase. In the challenge
phase, it does the following:
• Pre-ask attack [BV14]: Any malicious actor close to a veriﬁer can do the following
in each round i of the challenge phase: Before receiving a challenge ci from the
veriﬁer, he guesses it and sends the guessed challenge c′i to the far-away prover.
He does it early enough to receive a corresponding response r′i from the prover on
time. Meanwhile, the malicious actor receives the challenge ci from the veriﬁer. If
ci = c′i, then the malicious actor just relays ri = r
′
i. Otherwise, he may not pass the
round i, especially if P and V authenticate the challenges during the veriﬁcation
phase. The probability that the adversary passes the round i is 1numc . So, he passes
at least τ rounds with probability Tail(n,τ, 1numc ).
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• Post-ask attack [BV14]: Any adversary close to a veriﬁer can do the following in
each round i of the challenge phase: He receives a challenge ci from the veriﬁer.
Then, he picks a random response r′i and sends it to the veriﬁer. At the same time,
he forwards ci to the prover. The adversary succeeds to pass the round i with the
probability 1numr . So, he passes at least τ-rounds with probability Tail(n,τ,
1
numr
).
3.3 Optimal Security Bounds in New Structures
Before introducing the new structures, we give some useful lemmas which are used in
proving the new versions of DBopt.
Lemma 3.3. Let exp be an experiment, V be a participant and t0 be a time. We consider
a simulation expt0 of the experiment in which each participant U stops just before time
t0 + d(V,U). We denote by View
exp
t (U) and View
expt0
t (U) the view of participant U at a
time t in exp and expt0, respectively. For any t < t0+d(V,U),
Viewexpt (U) = View
expt0
t (U)
Proof. We prove it by induction on t such that for all t < t0 + d(V,U). Clearly,
Viewexp0 (U) = View
expt0
0 (U) at the beginning (t = 0) of the both experiments. Let us
assume that for all U and for all t ′ < t0+d(V,U), View
exp
t ′ (U) = View
expt0
t ′ (U) where t
′ < t.
Now, we show that Viewexpt (U) = View
expt0
t (U) with this assumption.
Let participant U be such that t < t0 + d(V,U). We know that View
exp
t ′ (U) =
View
expt0
t ′ (U). Any incoming message m at time t from a participant U
′ which is in a
diﬀerent location than U was sent at time t ′′ < t−d(U,U ′). We have t ′′ < t0 +d(V,U)−
d(U,U ′)≤ t0+d(V,U ′). Besides, since U ′ is at a diﬀerent location than U , we have t ′′ < t
so we can apply the induction hypothesis. Therefore, Viewexpt ′′ (U
′) = View
expt0
t ′′ (U
′) and so
the message m is the same in exp and expt0 . This applies to all instances at the same
location as U , since they locally compute the same messages for each other. Hence,
Viewexpt (U) = View
expt0
t (U).
Lemma 3.4. Given an experiment, if a message c is randomly selected with fresh coins
by a participant V at time t0, any cˆ received by a participant U at time t1 < t0 +d(U,V )
is statistically independent from c.
Proof. We apply Lemma 3.3. c is not selected at all in expt0 because V stops just before
t0 in expt0 . As t1 < t0+d(U,V ), cˆ is the same in exp and expt0 . c is randomly chosen with
fresh coins, so cˆ is statistically independent from c.
Remark that Lemma 3.4 diﬀers from the fundamental lemma (Lemma 2.7) as Lemma
3.4 is related with the independence of c received by other parties while the fundamental
lemma considers the independence of r from c which is received by V .
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3.3.1 Sync Structure
t2
t0
PV
Figure 3.4 – The time check in the com-
mon structure is done by measuring the
time diﬀerence between the curly par-
enthesis. t shows the time.
t2
t0
t1 PV
Figure 3.5 – The time check in the
sync structure is done by measuring the
time diﬀerence between the curly par-
entheses. t shows the time.
Deﬁnition 3.5 (Sync Structure). A DB protocol with the sync structure based on para-
meters (n,τ,numc,numr) has an initialization and a veriﬁcation phase which do not de-
pend on communication times. There is an n-round challenge phase between the ini-
tialization and the veriﬁcation phase. The challenge is on time if the elapsed time
between sending the challenge (by the veriﬁer) and receiving the challenge (by the prover)
(corresponds ﬁrst part in Figure 3.5) is at most B. The response is on time if the
elapsed time between sending the response (by the prover) and receiving the response
(by the veriﬁer) (corresponds second part in Figure 3.5) is at most B. Challenges and
responses are in sets of cardinality numc and numr, respectively.
During the challenge phase, challenges or responses can be corrupted during the trans-
mission. We say that the protocol is τ-complete when the veriﬁer accepts if and only if
at least τ rounds have correct and on-time responses and challenges.
Diﬀerently than the common structure, the arrival time of a challenge is part of the
sync structure.
Now, we analyze the optimal security bound of MiM-security in the sync structure.
Theorem 3.6. Assuming the time when V sends his challenge can be predicted by the
adversary and V and P have synchronized clocks, for any PPT adversary playing the
MiM game in Deﬁnition 2.12 or 2.13 with a τ-complete DB protocol (Deﬁnition 2.5)
following the sync structure with parameters (n,numc,numr), the probability of success is
bounded by Tail(n,τ, 1numc.numr ).
Remark that this bound is an improvement compared to Theorem 3.2 in the common
structure.
Proof. We consider V , a far-away prover P and a MiM-adversary A with a noiseless
communication. A relays the messages between V and P in the initialization and veri-
ﬁcation phases which are time insensitive. As P is far-away, it cannot just relay the
messages. Therefore, it has to guess the challenge and the response before receiving
them. Otherwise, it will be too late to make P receive the challenge on time and make
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V receive the response on time thanks to Lemma 3.4. Therefore, it cannot follow either
pre-ask or post-ask strategy. We denote that the distance between V and A by d1 and
the distance between A and P by d2. It can best follow this strategy:
No-Ask Strategy: A guesses the challenge and the response, and forwards them before
seeing them so that they arrive on time. Thanks to our assumption, A knows the time
ti0 that V sends a challenge ci at each round i. In each round i, it picks a challenge c′i and
sends c′i to P at a time less than equal t0+B−d2 so that P receives it at a time t1 ≤ t0+B.
It then picks a response r′i and sends it to V at a time less than equal t0 + 2B− d1. V
receives r′i at a time t2 ≤ t1 +B. Since t1 − t0 ≤ B and t2 − t1 ≤ B, A succeeds to be “on
time” for both the challenge and the response. If r′i and c
′
i are correctly guessed as well
then A passes round i. Hence, the probability that it passes the challenge/response
veriﬁcation for one round is 1numc.numr and the probability that the V outputs OutV = 1
is Tail(n,τ, 1numc.numr ).
The Problems in the Sync Structure without Synchronization: Remark that
in Theorem 3.6, we have the assumption of synchronized clocks between the veriﬁer and
the prover. Now, we discuss the reason of this assumption. Let’s say that the time
diﬀerence between the clocks of the veriﬁer and prover is |δ| 1. For example, V has time
t on its local clock while P has time T = t+δ on his local clock. V sends the challenge
at t0 according to V ’s local clock and P receives it at T1 ≥ t0 + d+ δ according to P’s
local clock where d is the distance of the prover from the veriﬁer. Then, V receives the
response at t2 ≥ t0 + 2d. So, V gets the following result in the veriﬁcation of timing:
T1− t0 ≥ δ+d and t2−T1 ≥ d−δ. If the prover is close, the inequality |δ| ≤ B−d should
be satisﬁed so that P passes the protocol.
In addition, an unsynchronized honest prover and veriﬁer give an advantage to the
adversary as pre-ask (for δ> 0) and post-ask (for δ< 0) attacks can be done. Indeed, if
the honest prover is far at a distance up to B+ |δ| and at least max(B, |δ|), A passes the
protocol with probability Tail(n,τ,max( 1numc ,
1
numr
)).
Note that t2 −T1 ≤ B and T1 − t0 ≤ B imply that t2 − t0 ≤ 2B which is the veriﬁcation
in the common structure. So, the security results of the common structure apply to the
sync structure even if the clocks are not synchronized.
In below attacks, we assume d = d1 + d2 such that d1 is the distance between the
veriﬁer and the adversary, and d2 is the distance between the prover and the adversary.
• Pre-Ask: A guesses the challenge before it is released and asks for the response
to P on time so that it can later on answer. If P and V are synchronized, this
strategy never works because A relays the response from P to V where the distance
between them is more than B. However, the following happens if P and V are not
synchronized and δ> 0.
We consider d = d1 + d2 ∈ [max(B, |δ|),B+ |δ|]. V sends the challenge c at t0. A
1If the diﬀerence between clocks is not constant it can be still considered as a constant during the
protocol as the distance bounding phase takes very short time (order of nanoseconds).
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guesses the challenge cˆ and sends it to P at tA which is before receiving the challenge
c from V . P receives cˆ at T1 = tA + d2 + δ which is the local time of P. P sends
response r and A relays it to V . V receives r at t2 = tA+2d2+d1.
T1 − t0 = tA+d2 + δ− t0. By selecting tA = t0 +d1 −2δ, T1 − t0 = d1 +d2 − δ ∈ [0,B].
So the challenge is considered on time.
t2−T1 = tA+2d2+d1−tA−d2−δ= d1+d2−δ∈ [0,B]. So, the response is considered
on time.
Therefore, the pre-ask attack is successful when δ> 0 and the distance between P
and V is in between max(B, |δ|) and B+ |δ|.
• Post-Ask: A guesses the response at the same time that it forwards the challenge
to P. If P and V are synchronized, this strategy never works because A relays the
challenge from V to P where the distance between them is more than B. However,
the following happens if P and V are not synchronized and δ< 0.
We consider d1 + d2 ∈ [−δ,B− δ]. V sends the challenge c, then A relays c. P
receives it at T1 = t0+d1+d2+δ. Without waiting the response from P, A guesses
the response and sends it at time tA to V . At the end, V receives it at t2 = tA+d1.
T1− t0 = t0+d1+d2+δ− t0 = d1+d2+δ ∈ [0,B]. So, the challenge is on time.
By selecting tA = t0 + d1 + 2d2 + 2δ, we have t2 −T1 = d1 + d2 + δ ∈ [0,B]. So, the
response is on time.
Therefore, the post-ask attack is successful when δ < 0 and the distance between
P and V is in between max(B, |δ|) and B+ |δ|.
As a result, we have the security bound of Theorem 3.11 if the distance between P
and V is more than B+ |δ| even though P and V are not synchronized. However, if P
is in the distance between max(B,δ) and B+ |δ|, we have the lower optimal-security
bound as in Theorem 3.2 (Tail(n,τ,max( 1numc ,
1
numr
)).
• The correctness problem: Beyond security, the other problem in the sync
structure with an unsynchronized P and V is correctness as the close-by P cannot
pass the protocol, when d(P,V ) ≤ B− |δ|. Therefore, if the veriﬁcation fails in
the sync structure, V can also do the time veriﬁcation of the common structure
which is checking if t2 − t0 ≤ 2B, but in this case we have a weaker β-security.
We stress that this does not require to restart the protocol. We rather obtain
a variant of the sync structure which OutV can take 3 possible values: “reject”,
“Common Structure accept”, or “Sync Structure accept”. Applications can decide
if a“Common Structure accept” is enough depending on the required security level.
3.3.2 Rand Structure and SyncRand Structure
We think of new structures which are combined with “Common Structure” or “Sync
Structure”. In the analysis of “Common Structure” and “Sync Structure”, we assume
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that the sending time ti0 of the challenge for each round i in challenge phase is known
by the adversary. Now, we suggest a new modiﬁcation where the veriﬁer randomizes
the sending time ti0 ∈ [T,T +Δ] where T and Δ are public and [T,T +Δ] is uniformly
distributed (as real numbers) so that the exact ti0 cannot be accurately known by the
adversary before seeing the challenge.
We note that random delays for the messages (challenges and responses) on both
the veriﬁer and the prover side are frequently used for location privacy, as discussed in
[RCˇ08, MOV14]. In our following structures, we use random delays (only on the veriﬁer
side) to achieve better security bounds.
Deﬁnition 3.7 (Rand Structure). A DB protocol with the rand structure based on para-
meters (n,τ,numc,numr,Δ) has the same properties with the common structure in Deﬁn-
ition 2.3. Additionally, the veriﬁer chooses randomly a sending time in the interval
[T,T +Δ] for each challenge in the challenge phase.
Deﬁnition 3.8 (SyncRand Structure). A DB protocol with the rand structure based
on parameters (n,τ,numc,numr,Δ) has the same properties with the sync structure in
Deﬁnition 3.5. Additionally, the veriﬁer chooses randomly a sending time in the interval
[T,T +Δ] for each challenge in the challenge phase.
Theorem 3.9. For any PPT adversary playing the DF game in Deﬁnition 2.8 or 2.9
with a τ-complete DB protocol (Deﬁnition 2.5) following either the “Rand Structure” or
the “SyncRand Structure” with parameters (n,τ,numc,numr,Δ), the probability of success
is bounded by Tail(n,τ,max( 1numc ,
1
numr
).2BΔ ).
Proof. We construct a DF adversary following the early reply strategy: A malicious
prover guesses the challenge ci or the response ri before it is emitted, and then sends the
response at time T i1 (We use capital T as the prover does not have to be synchronized
with the veriﬁer). However, before sending the response, the prover has to guess a proper
time T i1 because the veriﬁer checks the inequalities t
i
2− ti0 ≤ 2B for the “Rand Structure”
and T i1 − ti0 ≤ B and ti2 −T i1 ≤ B for the “SyncRand Structure”. ti2 is the time that the
veriﬁer receives the response and it depends on the sending time T i1 . It means that
0 ≤ ti2− ti0 = T i1 +d− ti0 ≤ 2B where d is the distance between the prover and the veriﬁer.
So, we can conclude that if ti0 ∈ [T i1 + d− 2B,T i1 + d] then P passes ith veriﬁcation. The
probability that it happens is 2BΔ . Once ci is received, the prover can deduce t
i
0 and use
ti1 =
ti0+t
i
2
2 for the veriﬁcation in the “SyncRand Structure” as the veriﬁer needs to know
ti1 to check if the response and challenge are on time. Therefore, the probability that
the prover succeeds the round i is max( 1numc ,
1
numr
).2BΔ since it also has to guess correctly
ci or ri. We can conclude that P succeeds at least τ rounds with the probability at least
Tail(n,τ,max( 1numc ,
1
numr
).2BΔ ).
Note that there is no change on the optimal MiM-security which is given in The-
orem 3.2 in the “Rand Structure”. As for the “SyncRand Structure”, the new bound is
as follows.
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Theorem 3.10. Assuming V and P have synchronized clocks, for any PPT adversary
playing the MiM game in Deﬁnition 2.12 or 2.13 with a τ-complete DB protocol (Deﬁn-
ition 2.5) following the “SyncRand Structure” with parameters (n,numc,numr), the prob-
ability of success is bounded by Tail(n,τ, 1numc.numr .
B
Δ).
Proof. We consider V , a far away prover P and MiM adversary A with a noiseless
communication. As showed in Theorem 3.6, A can use No-ask strategy to pass the
protocol. Diﬀerently, it also needs to guess a proper time tiA to send the guessed challenge
to P. P receives the challenge from A at time ti1 where ti1 = tiA+d2. If A passes ith round,
the following inequality 0≤ ti1− ti0 ≤ B should be satisﬁed. It means that 0≤ tA+d2− t0 ≤
B. If tA satisﬁes this inequality then t0 should be in the interval [tA+d2−B, tA+d2]. The
probability that it happens is BΔ . Therefore, the probability that prover succeeds the
round i is 1numc.numr .
B
Δ since it also has to guess a correct ci and ri. We can conclude that
P succeeds at least τ-rounds with the probability at least Tail(n,τ, 1numc.numr .
B
Δ).
As a result, among all the structures, “SyncRand Structure” gives the best optimal
security bounds for both MiM security and DF security. See Table 3.1 for the review of
the optimal bounds for all of the structures.
Structure DF MF
Common Tail(n,τ,max( 1numc ,
1
numr
)) Tail(n,τ,max( 1numc ,
1
numr
))
Sync Tail(n,τ,max( 1numc ,
1
numr
)) ∗Tail(n,τ, 1numc .
1
numr
)
Rand ∗Tail(n,τ,max( 1numc ,
1
numr
).2BΔ ) Tail(n,τ,max(
1
numc
, 1numr ))
SyncRand ∗Tail(n,τ,max( 1numc ,
1
numr
).2BΔ )
∗Tail(n,τ, 1numc .
1
numr
B
Δ)
Table 3.1 – The review of optimal security bounds in DB structures. The ones with ∗
are diﬀerent bounds than the bounds in the common structure.
3.4 DBopt in New Structures
We adapt DBopt [BV14] into our new structures ‘Sync Structure’, ‘Rand Structure’
and ‘SyncRand Structure’. We obtain DBoptSync DBoptRand and DBoptSyncRand,
respectively. These versions have some minor diﬀerences in the challenge and the veri-
ﬁcation phase comparing to DBopt.
DBoptSync DBoptRand and DBoptSyncRand are symmetric DB protocols in which
P and V share a secret s ∈ Z2 where  is a security parameter. The notations are the
following: n is the number of rounds, tag is the length of the tag, τ is a threshold, T is
the set of all possible time values, q is a prime power.
As in DBopt, we use the function fs which maps diﬀerent co-domains depending on
the input. fs(NP,NV ,Lμ,b)∈GF(q)n and fs(NP,NV ,Lμ,T,b,c)∈GF(q)tag . Lμ is a mapping
deﬁned from a vector μ ∈ Z2 where Lμ(s) = (μ(s),μ(s), ...,μ(s)) and μ(s) =map(μ.s) such
that map : Z2 →GF(q) is an injection. Here NP,NV ∈ {0,1}nonce , Lμ ∈ L where L includes
all possible Lμ mappings, b,c ∈ GF(q)n and T ∈ T n.
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Veriﬁer Prover
secret: s secret: s
initialization
phase
pick Lμ ∈U L ,NV ∈U
{0,1}nonce
NP←−−−−−−−−− pick NP ∈U {0,1}nonce
select b ∈ GF(q)n
a= fs(NP,NV ,Lμ,b)
NV ,Lμ,b−−−−−−−−−→ a= fs(NP,NV ,Lμ,b)
s′ = Lμ(s) s′ = Lμ(s)
challenge phase
for i= 1 to n
pick ci ∈U GF(q)
start time ti0
ci−−−−−−−−−→ receive c′i, save time ti1
receive ri, stop time ti2
r′i←−−−−−−−−− r′i = φc′i(ai,s′i,bi)
veriﬁcation
phase
receive c′′, check tag =
fs(NP,NV ,Lμ,T,b,c′′)
c′,T,tag←−−−−−−−−− tag =fs(NP,NV ,Lμ,T,b,c′)
check #{i;ci =
c′′i ,ri and t
i
2, t
i
1 correct}≥
τ
OutV−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 3.6 – DBoptSync
The initialization phases of DBoptSync DBoptRand and DBoptSyncRand are the
same as in the DBopt protocol [BV14] (See Figure 3.6). The challenge phases are as
follows:
DBoptSync: P saves the time ti1 of receiving the challenge c
′
i from V at round i and V
saves the times ti0 and t
i
2 which are the time of sending the challenge ci and receiving the
response r′i
2, respectively.
DBoptRand: It is as the challenge phase of DBopt except that V randomizes the
sending time ti0 ∈ [T,T+Δ] where T and Δ are public and [T,T+Δ] is uniformly distributed
(as real numbers) for each round i in the challenge phase. V saves the sending time
ti0 ∈ [T,T +Δ] of the challenge ci and saves the receiving time ti2 the response r′i from P
in each round i.
DBoptSyncRand: V randomizes the sending time ti0 ∈ [T,T +Δ] as in DBoptRand.
Then, as in DBoptSync, P saves the time ti1 of receiving the challenge c
′
i from V at round
i and V saves the times ti0 and t
i
2 which are the time of sending the challenge ci and
2We use the notations c′i and r′i instead of ci and ri as received messages because when a message
arrives it may change on the way because of the noise.
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receiving the response r′i.
The veriﬁcation phase of DBoptRand is the same as DBopt. The veriﬁcation
phase of DBoptSync and DBoptSyncRand is as follows: P sets T = (t11 , t
2
1 , ..., t
n
1) and
c′ = (c′1,c
′
2, ...,c
′
n) and calculates the tag fs(NP,NV ,Lμ,T,b,c
′). Then, P sends the tag and
V does the following:
• V ﬁrst checks if the tag and (c′,T ) are compatible, which means the tag it received
is equal to fx(NP,NV ,Lμ,T,b,c′). If it is compatible, it continues with the next step.
Otherwise, it rejects P.
• V counts the number of correct rounds. A round is correct if c′i = ci and r′i = ri. If
the number of correct rounds are less then τ, it rejects P and outputs OutV = 0.
Otherwise, it continues with the next step.
• V checks challenges and responses arrived on time for each correct round i. A chal-
lenge and a response is on time if ti0 ≤ ti1 ≤ ti2, ti1− ti0 ≤ B and ti2− ti1 ≤ B, respectively.
If the number of on time and correct rounds is at least τ, then V accepts P and
outputs OutV = 1. Otherwise, it rejects.
We note that the on time condition of DBoptSync and DBoptSyncRand implies ti2− ti0 ≤
2B, which is the only timing veriﬁcation in DBopt [BV14]. Therefore, the DBoptSync’s
timing condition is more restrictive.
In Section 3.5, we consider Δ = 100B for DBoptRand and DBoptSyncRand. For in-
stance, Δ= 1μs (microseconds) and B= 10ns (this corresponds to 3 m according to speed
of light). n rounds take n μs which is reasonable.
The responses are computed depending on the concrete instance of b and φci . There
are three protocols deﬁned in [BV14] whose instances are given in Table 3.2. Hence,
DBoptSync, DBoptRand and DBoptSyncRand have the same instances as well.
Protocol q map b φci
DB1 q > 2 map(u) = 0 no b used φci(a,x′i,bi) = ai+ cix′i
DB2 q= 2 map(u) = u Hamming weight n2 φci(a,x
′
i,bi) = ai+ cix
′
i+ cibi
DB3 q≥ 2 no map used Hamming weight n φci(a,x′i,bi) = ai+ cibi
Table 3.2 – Classiﬁcation of the protocols according the selection of b and φ in DBoptSync
DBoptRand and DBoptSyncRand [BV14]
Theorem 3.11 (MiM Security). Assuming that V and P are synchronized, the DBopt-
Sync protocol with the selection of b and φ as in Table 3.2 is MiM-secure with the success
probabilities
• (DB1 and DB2) Tail(n,τ, 1q2 )+ r
2
2 2
−nonce +(r+1)Adv(C-PRF)+ r2−tag when f is a
circular PRF (Deﬁnition 2.16),
• (DB3) Tail(n,τ, 1q2 ) + r
2
2 2
−nonce +Adv(PRF) + 2−tag when f is a PRF (Deﬁnition
2.15).
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Here, r is the number of honest instances.
If Adv(C-PRF), Adv(PRF), 2−nonce and 2−tag are negligible, DB1, DB2 and DB3 are
optimal for the security according to Theorem 3.6.
Proof. The proof is the same with [BV14] until Γ3.
Γ0 : We consider a distinguished experiment exp(V ) with no close-by prover and V
accepts with probability p0. We consider a game Γ0 where we simulate exp(V ). The
success probability of this game is p0. We reduce Γ1,Γ2 and Γ3 as in [BV14].
Γ1 : We reduce Γ0 to Γ1 whose success additionally requires that for every (NP,NV ,Lμ)
triplet, there is no more than one instance P(s) and one instance V (s) using this triplet.
As P(s) is honest and P(s) and V (s) are selecting NP and NV at random, respectively, the
success probability of Γ1 is at least p0− r22 2−nonce .
The following games are for DB1 and DB2.
Γ2 : We reduce Γ1 to Γ2 where V never accepts forged tag. fx satisﬁes the circular
PRF assumptions (See Deﬁnition 2.16) as shown in [BV14]. It means that the tag can
be forged with probability Adv(C-PRF)+2−tag . Therefore, the success probability of G2
is at least p0− r22 2−nonce − rε− r2−tag (See [BV14] for the full proof of this step).
Γ3 : In Γ3, we replace the oracle fs(.) by Os˜,F and obtain a simpliﬁed game Γ3. Γ3’s
requirements for the success is the same with Γ2. So, we have p3 ≥ p0− r22 2−nonce − (r+
1)Adv(C-PRF)− r2−tag .
We now detail the analysis of Γ3 which diﬀers from [BV14]. In Γ3, P and V never
repeat the nonces and use a random function F to select a. So, the distinguished V has
a single matching P and these two instances pick a at random. Furthermore, acceptance
implies that both instances have seen the same Lμ,T,b,c. The acceptance message of V
(OutV ) also depends on the correct and on time responses and challenges. In the case
that V accepts P, P has to receive the challenge c on time and V has to receive the
corresponding response r on time for at least τ rounds. Let’s denote ti0 the time when V
sends ci, ti1 the time when P receives c
′
i and t
i
2 the time when V receives ri. Thanks to
Lemma 3.4, in order to have on time responses and challenges, the challenge that P(s)
receives should be independent from the challenge that is sent by V (s). As the challenge
c is randomly selected by V (s), the message that P(s) received matches with probability
1
q .
Similarly, if we exchange the roles of P and V in Lemma 3.4 and replace t0 with ti1 and ti1
with ti2, we can conclude that r that V (s) receives is independent from the response r′i that
is sent by P(s) as well. The response functions on DB1, DB2 in each round i depends on
challenge, ai and s′i. In Γ3, ai is random in GF(q)n. As φc′i(ai,s
′
i,bi) = ai+g(c
′
i,s
′
i,bi) where
g is a function (See Table 3.2 for the details of g) we can assume that ai is randomly
selected in GF(q) just when r′i is computed. Equivalently, ri is uniformly selected in
GF(q) just before being sent. So, ri = r′i with probability
1
q .
As a result, we have p0 ≤Tail(n,τ, 1q2 )+ r
2
2 2
−nonce +(r+1)Adv(C-PRF)+r2−tag for DB1
and DB2 .
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For DB3’s analysis, we use a random oracle for PRF in Γ2 and obtain p0 ≤ r22 2−nonce +
Adv(PRF). Similarly, we deﬁne a game Γ3 where the tag is never forged and we obtain
p0 ≤ r22 2−nonce +Adv(PRF)+2−tag with a reduction from Γ2 to Γ3. Then, we can make
the same analysis as Γ3 above and obtain p3 ≤ Tail(n,τ, 1q2 ) because of Lemma 3.3. In
the end, we have p0 ≤ Tail(n,τ, 1q2 )+ r
2
2 2
−nonce +Adv(PRF)+2−tag for DB3.
Theorem 3.12 (MiM security). Assuming that V and P are synchronized, the sending
time of the challenge is randomized and the time interval [T,T +Δ] to send the challenge
is public. Then the DBoptSyncRand protocol is MiM-secure with the success probabilities
• (b and φ as in DB1 and DB2 [BV14]) Tail(n,τ, 1q2 .BΔ) + r
2
2 2
−nonce + (r +
1)Adv(C-PRF)+ r2−tag when f is a circular PRF [BV14],
• (b and φ as in DB3 [BV14]) Tail(n,τ, 1q2 .BΔ)+ r
2
2 2
−nonce +Adv(PRF)+2−tag when f
is a PRF.
Here, r is the number of honest instances of the prover and K is a complexity bound on
the experiment and φ is response function. β is negligible for τn ≥ 1q2 + cte and r and K
polynomially bounded and ε is negligible.
If Adv(PRF), Adv(C-PRF), 2−nonce and 2−tag are negligible, DB1, DB2 and DB3 are
optimal for the security according to Theorem 3.10.
Proof. The proof is the same as Theorem 3.11 until game Γ3. The success of Γ3 depends
on the correct and on time responses and challenges. Lemma 3.4 shows that the challenge
and the response have to be independent in each round so that they arrive on time. These
independent responses and challenges can be correct with probability 1q2 (See the proof
of Theorem 3.11). Additionally, they can be on time with probability BΔ as showed in
Theorem 3.10. Therefore, the probability of one successful round is 1q2 .
B
Δ .
Consequently, success probability Γ0 is at least Tail(n,τ, 1q2 .
B
Δ) +
r2
2 2
−nonce + (r +
1)Adv(C-PRF) + r2−tag for DB1 and DB2. For DB3, it is at least Tail(n,τ, 1q2 .
B
Δ) +
r2
2 2
−nonce +Adv(PRF)+2−tag .
Theorem 3.13 (DF security). The DBoptSyncRand and DBoptRand protocols are DF
secure with the success probabilities
• (DB1 and DB3) Tail(n,τ, 1q .2BΔ ),
• (DB2)
n
∑
i+ j≥τ
i, j≤n/2
(n/2
i
)
(2BΔ )
i(1− 2BΔ )
n
2−i
(n/2
j
)
(BΔ)
j(1− BΔ)
n
2− j
DB1 and and DB3 are optimal for the DF-resistance according to Theorem 3.9, while
DB2 cannot reach the optimal bounds for DF.
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Proof. We consider distinguished experiment exp(V ) with no close-by participant. Due
to the Fundamental Lemma (Lemma 2.7), the response ri is independent from ci. For
DB1 and DB2, ri is correct with probability 1q . As ri has to be arrived on time, the
proper time has to be chosen. As stated in Theorem 3.9 the sending time is chosen
correctly with probability 2BΔ . So, the probability of success in one round i is
1
q .
2B
Δ .
In DB2, half of the rounds where x′ = bi are correct because of the hamming weight of
b. Therefore, the only necessity in these rounds is sending the response in a correct time
which can be chosen well with probability 2BΔ . For the remaining rounds (
n
2 rounds),
at least τ− n2 rounds should pass correctly. The correct response is chosen with the
probability 12 and correct time with the probability
2B
Δ .
3.5 Performance
Three adaptations DBoptSync DBoptSyncRand and DBoptRand of DBopt have diﬀer-
ent success probabilities for DF and MiM security. DBoptSync and DBoptSyncRand
have better bound against maﬁa fraud compared to DBopt while DBoptRand has the
same security bound against MiM adversary with DBopt. In addition, DBoptRand
and DBoptSyncRand have the same and better success probability for distance fraud
compared to DBopt but DBoptSync is the same with DBopt.
Assuming a noise level of pnoise = 0.05 and BΔ = 0.01, we get results in Table 3.3 and 3.4.
We ﬁnd τ in terms of rounds n such that Tail(n,τ,1− pnoise) ≈ 99% for τ-completeness.
Table 3.3 shows the required number of rounds for the DF security. Table 3.4 shows the
number of rounds required for the MiM security. We used Theorem 3.11, 3.12, 3.13 and
theorems in [BV14] to compute the required number of rounds to achieve security level.
= 2−10 = 2−20
DB1 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB1 DB1 DB2 DB3
(q= 3) (q= 4) (q= 3) (q= 4)
DBoptSync 14 12 69 24 24 20 123 43
DBoptSyncRand 3 3 2 3 6 6 2 6
DBoptRand 3 3 2 3 6 6 2 6
DBopt 14 12 69 24 24 20 123 43
Table 3.3 – Number of required rounds to be secure against a distance fraud where  is
the security level in DB protocols. The bold protocols improve DBopt
As we can see in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, we can use DB2 with 5 rounds (instead of
123) in DBoptSyncRand and reach a pretty good security. If synchronized clocks are
not realistic, we can see that we have a much better DF-security with DBoptRand with
the same number of rounds.
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= 2−10 = 2−20
DB1 DB1 DB2-DB3 DB1 DB1 DB2-DB3
(q= 3) (q= 4) (q= 3) (q= 4)
DBoptSync 7 6 12 12 8 20
DBoptSyncRand 3 1 3 5 5 5
DBoptRand 14 12 24 24 20 43
DBopt 14 12 24 24 20 43
Table 3.4 – Number of required rounds to be secure against a MiM adversary where  is
the security level in DB protocols. The bold protocols improve DBopt
3.6 Conclusion
We deﬁne new structures for DB protocols. The ﬁrst structure is the “Sync Structure”
where the prover measures the time as well as the veriﬁer. We modify the DBopt [BV14]
according to sync structure and we get DBoptSync which has better security against MiM
adversary. Then, we add a new modiﬁcation which is randomizing the sending challenge
time to both “Common Structure” and “Sync Structure” and obtain the second and
third structures “Rand Structure” and “SyncRand Structure”, respectively. Similarly, we
modify the DBopt and DBoptSync protocols based on these structures and get better
security bounds against distance fraud for the DBoptSyncRand and DBoptRand pro-
tocols and MiM adversary for DBoptSyncRand protocol. We give the optimal security
bounds against distance fraud and MiM adversary for all DB protocols that follows these
new structures.
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Chapter 4
Eﬃcient Public-key Distance Bounding
In some applications such as payment systems, using public-key distance bounding pro-
tocols is practical as no pre-shared secret is necessary between the payer and the payee.
In general, such applications use powerless devices with RFID and NFC technologies.
Therefore, they may suﬀer from energy constraints because of very limited computation
resources. On the other hand, the public-key cryptography requires much more com-
putations than symmetric-key cryptography. So, the ineﬃciency may cause problems
on these powerless devices when they need to do the public-key cryptography related
computations.
In this chapter, we focus on the eﬃciency problem in public-key distance bounding
protocols and the formal security proofs of them. We construct two protocols Eﬀ-
pkDB and Eﬀ-pkDBp (the former without privacy, the latter with) which require fewer
computations on the prover side compared to the existing protocols, while keeping the
highest security level.
The content of this chapter was published in ASIACRYPT16 [KV16].
Related Works:
Table 4.1 shows the security and the eﬃciency properties of existing public-key pro-
tocols and our protocols (See Appendix A for the details and analysis of the pro-
cols in Table 4.1). We can see that most of the previous public-key DB protocols
[BC93, BB05, GOR14a, Vau15d, Vau15c, Vau15a, ABG+17] do not concentrate on this
eﬃciency problem, except HPO [HPO13]. So far, HPO is the most eﬃcient one among
them as it requires only 4 elliptic curve (EC) multiplications on the prover side, but it is
not strong private [Vau15b] and it is not secure against DH (See Appendix A.2, Figure
A.3) and TF. In addition to this, its security is based on several ad-hoc assumptions
[HPO13] which are not so well studied: “OMDL”, “Conjecture 1”, “extended ODH” and
“XL”.
GOR [GOR14a] (Appendix A.3) is constructed to have strong privacy and anonymity
against veriﬁer, but it has been shown [Vau15b] that it is neither strong private nor
37
Protocol MiM DF DH TF Privacy Strong Privacy
Brands-Chaum [BC93]   × × × ×
HPO [HPO13]   × ×  ×
GOR [GOR14a]   × × × ×
PaySafe [CGDR+15] ∗ × × × × ×
PrivDB [Vau15c]    ×  
ProProx [Vau15d]     × ×
eProProx [Vau15a]      
TREAD [ABG+17]    ×  
Simp-pkDB [KV16]   × × × ×
Eﬀ-pkDB [KV16]    × × ×
Eﬀ-pkDBp [KV16]    ×  
Table 4.1 – The review of the existing public-key DB protocols.  means that it is
secure for corresponding threat model and × means it is not. ∗ means that it is secure
against the adversaries that cannot relay the messages close to the speed of light.
private.
ProProx [Vau15d] (Appendix A.4) provides MiM, DF and DH security and extractor
based TF-security [BV14] but it is not private. Its version eProProx [Vau15a] is a exten-
sion with strong privacy. However, both ProProx and eProProx suﬀer from heavy cryp-
tographic operations such as zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs in order to achieve extractor
based TF-security [BV14]. These are the only extractor based TF-secure protocols, but
we can see that their cost is unreasonable.
PrivDB [Vau15c] (Appendix A.5) and our new protocol Eﬀ-pkDBp have the same
security properties. However, PrivDB is a bit less eﬃcient on the prover side than
Eﬀ-pkDBp and it has no light privacy-less variant, contrarily to Eﬀ-pkDBp.
TREAD [ABG+17] (Appendix A.6) is a very eﬃcient public-key DB compared to
its security level. It is MiM, DF and DH secure and strong private. It is claimed
that TREAD is simulator based TF-secure [DFKO11] (SimTF) but we realize that the
proof of SimTF security is not correct (See Appendix A.6). Thus, we do not consider
the SimTF security of TREAD in our comparisons. We remark that the TF-security
(extractor based) of and ProProx and eProProx [Vau15a] is stronger than claimed SimTF
security of TREAD. The extractor based TF-security is stronger because it guarantees
that the malicious prover cannot get help from an adversary to pass the protocol without
leaking its secret key. TREAD is very similar to PrivDB [Vau15c]. Diﬀerently, it has a
small trick in order to achieve the claimed SimTF-security. In this trick, the information
given to the adversary to pass the protocol lets the adversary replay. The same trick
can be applied to Eﬀ-pkDB and Eﬀ-pkDBp with preserving the eﬃciency.
PaySafe [CGDR+15] is a very eﬃcient protocol designed for contactless payment, but
we do not compare it with the other protocols because it assumes a weaker adversarial
model. It is only secure against MiM. It is not secure against DF, DH and TF because
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the response of the prover in the challenge phase does not depend on any message of the
veriﬁer. It also does not protect the privacy of the prover.
Adding privacy in public-key DB protocols is yet another challenge. Strong privacy
cannot be achieved so easily as shown in Section 4.4.2. HPO and GOR failed in this.
4.1 Our Contribution
Our contributions are as follows:
• We design two public-key DB protocols Eﬀ-pkDB and Eﬀ-pkDBp. The ﬁrst pro-
tocol is secure against DF, MF and DH but it is not private. It uses only
one public key related operation on the prover side. Basically, this protocol
can be used in applications not requiring privacy in a very eﬃcient way. Then, we
modify this protocol by adding a public-key encryption to make it strong private.
Both protocols are quite eﬃcient compared with the previous protocols.
Our constructions are generic based on a key agreement protocol, a weakly-secure
symmetric DB protocols, and a cryptosystem. We formally prove the security fol-
lowing the BMV model [BMV13a, BMV15, BMV13b] (See Section 2.2.1) which
was adapted to public-key DB in Vaudenay [Vau15c].
• We deﬁne a new key agreement (KA) security game (D-AKA). In literature, the
extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model [LLM07] is widely accepted for
KA. However, a weaker security model (D-AKA) is suﬃcient for the security
of our new public-key DB protocols as we care both the eﬃciency and the security.
Finally, we design a D-AKA secure key agreement protocol (Nonce-DH) based
on the hardness of the GDH problem and a random oracle. The Nonce-DH key
agreement protocol can be used in our DB constructions.
• We construct another reasonable protocol Simp-pkDB which was our ﬁrst attempt
to construct an eﬃcient and a secure protocol. Although this protocol is quite
eﬃcient and does not require any public-key of a veriﬁer, it fails in DH-
security.
• We compare the eﬃciency and security level of our protocols and we see that our
lighter protocol Eﬀ-pkDB and our ﬁrst attempt Simp-pkDB are the most eﬃcient
public-key DB protocols. We give a detailed analysis and comparison between
existing public-key DB protocols in Section 4.5.
Structure of the Chapter: In Section 4.2 and in Section 4.3, we introduce our new
key-agreement security model and more results about one time security of DB [Vau15c]
that we give in Section 2.2.1. The security model and the results are the basis of our
constructions Eﬀ-pkDB and Eﬀ-pkDBp. Then, in Section 4.4, we give our constructions
Eﬀ-pkDB and Eﬀ-pkDBp together with a variant and Simp-pkDB. We conclude this
chapter with Section 4.5.
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4.2 Authenticated Key Agreement (AKA) Protocols
4.2.1 One-Pass AKA Model
In this section, we show our new KA security model and some preliminaries about the
AKA protocols. The security models in this section are used to construct secure and
private public-key DB protocols Eﬀ-pkDB and Eﬀ-pkDBp in Section 4.4.
We note that Eﬀ-pkDB and Eﬀ-pkDBp in Section 4.4 can employ any eCK-secure
[LLM07] key agreement protocol to have the same security properties. However, eCK-
security is stronger than what we need in our protocols. Therefore, we deﬁne a weaker
notion to have simpler, more eﬃcient and secure public-key DB.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Authenticated Key Agreement (AKA) in One-Pass). A one-pass AKA
protocol (See Figure 4.1) is a tuple (GenA, GenB,D,A,B) of PPT algorithms. Let A and
B be the two parties. A and B generate secret/public key pairs (skA,pkA) and (skB,pkB)
with the algorithms GenA(1) and GenB(1), respectively where  is the security parameter.
B picks N from the sampling algorithm D and runs B(skB,pkB,pkA,N) which outputs
the session key s. Then, it sends N and ﬁnally, A gets the session key s by running
A(skA,pkA,pkB,N). We say that AKA is correct, if A and B obtain the same s at the end
of the protocol for all N and random coins.
A(skA,pkA,pkB) B(skB,pkB,pkA)
N ← D(1)
A(skA,pkA,pkB,N)→ s N←−−−−−−−−− B(skB,pkB,pkA,N)→ s
Figure 4.1 – The structure of an authenticated key-agreement (AKA) protocols in one
pass.
We now give the security deﬁnition of one-pass AKA protocol.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Decisional Authenticated Key-Agreement (D-AKA) Security). We
deﬁne set up of two oracles with skA,pkA,skB,pkB.
OA(., .) :
return A(skA,pkA, ., .)
OB(.) :
N′ ← D(1)
s′ ← B(skB,pkB, .,N′)
return s′,N′
Given b ∈ {0,1} and the oracles OA(., .),OB(.), the game KAOA(.,.),OB(.)b,A () is as follows:
1. Challenger executes GenA(1) → (skA,pkA),GenB(1) → (skB,pkB), sets up the or-
acles, calls OB(pkA)→ (s0,N) and randomly picks s1. Then, it sends sb,N,pkA,pkB
to the adversary A.
2. A has access to the oracle OB(.) and OA(., .) under the condition of not querying
the input (pkB,N) to the oracle OA. Eventually, A outputs b′.
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We deﬁne the advantage of this game as:
Adv(KA
OA(.,.),OB(.)
b,A ()) = |Pr[KAOA(.,.),OB(.)0,A () = 1]−Pr[KAOA(.,.),OB(.)1,A () = 1]|.
A one-pass AKA protocol with (GenA(1),GenB(1),D,A,B) is D-AKA secure if for all
PPT algorithms A, Adv(KAOA(.,.),OB(.)b,A ()) is negligible.
We show that eCK-security implies D-AKA security in Theorem B.1 in Appendix B.
It means that Eﬀ-pkDB and Eﬀ-pkDBp can employ eCK-secure key agreement protocols
as well.
We show in the following lemma that the probability that the same N is picked by the
oracle B is negligible when we have a D-AKA security.
Lemma 4.3. Assume that we have a key agreement protocol with (GenA,GenB,D,A,B).
We deﬁne the random variables (skA,pkA), (skB,pkB) generated with GenA(1) and
GenB(1) respectively, and (s,N) and (s′,N′) generated by OB(pkA). If the key agree-
ment protocol is D-AKA secure, then Pr[N = N ′] is negligible in . Furthermore, for all
values u which could depend on skA,pkA,skB,pkB, Pr[N = u] is negligible.
Proof. We deﬁne an adversary A playing the D-AKA game as follows:
A
receive sb,N,pkB,pkA
(s′,N′)← OB(pkA)
if N′ = N
if s′ = sb: output 0
else: output 1
else:
output b′ ← {0,1}
In this strategy, A wins if N = N ′ (except s1 = s0 and b= 1). Otherwise, he wins with
the probability 12 .
Pr[Awin] =
1
2
(1−Pr[N = N′])+Pr[N = N′]−Pr[N = N′,s1 = s0,b= 1]
=
1
2
+
1
2
Pr[N = N′]−Pr[N = N′,s1 = s0,b= 1]
We know from the D-AKA security that Pr[Awin]− 12 is negligible. Pr[s1 = s0] = 2− is
negligible as well. So, Pr[N = N′] is negligible. Now, we need to show that it holds for
all values u in the distribution D.
Let v be the most probable value for N. We have
Pr[N = N′] =∑
w
Pr[N = N ′ = w]
=∑
w
Pr[N = w]2
≥Pr[N = v]2
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So, we have the following inequality in the end:
Pr[N = u]≤ Pr[N = v]≤
√
Pr[N = N ′]
We know that Pr[N = N ′] is negligible so Pr[N = u] is negligible.
We also give a privacy deﬁnition for one-pass AKA. This deﬁnition is for the privacy
of the party which runs the algorithm B.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (D-AKAp Privacy). Given b ∈ {0,1} and the oracle OA(., .) (as deﬁned
in Deﬁnition 4.2), the game pKA
OA(.,.)
b,A () is follows:
1. Challenger runs GenA(1)→ (skA,pkA) and GenB(1)→ (skB1 ,pkB1), sets up the or-
acle and gives pkA,pkB1 and skB1 to A.
2. A generates (skB0 ,pkB0) with GenB(1
) and sends (skB0 ,pkB0) to the challenger.
3. Challenger runs D(1)→ N and then B(skBb ,pkBb ,pk
skBb
A ,N)→ s. Then, it sends s
to the adversary A.
4. A has access to the oracle OA without any constraint. Eventually, A outputs b′.
(Remark that A does not know N.)
5. The advantage of the game is
Adv(pKA
OA(.,.)
b,A ()) = Pr[pKA
OA(.,.)
0,A () = 1]−Pr[pKAOA(.,.)1,A () = 1].
An AKA protocol (GenA(1),GenB(1),D,A,B) is D-AKAp private if for all PPT al-
gorithms A, Adv(pKAOA(.,.)b,A ()) is negligible.
Basically, in D-AKAp privacy, we want to make sure that an adversary which may
corrupt a party who runs B cannot easily decide who generated a session key s.
4.2.2 A One-Pass AKA Protocol (Nonce-DH)
A(skA,pkA,pkB) B(skB,pkB,pkA)
pickN ∈ {0,1}n,
H(g,pkB,pkA,pk
skA
B ,N)→ s N←−−−−−−−−− H(g,pkB,pkA,pkskBA ,N)→ s
Figure 4.2 – The Nonce-DH key agreement protocol.
We construct a D-AKA secure protocol (Nonce-DH) based on the Diﬃe-Hellman (DH)
problem [DH76] as in Figure 4.2. Here, g is a generator of cyclic group G of prime order
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q. g and q depend on the security parameter . The parties know each others’ public
keys beforehand, where pkA = gskA and pkB = gskB and skA and skB are the corresponding
secret keys which are uniformly picked in Zq.
The party B has the input (skB,pkB,pkA). He randomly picks N from {0,1}n and
computes B(skB,pkB,pkA,N) = H(g,pkB,pkA,pk
skB
A ,N) to get s. The party A computes
A(skA,pkA,pkB,N) = H(g,pkB,pkA,pk
skA
B ,N) and gets s. Here, H is a deterministic func-
tion.
Clearly, Nonce-DH is correct as H is deterministic.
Theorem 4.5. Assuming that the GDH problem is hard in G (See Deﬁnition 2.17) and
n=Ω(), Nonce-DH is D-AKA secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. Γ0: The game is the D-AKA game. The challenger works as follows: He picks
q and g as described in Nonce-DH. He randomly picks skA,skB ∈ Zq, and computes
pkA = gskA , pkB = gskB . He picks randomly s1 ∈ {0,1} and then he gets (s0,N) from
OB(pkA) as deﬁned below. Then, he gives g,q,pkA,pkB,N,sb to the adversary A . A has
an access to the random oracle H, OA(., .) (with the restriction not asking for pkB,N)
and OB(.) deﬁned below.
OA(., .)
Input: pk′B,N′
if (pk′B,N′) equals (pkB,N)
return ⊥
else:
H(g,pk′B,pkA,pk
′skA
B ,N
′)→ s
return s
OB(.)
Input: pk′A
pick N′ ∈ {0,1}n
H(g,pkB,pk
′
A,pk
′skB
A ,N
′)→ s
return (s,N ′)
H(.)
Input: U
if (U, .) ∈ T
return V where (U,V ) ∈ T
else:
pick V ∈ {0,1}
store (U,V ) to T
return V
We let ⊥ be a special symbol which is unavailable to A . The success probability of A
in Γ0 is p0.
Γ1 : We reduce Γ0 to Γ1 where the oracle OB never selects again the nonce N (which
is obtained by the ﬁrst call to OB). As a nonce in Γ0 is equal to N with the probability
1
2n
, |p1 − p0| ≤ qB2n where qB is the number of queries to OB. Due to n = Ω(), p1 − p0 is
negligible.
Γ2 : We reduce Γ1 to Γ2 where we replace H with H ′. H ′ is deﬁned with an access to
a DDH oracle (as Deﬁnition 2.17) as follows:
H ′(.)
Input: U = (w,x,y,z,N ′)
if w= g and DDH(g,x,y,z)→ 1:
z←⊥
return H(w,x,y,z,N ′)
As there is one-to-one mapping in the transformation of (g,x,y,z,N′) and ⊥ cannot be
used by A in queries to H ′, the success probability of Γ2 remains the same which means
p2 = p1.
Γ3 : We deﬁne another game Γ3 where the only diﬀerence from Γ2 is that we replace
the oracle OB with the oracle O ′B.
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O ′B(.)
Input: pk′A
pick N′ ∈ {0,1}
H(g,pkB,pk
′
A,⊥,N′)→ s
send (s,N ′)
Note that O ′B queries H instead of H ′ and N′ = N due to the reduction to Γ1. Γ3 is
exactly same with Γ2 so the success probabilities p3 and p2 are the same.
Now in Γ3, skB is used only by the DDH oracle.
Γ4 : We reduce Γ3 to Γ4 where A does not make the query (g,pkB,pkA,z,N) with
z= pkskBA to H
′. Indeed, any such query can be ﬁltered using the DDH oracle and stopped
to solve the GDH problem. As the GDH problem is hard, A in Γ3 selects z= pkskBA given
(pkA,pkB) with negligible probability. Therefore, p4− p3 is negligible.
In Γ4, (g,pkB,pkA,⊥,N) is queried only once to H and this query is only done by the
challenger.
Γ5 : We reduce Γ4 to Γ5 where the challenger picks a random s0 instead of getting s0
from H.
Γ4 and Γ5 are the same because if (g,pkB,pkA,⊥,N) is never being queried again, it is
not necessary that H stores ((g,pkB,pkA,⊥,N),s0) in T . So, p4 = p5.
In Γ5, s0 and s1 play a symmetric role and could be erased with b from the game after
sb is released. So, the state of the game after erasure of b,s0 and s1 are independent from
b. Hence, p5 = 12 leading to p0− 12 is negligible.
Theorem 4.6. Assuming that n = Ω(), Nonce-DH is D-AKAp private in the random
oracle model.
Proof. Γ0 : The game Γ0 is D-AKAp game. The challenger works as follows: He picks
q and g as described in Nonce-DH. He selects skA,skB1 ∈ Zq, and computes pkA = gskA
and pkB1 = g
skB1 . Then, he sends pkA,pkB1 and skB1 to A . A selects skB0 and pkB0 and
sends them to the challenger. Next, the challenger picks b ∈ {0,1}, N ∈ {0,1}n, queries
(g,pkBb ,pkA,pk
skBb
A ,N) to H and receives s. He sends s to A . A has an access to the oracle
H and to the oracle OA(., .) as deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 4.5.
Γ1 : We reduce Γ0 to Γ1 where A never selects the nonce N in the query of the oracle
H or OA. The probability that he selects N again is 12n so p2− p1 is negligible.
Γ2 : We reduce Γ1 to Γ2 where OB picks s at random instead of a response from H. As
(g,pkBb ,pkA,pk
skBb
A ,N) is queried only one time by the challenger, we have p1 = p2. Now,
b is never used in Γ2. It means that s is independent from b, so p2 = 12 . Therefore, p0− 12
is negligible.
Table B.1 in Appendix B shows that Nonce-DH which is secure in our weaker model
is more eﬃcient than the previous KA protocols.
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4.3 More Security Results on OTDB
In this section, we deﬁne new security notions related to one-time secure DB. We deﬁne
them to be able to have the result in Theorem 4.8 which helps us to prove the security
of our constructions.
Deﬁnition 4.7 (Multi-veriﬁer OT-MiM:). The OT-MiM game with more than one veri-
ﬁer instance is called as multi-veriﬁer OT-MiM-security.
Remark that in OT-MiM deﬁnition (Section 2.2.1), we have only one veriﬁer instance.
Now, we complement the known security results of OTDB.
Theorem 4.8. OTDB [Vau15c] (See Section 2.2) is multi-veriﬁer OT-MiM secure.
Proof. Γ0: In this game, an adversary A plays multi-veriﬁer OT-MiM game. Here, we
have a distinguished veriﬁer instance V with other instances {V1, ...,Vk} and one prover
instance P. The success probability of Γ0 is p0.
Γ1 : We reduce Γ0 to Γ1 where at most one veriﬁer instance outputs 1. Let’s say E is
an event in Γ0 where at least two veriﬁer instances output 1 (OutV = 1). To reduce Γ0
to Γ1, we show that Pr[E] is negligible.
First, we deﬁne hybrid games Γi, j’s to analyze Pr[E]. Γi, j is similar to Γ0 except the
game stops right after Vi and Vj have sent their ﬁnal outputs and all OutV is replaced by
0 except Vi and Vj. The adversary wins the game if OutVi = OutVj = 1.
In Γi, j, we deﬁne three arrays for the challenges. The ﬁrst array CVi includes the
challenges sent by Vi, the second array CVj includes the challenges sent by Vj and the
third array CP includes the challenges seen by P. The bits in CVi and CVj are independent.
We also deﬁne a response function respk(c) = a2k+c−1 for each round k. As the bits of
the secret s are independent, the bits of {respk(0)||respk(1)}nk=1 are independent as well.
If CVi [k] =CVj [k], then the adversary could have taken CP[k] = c where c is equal either
CVi [k] or CVj [k] and learn respk(c). So, he responds correctly to either Vi or Vj for sure, but
to the other instance with probability 12 . We deﬁne an event Ei j,k where the responses
are correct for Vi and Vj in round k. Clearly, all events {Ei j,k}nk=1 are independent. So,
Γi, j =∏k Pr[Ei j,k]. Hence,
Pr[Ei j,k]≤ Pr[CVi [k] =CVj [k]]+Pr[Ei j,k|CVi [k] =CVj [k]]×Pr[CVi [k] =CVj [k]]≤
3
4
So, the adversary wins Γi, j with the probability (34)
n which is negligible.
Now, we can analyze E.
Pr[E]≤∑
i, j
Pr[Γi, j] = negl(n)
As E happens with the negligible probability, we can reduce Γ0 to Γ1 and conclude
p1− p0 is negligible. For Γ1 to succeed, only V must produce OutV = 1.
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Γ2 : We reduce Γ1 to Γ2 where we simulate all veriﬁer instances except V . We can do
this simulation because the messages but OutV sent by a veriﬁer does not depend on the
secret. As OutV = 0 for all veriﬁer instance except V in the winning case (only V can
output 1), p1 ≤ p2.
Now in Γ2, we are in OT-MiM game where there is only one veriﬁer instance V and
one prover instance P. By using the OT-MiM-security result of OTDB [Vau15c], we
deduce p2 is negligible so p0 is negligible.
Deﬁnition 4.9 (Multi-veriﬁer Impersonation Fraud (IF)). The game begins by running
the key setup algorithm K of a symmetric DB protocol DB = (K ,P,V,B) which outputs
s. It consists of veriﬁer instances running V (s) and an adversary. The adversary wins
if any veriﬁer instance outputs OutV = 1. A distance bounding protocol is multi-veriﬁer
IF-secure, if for any such game, the probability of an adversary to win is negligible.
Note that MiM-security implies multi-veriﬁer IF-security. In Theorem 4.10, we prove
that OT-MiM-security also implies multi-veriﬁer IF-security for a DB protocol following
the canonical structure (Deﬁnition 2.4). This result will be used to prove DH-security
of our constructions.
Theorem 4.10. If a (symmetric) DB protocol following the canonical structure is OT-
MiM secure, then it is multi-veriﬁer IF-secure.
Proof. We take an adversary M playing the multi-veriﬁer IF game. M interacts with
polynomially many veriﬁer instances Vj’s. We deﬁne adversaries Ai’s playing the OT-
MiM game. Ai simulatesM and takes the veriﬁer instance Vi as V in the OT-MiM game.
Concretely, we number the Vj’s by their order of appearance during the simulation ofM .
When M queries V1, ...,Vi−1,Vi+1, ...,Vk (where k is the total number of veriﬁer instances),
Ai just simulates them (this is possible as the protocol follows the canonical structure.
So, no message from the veriﬁer except OutV depends on s). If OutV needs to be returned
to M , Ai returns 0. When M queries Vi, Ai relays it to V and sends the response of V
to M .
Let Ei be the event in the multi-veriﬁer IF game which is OutVi = 1 and all previously
released OutV are equal to 0. Clearly, we have Pr[M wins] = ∑i≥1 Pr[M wins∧Ei]. On the
other hand, Pr[M wins∧Ei]≤ Pr[Aiwins] because for all coins making M win the multi-
veriﬁer IF-game and Ei occur at the same time, we have OutVj = 0 for all j< i and OutVi =
1 so the same coins make Ai win the OT-MiM game. So, Pr[M wins] ≤ ∑i≥1 Pr[Aiwins].
Due to OT-MiM security, Pr[Aiwins] is negligible for every i. So, Pr[M wins] is negligible.
So, we have multi-veriﬁer IF-security.
Thanks to Theorem 4.10, OTDB [Vau15c] in Figure 2.1 is multi-veriﬁer IF-secure.
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4.4 Our Constructions
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce our new protocol Eﬀ-pkDB which is secure against
DF, MF and DH and then Eﬀ-pkDBp which is a variant of it preserving the strong
privacy as well. We also present two new protocols related to Eﬀ-pkDB which have some
advantages and disadvantages against Eﬀ-pkDB and Eﬀ-pkDBp. Finally, we introduce
another eﬃcient public-key DB protocol Simp-pkDB which does not require any key
setup for the veriﬁer.
4.4.1 Eﬀ-pkDB
V (skV ,pkV ) P(skP,pkP,pkV )
N ← D(1)
A(skV ,pkV ,pkP,N)→ s
N,pkP←−−−−−−−−− B(skP,pkP,pkV ,N)→ s
symDB(s)←−−−−−−−−→
OutV−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 4.3 – Eﬀ-pkDB
Eﬀ-pkDB is constructed with a one-pass AKA and a symmetric DB protocol. P and
V ﬁrst agree on a secret key s using an AKA protocol (GenA,GenB,A,B,D). Then, they
together run a symmetric key DB protocol symDB by using s as a secret key.
Using OTDB in Figure 2.1 as symDB and using Nonce-DH in Section 4.2.2 as an AKA
protocol appear to be enough for its security as shown in the following theorems.
Theorem 4.11. If symDB is DF-secure, then Eﬀ-pkDB is DF-secure.
Proof sketch: The malicious and far away prover with its instances plays the DF
game. We can easily reduce it to a game where a distinguished veriﬁer V and the
malicious prover receive the same s′ from outside (even if maliciously selected). As
symDB is DF-secure, the prover passes the protocol with the negligible probability.
Theorem 4.12. If symDB is multi-veriﬁer OT-MiM-secure and the one-pass AKA
(GenA,GenB,A,B,D) is D-AKA secure, then Eﬀ-pkDB is MiM-secure.
Proof. Γ0 : The adversary plays the MiM game in Eﬀ-pkDB with the distinguished
veriﬁer V , instances of the veriﬁer and instances of the prover. V receives pkP and a
given N. We call “matching instance” the instance who sends this N.
Γ1 : We reduce Γ0 to Γ1 where no nonce produced by any prover instance is duplicated
or equal to any nonce received by any veriﬁer instance before. Thanks to Lemma 4.3
which says that repeating a nonce picked using D is negligible, p1− p0 is negligible. So,
the matching instance (if any) is unique and sets N before it is sent to V .
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Γ2 : We simulate the prover instances and V as below in this game. Basically, in Γ2,
the prover and the veriﬁer do not use the secret generated by the oracles OB and OA,
respectively.
P(.) (in Γ2)
run OB(pkV )→ (s0,N′)
send N′,pkP
pick s1
store (N′,s1,pkP) in T
run symDB(s1)
V(.) (in Γ2)
receive N′,pkP
if (N′, .,pkP) ∈ T
retrieve s from T where (N′,s,pkP) ∈ T
else:
OA(pkP,N′)→ s
run symDB(s)
With the reduction from Γ1 to Γ2, we show that the secret generated by A and B are
indistinguishable from the randomly picked secret. The reduction is showed below using
the D-AKA security of AKA:
We deﬁne the hybrid games Γ2,t to show p2 − p1 is negligible. Here, t ∈ {0,1,2, ...,k}
and k is the number of prover instances bounded by a polynomial.
Γ2,i : V is simulated as in Γ2. The jth instance of P is simulated as in Γ1 for all j ≤ i
and as in Γ2 for all j > i. Clearly, Γ2,0 = Γ2 and Γ2,k = Γ1.
First, we show that Γ2,i and Γ2,i+1 are indistinguishable. For this, we use an adversary
B that plays the D-AKA game. B receives pkA,pkB,sb,N from the D-AKA challenger and
simulates either Γ2,i or Γ2,i+1 against the adversary A which distinguishes Γ2,i and Γ2,i+1.
B lets pkV = pkA and pkP = pkB in his simulation. B simulates each prover instance Pj
( jth prover instance) as described below.
Pj(.)
if j < i+1
OB(pkV )→ (s′,N′) (Using the D-AKA game)
else if j > i+1
pick s′
store (N′,s′,pkP) to T
else: ( j = i+1)
s′ ← sb and N′ ← N (sb and N were received from the D-AKA-game as a challenge)
store (N′,s′,pkP) to T
send N′,pkP
run symDB(s′)
Note that if b = 0 in the D-AKA game which means sb is generated by the oracle OB
then B simulates the game Γ2,i+1. Otherwise, he simulates Γ2,i.
For the veriﬁer simulation, B ﬁrst checks, if (N′, .,pkP) is stored by himself as V in Γ2.
Otherwise, he sends (pkP,N′) to the oracle OA and receives s′. As (N,sb,pkP) is always
stored in T , (pkP,N) is not queried to OA oracle by B. At the end of the game, A sends
his decision. If A outputs i, then B outputs 1. If A outputs i+ 1, then B outputs 0.
Clearly, the advantage of B is p2,i− p2,i+1. Due to the D-AKA security, we obtain that
p2,i − p2,i+1 is negligible. From the hybrid theorem, we can conclude that p2,0 − p2,k is
negligible where p2,0 = p2 and p2,k = p1.
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Γ3 : We simulate the prover instances as below so that they do not run the oracle OB
to have N. The only change in this game is the generation of the nonce. As the prover in
Γ3 picks the nonce from the same distribution that OB picks, p3 = p2. This game shows
that the prover generates N′ (and also s1) independently from OB.
P(.) (in Γ3)
pick N ′ ∈ D(1n)
send N′,pkP
pick s1
store (N′,s1,pkP) to T
run symDB(s1)
Γ4 : We reduce Γ3 to the multi-veriﬁer OT-MiM-security game Γ4 where there is only
matching instance and the other instances are simulated. With this ﬁnal reduction, we
show that the adversary has to break the multi-veriﬁer OT-MiM-security of symDB in
order to break the MiM-security of Eﬀ-pkDB.
The reduction is the following: A3 plays Γ3. We construct an adversary A4i in Γ4. A4i
receives N from the matching prover in Γ4. A4i takes Pi as a matching prover in Γ3 where
i ∈ {1, ...,k}. A4i simulates all of the provers except Pi against A3. For Pi, A4i just sends
(pkP,N). In the end, if Pi is the matching instance in Γ3 and A3 wins then A4i wins.
Therefore p3 ≤ ∑i p4,i where p4,i is the probability that A4i wins. Due to multi-veriﬁer
OT-MiM-security, all p4,i’s are negligible. So, p3 is negligible. Hence, p0 is negligible.
Theorem 4.13. If symDB is OT-MiM-secure, OT-DH-secure and follows the canonical
structure, and if the one-pass AKA (GenA,GenB,A,B,D) is D-AKA secure, then Eﬀ-pkDB
is DH-secure.
Proof. Γi is a game and pi denotes the probability that Γi succeeds.
Γ0 : The adversary P with its instances plays the DH-security game in Eﬀ-pkDB with
the distinguished veriﬁer V , other instances of the veriﬁer and an honest prover P′. The
probability that the adversary succeeds in Γ0 is p0.
Γ1 and Γ2 : These games are like in the proof of Theorem 4.12 except that Pj is replaced
by P′j. The reduction from Γ0 to Γ1 and Γ1 to Γ2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.12.
So we can conclude that p2− p0 is negligible.
We let N be the nonce produced by the instance of P′ and s1 be its key which is playing
a role during the challenge phase of V in the DH game.
Γ3 : We reduce Γ2 to a game Γ3 in which all OutV from a veriﬁer instance who receives
pkP and N is replaced by 0 during the initialization phase. Intuitively, in this case,
OutV cannot be equal 1 because if it is 1, it means P′ impersonates P. The reduction is
as follows: During the initialization game, P′ sends messages which do not depend on
s1 because of the canonical structure, and which can be simulated. So, we can reduce
this phase to the multi-veriﬁer IF game and use Theorem 4.10 to show that p3 − p2 is
negligible. This reduction shows that the DH-adversary P cannot win the game with
sending pkP and N generated by P′.
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Γ4 : We reduce Γ3 to Γ4 where the game stops after the challenge phase for V . As
the veriﬁcation phase which is after the challenge phase is non-interactive and OutV is
determined at the end of the challenge phase, p4 = p3.
Γ5 : We reduce Γ4 to Γ5 which is OT-DH game. In Γ4, s1 has never been used so s (the
key of V which is given by the adversary) is independent from s1. In this case, P′ and
V run symDB with independent secrets. So, p5 = p4. Because of the OT-DH security of
symDB, p5 is negligible.
4.4.2 Eﬀ-pkDBp
Eﬀ-pkDB is not strong private as the public key of the prover is sent in clear. Adding
one encryption operation to Eﬀ-pkDB is enough to have strong privacy.
Eﬀ-pkDBp in Figure 4.4 is the following: The prover and the veriﬁer generate their
secret/public key pairs by running the algorithms GenP(1) and GenV (1), respectively.
We denote (skP,pkP) for the secret/public key pair of the prover and (skV ,pkV ) for the
secret/public key pair of the veriﬁer where skV = (skV1 ,skV2) and pkV = (pkV1 ,pkV2). The
ﬁrst key of the veriﬁer is used for the encryption and the second key is used for the
AKA protocol. The prover picks N from the sampling algorithm D and generates s with
the algorithm B(skP,pkP,pkV2 ,N). Then, he encrypts pkP and N with pkV1 . After, he
sends the ciphertext e to the veriﬁer. The veriﬁer decrypts e with skV1 and learns N
and pkP which helps him to understand who is interacting with him. Next, the veriﬁer
runs A(skV2 ,pkV2 ,pkP,N) and gets s. Finally, the prover and veriﬁer run a symmetric DB
protocol symDB protocol with s.
V (skV ,pkV ) P(skP,pkP,pkV )
N ← D(1)
B(skP,pkP,pkV2 ,N)→ s
pkP,N = DecskV1 (e)
e←−−−−−−−−− e= EncpkV1 (pkP,N)
A(skV2 ,pkV2 ,pkP,N)→ s
symDB(s)←−−−−−−−−→
OutV−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 4.4 – Eﬀ-pkDBp: private variant of Eﬀ-pkDB
We can easily show that Eﬀ-pkDBp is DF, MiM, DH-secure from Theorem 4.11, 4.12,
4.13 with the same assumptions, respectively. To prove this, we start from an adversary
playing the DF, MiM or DH-security game against Eﬀ-pkDBp. We construct an ad-
versary playing the same game against Eﬀ-pkDB to whom we give skV1 . The simulation
is straightforward. Now, we show the strong privacy of Eﬀ-pkDBp.
Theorem 4.14. Assuming the one-pass AKA (GenA,GenB,A,B,D) is D-AKAp secure
and the cryptosystem is IND-CCA secure, then Eﬀ-pkDBp is strong private in the HPVP
model (Deﬁnition 2.14).
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Proof. Γ0 : The adversary A plays the HPVP privacy game.
Γ1 : The veriﬁers skip the decryption when they receive a ciphertext produced by any
prover and continue with the values encrypted by the prover. Because of the correctness
of the encryption scheme p1 = p0.
Γ2 : This game is the same as Γ1 the except the provers encrypt a random string
instead of pkP,N. The veriﬁer retrieves e and s from the table T so that it does not
decrypt any ciphertext that comes from a prover as in Γ1. Thanks to the IND-CCA
security (Veriﬁers are simulated using a decryption oracle due to our Γ1 reduction. The
use of this oracle is valid in IND-CCA game), p2 − p1 is negligible. So, provers and the
veriﬁer works as follows:
P(.) (in Γ2)
pick N ∈ D(1)
B(skP,pkP,pkV2 ,N)→ s
pick r
e← EncpkV1 (r)
store (e,s) to T
send e
run symDB(s)
V(.) (in Γ2)
receive e
if (e, .) ∈ T
retrieve s from T
where (e,s) ∈ T
else:
(pk′,N)← DecskV1 (e)
A(skV2 ,pkV2 ,pk
′,N)→ s
run symDB(s)
This reduction shows that the adversary cannot retrieve pkP and N from the encryp-
tion.
Γ3 : It is the same as Γ2 except that we simulate the prover as below. In this game, s
is generated independently from skP and pkP.
P(.) (in Γ3)
GenB(1)→ (sk,pk)
pick N ∈ D(1)
run B(sk,pk,pkV2 ,N)→ s
pick r
e← EncpkV1 (r)
store (e,s) to T
send e
run symDB(s)
We deﬁned hybrid games Γ3,t to show p3− p2 is negligible. Here, t ∈ {0,1,2, ...,k} and
k is the number of prover instances bounded by a polynomial.
Γ3,i : V is simulated as in Γ3. The jth instance of P is simulated as in Γ2 if j ≤ i and
as in Γ3 if j > i.
First, we show that Γ3,i and Γ3,i+1 are indistinguishable. For this, we use an adversary
B that plays D-AKAp game. B receives pkA,pkB1 and skB1 from the D-AKA
p challenger,
generates (skB0 ,pkB0) by running GenB(1
) and sends (skB0 ,pkB0) to the D-AKA
p game.
Finally, B receives s. After, he begins simulating either Γ3,i or Γ3,i+1 against the adversary
A that wants to distinguish Γ3,i and Γ3,i+1. In the simulation, B lets pkV = pkA and
pkP = pkB1 . It can simulate the Corrupt oracle called by A since skB1 is available. For all
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of the prover instances Pj where j = i+1, it simulates normally and for Pi+1, it simulates
as follows:
Pi+1(.)
pick r
e← EncpkV (r)
store (e,s) to T
send e
run symDB(s)
Note that if s is generated by running B(skB0 ,pkB0 ,pkV ,N) then B simulates Γ3,i and
if it is generated from B(skB1 ,pkB1 ,pkV ,N) then B simulates Γ3,i+1.
For the veriﬁer simulation, B ﬁrst checks if (e, .) is stored by himself as V in Γ3.
Otherwise, he decrypts e and sends (pkPj ,N) to the oracle OA(pkP,N) and receives s. At
the end of the game, A sends his decision. If A outputs i, then B outputs 0. If A outputs
i+ 1, then B outputs 1. Clearly, the advantage of B is p3,i − p3,i+1 which is negligible
because of the D-AKAp assumption. From the hybrid theorem, we can conclude that
p3,0 and p3,k is negligible where p3,0 = p2 and p3,k = p3.
Now, in Γ3, no identity is used by the provers. Hence, A does not have any advantage
to guess the prover which means p3 = 12 . As a result of it, p0− 12 is negligible.
Consequently, if we use D-AKA secure and D-AKAp private key agreement protocol in
Eﬀ-pkDBp, then we have DF, MF, DH secure and strong private public-key DB protocol.
For instance, Nonce-DH key agreement protocol is a good candidate for Eﬀ-pkDBp.
Diﬃculties of having strong privacy: The strong privacy is the hardest privacy
notion to achieve in DB protocols. Sending all messages of provers with an IND-CCA
secure encryption is not always enough to have a strong privacy. We exemplify our
argument as follows: Clearly, Eﬀ-pkDB protocol is still DF-MiM and DH-secure, if we
replace the nonce selection by a counter. So, we can make a new version of Eﬀ-pkDBp
based on the counter version of Eﬀ-pkDB where the prover encrypts his public key
and the counter by an IND-CCA encryption. However, it does not give strong privacy
because when an adversary calls Corrupt oracle, he learns the counter of two drawn
provers. Since the adversary knows the corresponding secret keys for both of them,
he can easily diﬀerentiate the drawn provers based on the counter. This attack is not
possible in Eﬀ-pkDBp which uses a nonce instead of a counter because the nonce is in
the volatile memory. So, the adversary does not learn it with the Corrupt oracle.
4.4.3 Another variant of Eﬀ-pkDB: Eﬀ-pkDB+1
In this section, we give a variant of Eﬀ-pkDB (the same can apply for Eﬀ-pkDBp). In
this variant, by adding one more pass to Eﬀ-pkDB, we can replace the assumption of
multi-veriﬁer OT-MiM security in Theorem 4.12 with the assumption OT-MiM-security.
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In this way, we require less security on the symmetric DB protocol by having one-more
message exchange.
Eﬀ-pkDB+1 is very similar to Eﬀ-pkDB. Diﬀerently, V picks and sends a nonce
NV to P before starting the one-pass AKA protocol. In the AKA phase, V runs
ANV (skV2 ,pkV2 ,pkP,N) and P runs BNV (skP,pkP,pkV2 ,N) to obtain the secret key s. Here,
ANV and BNV are the algorithms of the AKA protocol but their outputs depend on NV .
The rest is the same as Eﬀ-pkDB.
V (skV ,pkV ) P(skP,pkP,pkV )
NV ←{0,1} NV−−−−−−−−−→ N ← D(1)
ANV (skV2 ,pkV2 ,pkP,N)→ s
pkP,N←−−−−−−−−− BNV (skP,pkP,pkV2 ,N)→ s
symDB(s)←−−−−−−−−→
OutV−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 4.5 – Eﬀ-pkDB+1
Theorem 4.15. Assuming the one-pass AKA (GenV ,GenP,ANV ,BNV ,D) is D-AKA secure
for all ﬁxed NV ∈ {0,1}s and symDB is one time MiM-secure then Eﬀ-pkDB+1 is
MiM-secure.
Proof. Γ0 : The adversary plays MiM-game of Eﬀ-pkDB+1 with the prover instances
and the veriﬁer instances where one of them is the distinguished veriﬁer V .
Γ1 : We reduce Γ0 to the game Γ1 where at most one prover instance and V see the
same pair (NP,NV ). Because of the D-AKA security, D(1) guarantees that the repetition
of NP is negligible, and NV is picked randomly. So, p1− p0 is negligible.
We can reduce Γ1 to the game Γ3 in Theorem 4.12 with using the similar reductions.
Now, we have at most one distinguished pair V and P which see (NV ,NP) and they
share a random secret s. Therefore, we are in OT-MiM game. As symDB is OT-MiM
secure, p1 is negligible.
We deduce that Eﬀ-pkDB+1 is MiM-secure because p0 is negligible.
We give this variant separately because this version have one more round and a com-
putation on the prover side related to NV which depends on the AKA algorithm. On the
other hand, this version can use less secure symmetric DB protocol to have the same
level of security with Eﬀ-pkDB.
4.4.4 Simp-pkDB
We construct another public-key DB protocol Simp-pkDB in Figure 4.6 which is as
eﬃcient as Eﬀ-pkDB and does not require key setup for the veriﬁer algorithm. The key
setup algorithm KP is the key generation algorithm of an encryption scheme (Enc,Dec).
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In Simp-pkDB, the prover P randomly selects a nonce N ∈ {0,1} and sends it to the
veriﬁer together with pkP. Then, V selects a secret s ∈ {0,1}, encrypts it and N with
the public key pkP and sends the encryption e to P. After receiving e, P decrypts it with
its secret key skP and obtains s,N. If N is the nonce of P, then they run a symmetric
DB symDB with using s as a secret key.
V P(pkP,skP)
pick s ∈ {0,1} N,pkP←−−−−−−−−− pick N ∈ {0,1}
e= EncpkP(s||N)
e−−−−−−−−−→ s,N = DecskP(e)
Verify(N)
symDB(s)←−−−−−−−−→
OutV−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 4.6 – Simp-pkDB
We show that this protocol is MiM-secure but not DH-secure. P in Simp-pkDB requires
only one operation which is IND-CCA decryption.
Theorem 4.16. If symDB is DF-secure then Simp-pkDB is DF-secure.
We can easily reduce the DF-game of Simp-pkDB to the DF game of symDB.
Theorem 4.17. If symDB is one-time MiM-secure and the encryption scheme is IND-
CCA secure then Simp-pkDB is MiM-secure.
Proof. Γ0 : Adversary plays the MiM game with the veriﬁer instances and the prover
instances. Let’s assume that the number of prover instances is t where t is polynomially
bounded.
Let s,pkP,N and e be the values seen by the distinguished instance V of the veriﬁer.
Here, e= EncpkP(s||N). We group the prover’s instances as follows:
1. The provers seeing N and e,
2. The provers seeing e but another nonce N′.
3. The provers not seeing e (see a ciphertext e′ which is not e).
The probability that an adversary succeeds in Γ0 is p0.
Γ1 : We reduce Γ0 to Γ1 where the ﬁrst group has up to one prover instance P (matching
prover). The probability that more than one prover picks the same N is bounded by(k
2
)
2− which is negligible. So, p1− p0 is negligible.
Γ2 : We reduce Γ1 to Γ2 where the matching P receives e after V has released e. This
means that e which is the encryption of s||N is only sent by the veriﬁer. In Γ1, the
probability that V selects s after P has received e so that Decsk(e) = s,N is 12 which
means that p2− p1 is negligible.
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Γ3 : We reduce Γ2 to Γ3 where the prover instances are simulated as below:
The prover instance P, after receiving e, runs symDB(s) without decrypting e. As e
was released before, the value of s is already deﬁned. The prover instances in the second
group, abort the protocol after receiving e. The prover instances in the third group, call
decryption oracle Decsk(.) after receiving e′ and check if the nonce is the same nonce that
was chosen by them. Then, they run symDB(s′) with s′ obtained from the decryption
oracle.
The simulation gives the identical result so the success probabilities in Γ3 and Γ2 are
the same.
Γ4 : We reduce Γ3 to Γ4. We simulate V in Γ4. The simulation of V , after selecting s,
encrypts a random message instead of s||N.
Γ3 and Γ4 are indistinguishable because of the IND-CCA security of the encryption
scheme. We construct an adversary B playing IND-CCA game and simulating MiM
game against the adversary A .
B receives pkP from the IND-CCA game challenger and then B forwards it to A .
Firstly, B picks N,s ∈ {0,1}×{0,1} and r ∈ {0,1}2 and lets m0 = s||N,m1 = r. Then,
he sends m0 and m1 to IND-CCA game challenger and receives the response eb where
eb = EncpkP(m0) or EncpkP(m1). If A interacts with V then B sends eb, if A interacts with
P, then B sends N. For the simulation of other prover instances, B sends the encryptions
e′ to IND-CCA game challenger and receives decryption of e′. In the end, if A succeeds
then B outputs 0, otherwise, he outputs 1. If A succeeds given b = 0, then it means
that he succeeds Γ3 and if A succeeds given b = 1 then it means that he succeeds Γ4.
Therefore, we have the following success probability of B.
Adv(B) = Pr[B → 1|b= 0]+Pr[B → 1|b= 1] = p3− p4
As we know that the advantage of B is negligible, we can deduce that p3 − p4 is
negligible.
Γ5 : In Γ5, we have at most one prover and veriﬁer instance and they both run symDB(s)
with the same and fresh random s. Γ4 and Γ5 work the same. So. p4 = p5. The success
probability p5 of Γ5 is negligible because of the OT-MiM security of symDB. As as result,
we can conclude that p0 is negligible.
DH-Security: Simp-pkDB is not secure against DH because of the attack in Figure
4.7. In this attack, the malicious and far away prover P uses honest and close prover P′
so that in the end V accepts P.
The attack starts after seeing the nonce N that is picked by P′. P sends (pkP,N) to V
where pkP is the public key of P. Then, V encrypts s||N with pkP and sends it to P. P
decrypts e with his own secret key skP and behaves as if he is the veriﬁer and sends the
encryption e′ = EncpkP′ (s||N) where pkP′ is the public key of P′. As e′ is valid encryption
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for P′, it continues by executing symDB(s) with V . At the end of the protocol, V accepts
P. P′ is used by P only to be able to pass the challenge phase of symDB(s) protocol.
V (pkP) P(pkP,skP) P′(pkP′ ,skP′)
pick s
N,pkP′←−−−−−−− pick N
e= EncpkP(s||N)
N,pkP←−−−−−−−
e−−−−−−−→ s,N = DecskP(e)
e′ = EncpkP′ (s||N)
e′−−−−−−−→ s,N = DecskP′ (e′)
Verify(N)
symDB(s)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
OutV−−−−−−−→
Figure 4.7 – DH attack on Simp-pkDB.
We can have weak private variant of Simp-pkDB. In this variant (Simp-pkDBp), V
has secret/public key pair (skV ,pkV ) which is the key pair of another encryption scheme
(Enc′,Dec′). P sends pkP,N as in Simp-pkDB but diﬀerently by encrypting them with
pkV . The rest is the same.
Theorem 4.18 (Weak privacy of Simp-pkDBp). Assuming that the encryption scheme
with (Enc′,Dec′) is IND-CCA secure and the encryption scheme with (Enc,Dec) is IND-
CCA and IK-CPA [BBDP01] secure (Deﬁnition 2.19), then Simp-pkDBp is weak private
(Deﬁnition 2.14).
Proof. Γ0 : The adversary A plays the weak-privacy game. The success probability of A
is p0.
Γ1 : We reduce Γ0 to Γ1 where the veriﬁers do not decrypt (with Dec′) any encryptions
sent by the provers and the provers do not decrypt (with Dec) the encryptions generated
by the veriﬁers. Instead, they directly use the values inside the encryption. Because of
the correctness of both encryption schemes p1 = p0.
Γ2 : We reduce Γ1 to Γ2 where all provers encrypt (with Enc′) a random value instead
of pkP,N and all veriﬁers encrypt (with Enc) a random value instead of (s||N). Note that
the change on the encryption is indistinguishable by an adversary as it does not know
skP (we prove here weak privacy). Thanks to the IND-CCA security of the encryption
schemes p1− p2 is negligible.
Γ3 : We reduce Γ2 to Γ3 where the prover does not decrypt (with Dec) the encryptions
e generated by the adversaries and it aborts. As N has never been used, the probability
that A sends a valid encryption of N is negligible. Therefore, p3 − p2 is negligible.
Remark that in Γ3, DecskP has never been used.
Γ4 : We reduce Γ3 to Γ4 where the prover replaces pkP by a freshly generated public-
key. (that V uses if the encryption that P sends is correctly forwarded). The only visible
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change from Γ3 is that now e (sent by the veriﬁer) is encrypted using a new key. Because
of IK-CPA security of the encryption scheme (with Enc,Dec), p4− p3 is negligible.
Now, in Γ4, no identity is used by the veriﬁers and the provers, so adversary succeeds
Γ4 with 12 probability. Therefore, p0− 12 is negligible.
Simp-pkDBp is not strong private due to the following attack: assume that an ad-
versary corrupts a prover P and learns skP. Later, he can decrypt all encryptions (e)
sent by the veriﬁer with skP. If e is sent to P, then it means the adversary learns the
challenges and responses. When these challenges and responses become known during
symDB, the adversary can identify P.
Simp-pkDBp is not as good as Eﬀ-pkDBp, privDB [Vau15c] which have higher security
level. Its only advantage is that it does not require a key setup for the veriﬁer. We give
Simp-pkDBp to show that we can obtain some level of privacy and security which can
be converted into higher privacy and security level in a diﬀerent model as we discuss in
Chapter 5.
4.5 Conclusion
Our main purpose in this chapter was to design an eﬃcient and a secure public-key DB
protocol. Therefore, we began by designing a new AKA security model which we can use
to construct a public-key DB. The level of security of AKA we deﬁned is less strong than
existing ones [LLM07]. However, as our main purpose is eﬃciency, we deﬁne the least
security level that we want from an AKA protocol to achieve a good security (MiM, DF,
DH- security) on our public-key DB protocols. Finally, we designed a public-key DB
protocol Eﬀ-pkDB which is secure against DF, MiM and DH with using an AKA protocol
and a symmetric-DB protocol. We did not consider privacy in this one because privacy
is not the main concern of some applications. Eﬀ-pkDB is one of the most eﬃcient
public key DB protocols compared to the previous ones (See Table 4.2). Besides, we
added strong privacy to the Eﬀ-pkDB protocol and obtained Eﬀ-pkDBp. We achieved
this by adding one public-key IND-CCA secure encryption. In this case, the protocol is
not as eﬃcient as before but still one of the most eﬃcient ones with the same security
and privacy properties.
We also discussed about a variant of Eﬀ-pkDB and Eﬀ-pkDBp: the one (Eﬀ-pkDB+1)
that requires less security on the symmetric DB. We suggested another public-key DB
protocol Simp-pkDB which is quite eﬃcient and do not require any key setup for veriﬁers.
It is DF and MiM-secure but not DH-secure.
Now, we prove our claim about the prover eﬃciency of Eﬀ-pkDB, Eﬀ-pkDB and Simp-
pkDB.
Comparison: In Table 4.2, we give the security properties of existing public-key DB
protocols along with the number of computations done on the prover side. We use
the number of elliptic curve multiplications and hashing as a metric in our eﬃciency
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Protocol Security Privacy
PK
operations
Number of Computations
Brands-Chaum
[BC93]
MiM, DF No Privacy
1 commitment,
1 signature
1 EC multiplication, 2
hashings, 1 mapping, 1
modular inversion, 1 random
string selection
HPO [HPO13] MiM, DF Weak Private
4 EC multiplications, 2
random string selections, 2
mappings
PrivDB
[Vau15c]
MiM, DF, DH Strong Private
1 signature, 1
IND-CCA
encryption
3 EC multiplications, 2
hashings, 2 random string
selection, 1 modular inversion,
1 mapping, 1 symmetric key
encryption, 1 MAC
TREAD
[ABG+17]
MiM,DF,DH Strong Private
1 signature, 1
IND-CCA
encryption
3 EC multiplications, 2
hashings, 2 random string
selection, 1 modular inversion,
1 mapping, 1 symmetric key
encryption, 1 MAC
Simp-pkDB MiM, DF No Privacy 1 decryption
1 EC multiplication, 1
hashing, 1 symmetric key
decryption, MAC
Eﬀ-pkDB MiM, DF, DH No privacy
1 D-AKA
secure KA
protocol
1 EC multiplication, 1
hashing, 1 random string
selection
Eﬀ-pkDBp MiM, DF, DH Strong Private
1 IND-CCA
Encryption, 1
D-AKA secure
KA protocol
3 EC multiplications, 2
hashings, 2 random string
selections, 1 symmetric key
encryption, 1 MAC
Table 4.2 – The eﬃciency and security of existing public-key DB protocols.
analysis. We exclude GOR, ProProx and eProProx (in Appendix A.3 and A.4) as they
clearly require a lot more computation than the other public-key DB protocols.
In our counting for the number of computations in Table 4.2, 1 commitment is coun-
ted as 1 hashing operation. For the signature, we prefer an eﬃcient and existentially
unforgeable under chosen-message attacks resistant signature scheme ECDSA [JMV01].
ECDSA requires 1 EC multiplication, 1 mapping, 1 hashing, 1 modular inversion and 1
random string selection. For the IND-CCA encryption scheme, we use ECIES [Sho01]
which requires 2 EC multiplications, 1 KDF, 1 symmetric key encryption, 1 MAC and 1
random string selection. For the D-AKA secure key agreement protocol, we use Nonce-
DH which requires 1 EC multiplication, 1 hashing and 1 random string selection.
We ﬁrst compare the protocols considering the security and the eﬃciency trade-oﬀ.
Eﬀ-pkDB and Simp-pkDB are the most eﬃcient ones. However, Simp-pkDB is secure
only against MiM and DF. After Eﬀ-pkDB, the second most eﬃcient protocol is Brands-
Chaum protocol [BC93] (Appendix A.1) but this protocol is only secure against MiM
and DF while Eﬀ-pkDB is secure against DH as well.
Now, we compare the protocols considering security, privacy and eﬃciency trade-oﬀ.
In this case, HPO requires 4 EC multiplications while PrivDB, TREAD and Eﬀ-pkDBp
require 3 EC multiplications and 1 hashing. Hashing is more eﬃcient than elliptic curve
multiplication so it looks like PrivDB and Eﬀ-pkDBp are more eﬃcient. However, HPO
has an advantage in eﬃciency if it is used in a dedicated hardware allowing only EC
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operations. On the other hand, Eﬀ-pkDBp and PrivDB are secure against MiM, DF,
DH and strong private while HPO is only MiM and DF secure and only private.
Eﬀ-pkDBp, TREAD and PrivDB have the same security and privacy properties and
almost the same eﬃciency level. However, if we analyze the eﬃciency with more metrics,
we see that PrivDB and TREAD require 1 extra modular inversion and 1 mapping. So,
Eﬀ-pkDBp is slightly more eﬃcient. More importantly, Eﬀ-pkDBp has lighter version
Eﬀ-pkDB which can be used eﬃciently in the applications which do not need privacy.
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Chapter 5
Formal Analysis of Distance Bounding
with Secure Hardware
Until this chapter, we mainly covered MiM, DF and DH secure constructions. However,
we did not fully concentrate on TF-security because of the problems on achieving it.
We analyze it in this chapter. Formally, the TF-security prevents against malicious and
far-away provers which try to make the veriﬁer accept the access of himself with the
help of an adversary who may be closer. Clearly, the strongest security notion in the DB
world is the resistance to TF. So, if we can construct a DB protocol that is secure against
TF, then the DB protocol will be secure against MiM, DF and DH. However, it is not
possible to achieve the TF-security because of a trivial attack: the malicious prover gives
his secret (key) to a close adversary, and the adversary authenticates on behalf of the
malicious prover by running the protocol. To achieve the TF-security, the trivial attack
is artiﬁcially excluded from the TF model in the literature by assuming that malicious
provers would never share their keys (in this chapter, we call this weaker version “TF’-
security”). Beyond being weak, we cannot adapt TF’-security as an all-in-one security
notion because no connection between TF’-security and MiM, DF or DH security can
be established. Because of this disconnection, all DB protocols require separate security
analysis for each of them.
The content of this chapter was published in ACNS18 [KV18a].
Related Works:
The only public-key DB protocols that are secure against all of them (MiM, DF, DH,
TF’) are ProProx [Vau15d], its variant eProProx [Vau15a] and TREAD [ABG+17].
There are also a few symmetric key DB protocols [BMV13a, BMV15, BMV13b, FO13,
Vau13, BV14] that are secure against all (MiM, DF, DH, TF’). Some important distance
bounding protocols [BC93, BB05, CˇBH03, Han05, RNTS07, SP07, KV16] are all vul-
nerable to TF’. The protocol by Bultel et al. [BGG+16] is TF’-secure thanks to a ‘cheat
option’ (as explained below) but it is not DH-secure since it aims for anonymity against
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veriﬁer.
Moreover, the formal deﬁnition of TF’-security is controversial. The TF’-security
deﬁnition of Du¨rholz et al. [DFKO11] allows treatment of the partial disclosure of the
secret key. Essentially, the TF’ security in this deﬁnition implies that any information
forwarded to a close-by adversary would allow another adversary to later pass, without
a help of the prover, with the same probability. Fischlin and Onete [FO13] adapted
the Swiss-Knife protocol [KAK+08] to have this deﬁnition. However, it was proven
that this technique weakens Swiss-Knife for MiM-security [Vau13]. Clearly, it is not
reasonable to weaken the most relevant security to protect it against the least relevant
one. There are also extractor based TF’-security deﬁnitions [BV14, Vau15d, Vau13]
stronger than the deﬁnition of Du¨rholz et al. model [DFKO11]. However, all TF’-
security deﬁnitions are constructed with the assumption that the malicious prover do not
reveal any secret key related information. This assumption can be considered weak and
not realistic. Recently, Ahmadi and Safavi-Naini [ASN17] showed that some existing
TF’-secure protocols become insecure when the malicious prover and the veriﬁer use a
directional antenna. In short, none of the models in the literature fully covers TF.
Apparently, there is no way of achieving TF-security without hiding the secret key
from the prover. This intuitive idea has been noticed [SP05, BR04, ABK+09, ABK+11],
but never formally deﬁned. A natural question to ask here is whether this idea really
prevents TF. The answer is “yes and no” because hiding the key is necessary but not
suﬃcient. We can give an example protocol where the prover never learns the key but
the protocol is still vulnerable to TF-attacks.
In a nutshell, state-of-the-art DB results say that TF-security is not possible in the
existing models of DB and it could be possible by hiding the key but this is not enough.
However, it is still not formally noted how it can be achievable. Therefore, in this chapter,
we deﬁne a new formal model where constructing TF-secure protocols is possible.
5.1 Our Contribution
Our formal model for DB, which we call secure hardware model (SHM), provides a
solution to all DB related problems that we mention. We denote the two-algorithm
(Prover and Veriﬁer) DB corresponding to the classical DB in the literature as “plain
model” (PM) [BC93, DFKO11, BMV13a, BV14, Vau15c] that we cover in Section 2.2.1.
In the SHM, we have another entity called “Hardware” that is always honest and only
communicates with its holder (the prover). Mainly, this hardware runs some part of the
prover algorithm honestly and neither a malicious prover nor an adversary can corrupt
it. In the real world, we can realize our new entity as e.g. tamper-resistant modules in
smart-cards. In more detail, our contribution in this chapter is the following:
• We deﬁne a new type of DB with three algorithms (V,P,H): veriﬁer, prover, hard-
ware. Then, we design a communication and adversarial model for three-algorithm
DB which we call secure hardware model (SHM). In SHM, it is possible to have
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TF-secure DB protocols without excluding trivial attacks. We give a new security
deﬁnition in SHM for a three-algorithm DB. In this security deﬁnition, achiev-
ing TF-security means achieving MiM, DF and DH-security. So, we obtain an
all-in-one deﬁnition.
• We obtain a convincing model for TF based on SHM. We show that the TF-
security of (V,P,H) in SHM is equivalent to the MiM-security of (V,H) in PM
where H in PM corresponds to the prover algorithm. This result implies that P
plays no role in security but only in the correctness of the protocol to
have TF-security.
• We establish security relations between PM and SHM. We show that the MiM-
security in SHM and the MiM-security in PM are equivalent when we take as a
prover algorithm in PM the union PH of the prover P and the hardware H in SHM.
Additionally, we show that a MiM-secure DB protocol in PM can be converted
into a fully-secure DB protocol in SHM. This result shows that if we have only
a MiM-secure DB protocol in PM, we can easily construct an eﬃcient DB
protocol secure against all threats in SHM.
• We deﬁne a strong privacy notion of DB in SHM.
• We construct a symmetric DB protocol MiM-symDB which is the most ef-
ﬁcient optimally secure MiM-secure protocol in PM (in terms of com-
putation and number of rounds) among the protocols with binary chal-
lenges and responses. Then, we convert it into a DB protocol in SHM (Full-
symDBH) and obtain the most eﬃcient symmetric DB protocol secure against all
threats and achieving optimal security bounds.
We underline that the only assumption on the secure hardware is that it is
honest which means that it runs the speciﬁed algorithm only. By doing so, we give
a model here where the TF-security is achievable. Avoine et al. [ABK+09, ABK+11]
considered a similar model called “black box model”. In their model, they assume that
the prover cannot observe or tamper with the execution of the algorithm. Diﬀerently,
in SHM, we consider two algorithms a prover and a hardware algorithm and only the
hardware algorithm cannot be tampered. The black box model can be seen as a variant
of our model where the prover algorithm is dummy which only relays the messages
between the hardware and the veriﬁer. In addition, in the black box model, Avoine et
al. [ABK+09, ABK+11] only consider TF’-security instead of TF-security.
One may argue that our assumption on secure hardware is too strong for the real world
applications. For example, in the real world, if the secure hardware is implemented using
a tamper-resistant hardware, it is always possible that a side-channel attack will break
our assumption. However, we believe that relying on our assumption is more reason-
able than relying on some adversarial intention (e.g., that the adversary never shares
his secret). We can never prevent a TF-adversary to share his secret-key, but we can
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construct a strong tamper-resistant hardware which requires very expensive equipments
to be tampered. Besides, MiM-security would be preserved even if the tamper resistance
assumption is broken.
Structure of the Chapter: In Section 5.2, we give the formal deﬁnitions of SHM and
its security and privacy deﬁnitions. We also prove some security implications in SHM.
In Section 5.3, we introduce the MiM-symDB protocol in PM and adapt it to SHM. In
Section 5.4, we show how we can achieve full security in public-key DB in SHM with
Eﬀ-pkDBp and Simp-pkDBp. We conclude the chapter in Section 5.5.
5.2 Secure Hardware Model
We ﬁrst give the formal deﬁnitions of SHM and security in this model. Then, we provide
some security relations related to PM and SHM.
5.2.1 Deﬁnitions
Parties of a DB protocol are a prover and a veriﬁer [BC93] as detailed in previous
chapters. However, we deﬁne a new version of it called three-algorithm (symmetric or
public-key) DB where the algorithms are prover, veriﬁer, and hardware.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Three-Algorithm Symmetric DB). Three-algorithm symmetric DB is a
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) protocol. It consists of a tuple (K ,V,P,B,H) where
K is the key generation algorithm, P is the proving algorithm, H is the hardware al-
gorithm, V is the verifying algorithm and B is the distance bound. The input of V and H
is K generated by K . P interacts with H(K) and V (K). At the end of the protocol, V (K)
outputs a ﬁnal message OutV ∈ {0,1}. If OutV = 1, then V accepts. If OutV = 0, then V
rejects.
In symmetric DB, V knows that it needs to use K (possibly resulting from a prior
identiﬁcation protocol).
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Three-Algorithm Public-key DB). Three-algorithm public key distance
bounding is a PPT protocol. It consists of a tuple (KP,KV ,V,P,B,H) where (KP,KV ) are
the key generation algorithms of P and V , respectively. The output of KP is a secret/pub-
lic key pair (skP,pkP) and the output of KV is a secret/public key pair (skV ,pkV ). V is
the verifying algorithm with the input (skV ,pkV ), P is the proving algorithm with the
input (pkP,pkV ) and H is the hardware algorithm with the input (skP,pkP). B is the dis-
tance bound. P interacts with H(skP,pkP) and V (skV ,pkV ). At the end of the protocol,
V (skV ,pkV ) outputs a ﬁnal message OutV ∈ {0,1} and has pkP as a private output. If
OutV = 1, then V accepts. If OutV = 0, then V rejects.
This deﬁnition assumes a priori identiﬁcation of pkV for P.
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Deﬁnition 5.3 (Correctness of DB). A public-key (resp. symmetric) DB protocol is
correct if and only if under an honest execution, whenever the distance between P and V
is at most B, V always outputs OutV = 1 and pkP (resp. /0).
In all the deﬁnitions below, veriﬁers, provers, and hardware are the parties running
the algorithms V , P and H, respectively. The parties can move and run their algorithms
multiple times. Each new execution of a party’s algorithm is an instance of this party.
Classical DB in literature is very similar to three-algorithm DB with the following
diﬀerences: no H algorithm exists and the input of P in public-key and symmetric DB
is (skP,pkP,pkV ) and K, respectively. The plain model is the model corresponding to the
classical DB (See Section 2.2.1 for details).
The secure hardware model is the model corresponding to three-algorithm DB: P, V
and H.
Secure Hardware Model (SHM): Parties of SHM are provers, secure hardware,
veriﬁers and other actors. SHM includes all the characteristics of PM given in Section
2.2.1 and the additional ones:
• Secure hardware are honest parties.
• Each prover possesses its own secure hardware.
• The secure hardware of an honest prover can only communicate with its prover
and they are both at the same location.
In the rest of the chapter, whenever we say “a distance bounding protocol in SHM”,
it refers to the three-algorithm DB.
Remark that as secure hardware are honest parties, they always run their assigned
algorithms even if malicious provers hold them. They should be taken as a subroutine
of a prover algorithm running on a secure enclave where the prover can never change or
interfere it.
Now, we give our security deﬁnition for a DB protocol in SHM. The deﬁnition covers
distance fraud, maﬁa fraud (MiM), distance hijacking and terrorist fraud which are the
threat models in PM.
Deﬁnition 5.4 (Security in SHM). Consider a public-key DB. The game consists of a
veriﬁer and provers P1,P2, ...,Pt with their corresponding hardware H1,H2, ...,Ht . It begins
by running the key setup algorithm KV outputting (skV ,pkV ) for V and KP outputting
(skPi ,pkPi) for Hi. The game consists of instances of the veriﬁer, provers, hardware and
actors. V is a distinguished instance of the veriﬁer. One prover (let’s denote P) is the
target prover. The winning condition of the game is V outputs OutV = 1 and privately
pkP (public key of P) if no close instance of P’s hardware exists during the execution of
V .
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• The DB protocol is MiM-secure if the winning probability is always negligible
whenever P is honest1.
• The DB protocol is DF-secure if the winning probability is always negligible
whenever there is no instance of any party close to V .
• The DB protocol is DH-secure if the winning probability is always negligible
whenever all close instances are honest provers other than P and their hardware.
• The DB protocol is TF-secure if the winning probability is always negligible.
The same security deﬁnition holds for a symmetric DB where we replace KV and KP
with K and skPi/pkPi with Ki.
Without loss of generality, we can consider all other actors as adversaries.
It is clear that TF-security implies DF-security, MiM-security, and DH-security. So,
we have an all-in-one security notion in SHM. Hence, we say “secure” instead of
“TF-secure” in SHM.
Security in PM: In PM, there is always a trivial TF-attack in which a malicious
prover can give his secret key to another malicious party so that the party authenticates
the prover while it is far-away. So, TF-security is not possible in PM. Clearly, this trivial
attack is preventable in SHM if we can assure that H never leaks K.
Note that we do not consider the weaker version of TF-security
[DFKO11, KAK+08, Vau13] (TF’-security) which artiﬁcially excludes trivial attack.
So, when we refer to TF-security in PM, we indeed refer to an impossible-to-achieve
notion.
Notations:
Pdum is a dummy prover algorithm in SHM which only relays the messages between
the outside world and H without even using any of its input. Remark that if the prover
who should run Pdum is malicious, then it can still play with its hardware or other parties
maliciously.
PH is the algorithm which is constructed from joining P and H in SHM. More precisely,
PH runs P and instead of interacting with H, it executes the same computation that H
would do if P had interacted. Therefore, PHdum is actually the hardware algorithm H.
5.2.2 Security Results
We give some security relations between a DB protocol in PM and SHM.
Theorem 5.5 (MiM in SHM ⇒ MiM in PM). Let DB=(K ,V,P,B,H) be a symmetric-
key DB protocol in SHM. We deﬁne a DB protocol DB′ = (K ,V,PH ,B) in PM. If DB is
MiM-secure then DB′ is MiM-secure.
The same holds with public-key DB.
1Recall that it implies that H communicates with P only and that they are at the same location.
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The proof is trivial by adding a hardware to every honest prover at the same location:
A MiM-game against DB′ becomes a MiM-game against DB.
Theorem 5.6 (MiM-security in PM with PHdum ⇔ Security in SHM). Let DB =
(K ,V,P,B,H) be a symmetric DB in SHM and and DB′ = (K ,V,PHdum,B) be a symmetric-
key DB in PM where superscript of PHdum in DB
′ corresponds H of DB. DB′ is MiM secure
in PM if and only if DB is TF-secure in SHM.
Here, the prover algorithm of DB′ is just H because PHdum ≡ H.
Surprisingly, Theorem 5.6 does not depend on the prover algorithm P of DB. Note that
DB′ in Theorem 5.6 is not a correct DB protocol in general if P = Pdum as the algorithm
P disappeared. However, we can still consider MiM-security for DB′ without correctness.
Proof. (⇒) Consider a TF-game against DB in SHM. We run this game against DB′
in PM by simulating the secure hardware H of DB with the prover PHdum of DB
′ and
simulating the prover P in SHM with a malicious actor in PM (it is possible because P
in SHM, does not have any secret key as an input). Then, we obtain MiM-game of DB′
with the same probability of success.
(⇐) If A wins the MiM-game of DB′, then a TF adversary runs A and wins the
TF-game for DB.
Remark that it is not possible to prove“MiM-security of DB′ = (K ,V,PH ,B)⇔ security
of DB = (K ,V,P,B,H)” where P in DB′ is not necessarily Pdum because we could not
simulate H and P in “⇒” case of the proof in Theorem 5.6. A counterexample which
elucidates this can be seen in Section 5.3. In this counterexample, we have a MiM-secure
protocol in PM and a conversion of it in SHM without Pdum. Its conversion is not secure
in SHM even though P does not learn any key related information.
Clearly, having a secure hardware running whole algorithm without its prover’s eﬀect
on the security is a trivial solution to have a TF-security. However, we show here that it
does not always work when the prover is active. This result does not mean that
prover should not do any computation to have TF-security. Actually, in our TF-secure
protocols in Section 5.4, the prover algorithm in SHM still executes some part of the
algorithm PH in PM but it does not have any eﬀect on the security of the protocol (as
it can be seen in their security proofs Theorem 5.12 and Theorem 5.14).
Some more results of Theorem 5.6:
• We can conclude if DB′ = (K ,V,PHdum,B) is MiM-secure and correct DB protocol,
then we can construct a secure DB protocol DB = (K ,V,P,B,H) in SHM for any
algorithm P. DB is further correct when P= Pdum.
• In order to prove security of DB = (K ,V,P,B,H) in SHM, it is enough to prove
MiM-security of DB′ = (K ,V,PHdum,B) in PM.
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• MiM security and security of a DB protocol DB = (K ,V ,P,B,H) in SHM
are equivalent if P = Pdum due to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Note that this
result may not hold without Pdum .
In Figure 5.1, we give the security (non)-implications in SHM and PM. The proof of
these (non)-implications are in Appendix C. In Figure 5.2, we give the same for SHM
when the prover is Pdum. In this case, the full security is equivalent to MiM-
security. The rest of the (non)-implications in Figure 5.2 can be proven as in Appendix
C.
MiM
TF DFDH





Figure 5.1 – Security implications of DB pro-
tocols in PM and SHM. TF-security implies
all of them, DH-security implies DF security
and no relation exists between MiM and DH
(also DF).
TF≡MiM DH DF 
Figure 5.2 – Security implications in SHM
with the prover Pdum. TF-security and
MiM security are equivalent in SHM with
Pdum. The relations between DF, DH and
MiM are the same as in Figure 5.1.
5.2.3 Privacy
In strong-privacy deﬁnition of PM, the adversary can corrupt the provers and learn the
secrets. However, the hardware in SHM is honest by nature. So, it cannot be corrupted.
Hence, we deﬁne semi-strong privacy with no such corruption. Achieving semi-strong
privacy in a DB protocol is good enough assuming that the hardware is tamper-resistant.
Nevertheless, we also allow corruption of hardware in order to deﬁne the strong privacy
notion.
Deﬁnition 5.7 (Privacy in SHM). The privacy game in SHM for a public-key distance
bounding DB = (KP,KV ,V,P,B,H) with a bit b ∈ {0,1} is the following: The game runs
the key setup algorithms KP(1) for a number t provers and KV (1) for the veriﬁer. Then,
it lets the adversary A play the game shm−PrivOb,A() with the oracles in Deﬁnition 2.14
with a change in the corrupt oracle and the oracle SendH:
• SendH(vtag,m): It sends the message m to the drawn prover’s hardware and returns
the response m′ of the hardware. If vtag was not drawn or was released, nothing
happens.
• Corrupt(Pi) : It returns the current state of Pi and its hardware Hi. Current state
includes all values in Pi’s and Hi’s current memories. It does not include volatile
memory.
In the end, the adversary outputs b′. If b′ = b, the adversary wins. Otherwise, it loses.
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We say a DB protocol in SHM is strong private if the advantage of the adversary
in this game is bounded by a negligible probability. We say a DB protocol in SHM is
semi-strong private if the advantage of the adversary in a version of this game, where
the corruption only lets the adversary communicate with the hardware non-anonymously,
is bounded by a negligible probability.
In semi-strong privacy, even though we do not allow corruption of hardware, we let
semi-strong corruption occur by allowing interaction with the secure hardware. In SHM,
we stress that when P interacts with its secure hardware, this interaction remains private.
Hermans et al. [HPVP11] (See Deﬁnition 2.14) deﬁned a similar game for the strong
privacy of DB in PM. In that game, no hardware exists, so the deﬁnition of semi-strong
privacy is not considered. Instead, the weak privacy notion exists where no corruption
on provers are allowed.
Note that we obtain a notion of strong privacy of DB= (K,V,P,B,H) in SHM which is
fully equivalent to the strong privacy of DB′ = (K,V,PH ,B) in PM.
5.3 Optimal symmetric DB protocol in SHM
In this section, we show our new protocol MiM-symDB in PM which is only MiM-secure
(not DF, DH or TF-secure). We construct a DB at this level of security because having
MiM-security in PM is enough to achieve (full) security in SHM as a result of Theorem
5.6. The security bounds of MiM-symDB is very close to optimal security bounds. Its
conversion into SHM reaches the same bound as well. As we see in Chapter 3, it is
proved [BV14] that an optimal security bound in PM for a MiM-adversary is (12)
n given
that challenges and responses are bits and the challenge phase consists of n rounds. The
same bound applies in SHM as well.
We note that using other optimally MiM-secure DB protocols such as DB1, DB2, DB3
(variants of DBopt) [BV14] is reasonable as well to have fully secure DB protocols in
SHM. However, these protocols are also secure against DF or TF’ in PM which is an
overkill as we need only MiM-security. By constructing an optimal MiM-only secure
DB in PM, we can save some computations and rounds to make an optimal protocol in
SHM.
Notation: When we use H as a superscript in the name of a protocol, it shows that
it is in SHM.
MiM-OTDB: First, we describe our MiM-OTDB protocol which is MiM-secure when
it is executed only once. The prover P and the veriﬁer V share a secret key s = C||R.
Here, the bits of C correspond to the challenges and the bits of R correspond to the
responses. In the challenge phase, in each round i, V sends the challenge ci =C[i] to P
and P sends the response ri = R[i] to V . If P receives a challenge which is diﬀerent from
C[i], then P does not continue to the protocol. In the veriﬁcation phase, V checks if the
responses are correct and on time. (See Figure 5.3.)
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V (s) P(s)
s=C||R s=C||R
challenge phase
for i= 0 to n
ci =C[i], start timeri
ci−−−−−−−−−→ if ci =C[i], abort
stop timeri
ri←−−−−−−−−− otherwise, ri = R[i]
veriﬁcation phase
check timeri ≤ 2B,ri = R[i] OutV−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 5.3 – MiM-OTDB
MiM-symDB: Now, we describe MiM-symDB which is constructed on top of MiM-
OTDB and optimally MiM secure. The prover P and the veriﬁer V share a secret key
s. They use a pseudo random function (PRF) f returning strings of 2n bits. P and V
exchange the nonces NP,NV ∈ {0,1}, respectively, where  is a security parameter. Then,
P and V compute fs(NP,NV ) which outputs C||R. Finally, V and P run MiM-OTDB with
using C||R as a key. (See Figure 5.4.)
V (s) P(s)
pick NV ∈ {0,1}s NP←−−−−−−−−− pick NP ∈ {0,1}s
C||R= fs(NP,NV ) NV−−−−−−−−−→ C||R= fs(NP,NV )
MiM-OTDB(C||R)←−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 5.4 – MiM-symDB
Theorem 5.8 (MiM-security of MiM-symDB). If f is a secure PRF, then the winning
probability of a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary in a MiM-game of MiM-
symDB in PM is at most 32n+1 +
q2
2+1 +
q′2
2+1 +AdvPRF((ε,K)). For a PPT game, this is
negligible.
Proof. Γ0 : It is a MiM-game where P’s instances and V ’s instances with the distinguished
instance V play in PM. The winning probability in Γ0 is p.
Γ1 : We reduce Γ0 to Γ1 where the nonces of the prover instances and the nonces of the
veriﬁer instances do not repeat. The probability that a prover (resp. veriﬁer) instance
selects the same nonce with the one of the other prover (resp. veriﬁer) instances is
bounded by q
2
2
1
2 (resp.
q′2
2
1
2 ). So, the winning probability of Γ1 is at least p− q
2
2s+1 − q
′2
2+1 .
Γ2 : We reduce Γ1 to Γ2 where V and the prover’s instances replace fs(., .) by a random
function. Clearly, the winning probability in Γ2 is at least p− q
2
2+1 − q
′2
2+1 − 12 −Adv(PRF).
In Γ2, we have a game where at most one prover instance P seeing (NP,NV ) pair with
V and C||R is completely random meaning that it is independent from NP and NV . If P
exists, it has to be far from V because of the winning condition of MiM-game. Assuming
that V and P see the same (NP,NV ), we look each round i for the case where ri arrived on
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time. If ri arrived on time, thanks to Lemma 3.3, the response sent by P is independent
from ri or the challenge that P received is independent from ci sent by V . In any case,
the adversary’s probability to pass each round is 12 because the response ri has to be
correct and on time: the adversary guesses either ri or ci (post-ask or pre-ask attack
as shown in Section 3.2). There may also be one round where the pre-ask strategy is
done for a constant number of rounds until it makes P abort. After abort, there is an
additional opportunity (in the last of these rounds) for the adversary to pass the round
by guessing the response. Therefore,
p=
3
2n+1
+
q2
2+1
+
q′2
2+1
+
1
2
+Adv(PRF).
Theorem 5.9 (OT-MiM security of MiM-OTDB). MiM-OTDB is OT-MiM-secure (one
time MiM-secure).
Proof. Using the last game in the proof of Theorem 5.8, we can show that MiM-OTDB
is OT-MiM-secure.
Assuming that q
2
2+1 +
q′2
2+1 +
1
2 +Adv(PRF) is negligible, the success probability of a
MiM-adversary is 32n+1 very close to the optimal security
1
2n .
MiM-symDB is more eﬃcient than the existing optimally MiM-secure pro-
tocols DB1, DB2, DB3 [BV14]. The provers in DB1, DB2, DB3 compute a PRF
function two times and compute some other mappings too. So, with parameter nc = nr = 2
in common structure, for a given target security, we construct a nearly optimal protocol,
both in terms of number of round complexity and computation complexity.
Adaptation of MiM-symDB to SHM (Full-symDBH): We deﬁne Full-symDBH
with the tuple (K ,V,Pdum,B,H) where B,V and K are as in MiM-symDB, H is the same
with P in MiM-symDB.
Theorem 5.10 (Security of Full-symDBH). If f is a secure PRF, Full-symDBH is secure
in SHM.
Proof. The conversion of Full-symDBH in PM is (K ,V,PHdum,B) which is equal to MiM-
symDB. We know that MiM-symDB is MiM-secure as f is a secure PRF. Hence, Full-
symDBH with (K ,V,Pdum,B.H) is secure thanks to Theorem 5.6. The security bound of
Full-symDBH is the same with the MiM-security bound of MiM-symDB.
Full-symDBH is the ﬁrst protocol that reaches the optimal secure bounds for MiM,
DH, DF and TF secure.
The following counterexample shows why we need more than hiding the key from the
prover to achieve TF-security and why Theorem 5.6 holds with Pdum.
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Why is not Theorem 5.6 correct without Pdum?: Let us deﬁne Full-symDBH
′
with the tuple (K ,V,P′,B,H ′) where B,V and K are the same with those deﬁned in
MiM-symDB. P′ and H ′ are as follows:
P′
pick NP ∈ {0,1}s
send NP to V
receive NV from V
send NV ,NP to H ′
relay between V and H ′
H ′(s)
receive NP,NV
compute C||R= fs(NV ,NP)
run MiM-OTDB(C||R)
Letting P′ pick NP is the only diﬀerence between the prover of Full-symDBH and
the prover of Full-symDBH
′
. However, Full-symDBH
′
is not DF-secure because of the
following attack: Malicious and far away P′ sends NP,NV to H ′. After, in MiM-OTDB
execution, P′ sends a guessed challenge c′ to H ′ as if V sends. If H ′ accepts c′, then P′
learns the corresponding response r′. If c′ is not the valid challenge, then P′ restarts
with inputs NP,NV to H ′ again. This time, P′ sends 1− c′ as a challenge and learns the
corresponding response. P′ follows the same strategy until it learns all the challenges
and the responses. For sure, after 2n trials, it determines C||R. After learning C||R, P′
just sends C||R to a close adversary. Finally, the adversary runs MiM-OTDB(C||R) with
V picked NV and passes the protocol.
Clearly, (K ,V,P′H ′ ,B) is MiM-symDB which is a conversion of Full-symDBH ′ into PM.
So, the conversion is MiM-secure. However, Full-symDBH
′
is not secure. This shows
that Theorem 5.6 may not hold without Pdum.
Actually, this insecurity result is not surprising because picking NP has an inﬂuence
on the security of the protocol as it can be seen in the proof of Theorem 5.8. We repeat
the result of Theorem 5.6: the prover has to be as passive as Pdum on a security of the
DB protocol in SHM to have the full security.
Remark that in Full-symDBH
′
, even though P′ does not learn any information about s,
it is able to break the security. Therefore, we can see that the intuitive idea [SP05, BR04]
of sealing secret keys in a secure hardware is not enough, in general, to always protect
against TF. This shows the necessity of a formal model.
5.4 Optimal Public-key DB Protocols in SHM
In this section, we give two public key DB protocols in SHM: Simp-pkDBH and Eﬀ-
pkDBH which is correct, private and secure. The ﬁrst one is derived from Simp-pkDBp
in PM (Section 4.4.4). The second one is derived from the version Eﬀ-pkDBp with OT-
MiM security (Section 4.4.3) in PM. We use these protocols because of their eﬃciency
in PM.
Simp-pkDBH : This protocol is derived from Simp-pkDBp in Section 4.4.4. It is the
same as Simp-pkDBp except that P and H in Simp-pkDBH shared the computation
done by P in Simp-pkDBp. In Simp-pkDBH , P encrypts the nonce N picked by H along
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with pkP. H decrypts the encryption sent by V . The algorithm V is unchanged. As a
symmetric DB, V and H runs MiM-OTDB. The protocol is depicted in Figure 5.5.
V (skV ,pkV ) P(pkP,pkV ) H(skP,pkP)
pkP,N = Dec
′
skV (eP) eP←−−−−−−−− eP = Enc
′
pkV
(pkP,N)
pkP,N⇐==== N ←{0,1}s
pick C||R ∈ {0,1}2n
eV = EncpkP(C||R||N) eV−−−−−−−−→
eV====⇒ C||R||N = DecskP(eV )
Verify N
MiM-OTDB(C||R)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
POutV = pkP
Figure 5.5 – Simp-pkDBH . The double arrow shows the communication between P and
H
Theorem 5.11 (Security of Simp-pkDBH). If the encryption scheme (Enc,Dec) is IND-
CCA secure, Simp-pkDBH is secure in SHM.
Proof. Consider DB = (KV ,KP,V,PHdum,B) with V and H from Simp-pkDBH . Actually,
DB = Simp-pkDBp. Using Theorem 5.6, Simp-pkDBH is secure because DB = Simp-
pkDBp is MiM-secure (Theorem 4.17) assuming that (Enc,Dec) is IND-CCA secure and
MiM-OTDB is OT-MiM-secure.
Simp-pkDBH achieves almost optimal security bounds because MiM-security of Simp-
pkDB is reduced to MiM-security of MiM-OTDB as shown in the proof of Theorem
4.17.
We see that Simp-pkDBH is still secure without Enc′ (only Enc needs security). Actu-
ally, this encryption is only used for achieving privacy. So, if privacy is not a concern, we
can use Simp-pkDBH without the encryption and decryption. In this case, the veriﬁer
has no secret/public key pair. This can be useful in practical applications.
Now, we prove that Simp-pkDBH is semi-strong private in SHM.
Theorem 5.12 (Semi-strong privacy of Simp-pkDBH). Assuming that the encryption
scheme with (Enc′,Dec′) is IND-CCA secure and the encryption scheme with (Enc,Dec)
is IND-CCA and IK-CCA [BBDP01] secure, then Simp-pkDBH is semi-strong private
in SHM.
Proof. The proof works like in Theorem 4.18. We only let non-anonymous hardware
decrypt eV from the adversary with the right key through a CCA query in the IK-CCA
game.
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Eﬀ-pkDBH : One of the assumptions in MiM-security of Eﬀ-pkDBp is that the sym-
metric DB is “one-time multi-veriﬁer MiM-secure” deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4.7. It is not
possible to use MiM-OTDB on Eﬀ-pkDBp as a symmetric DB because MiM-OTDB
does not fulﬁll the assumption. Hence, we use Eﬀ-pkDB+1 (Section 4.4.3) when con-
truction Eﬀ-pkDBH . In this way, we are able to use MiM-OTDB as a symmetric DB
which does not require any computation.
Eﬀ-pkDBH is the same as Eﬀ-pkDB+1 (Figure 4.5) except that P and H share some
computations done by P in Eﬀ-pkDBp. P computes the encryption and H selects the
nonce and runs B. As a symmetric DB, V and H runs MiM-OTDB. The protocol is
depicted in Figure 5.6.
V (skV ,pkV ) P(pkP,pkV ) H(skP,pkP)
NV ←{0,1}s NV−−−−→ NV ,pkV====⇒ NP ← D(1s),
pkP,NP = DecskV1 (e),
e←−−−− e= EncpkV1 (pkP,NP)
NP,pkP⇐====
C||R= C||R=
ANV (skV2 ,pkV2 ,pkP,NP) BNV (skP,pkP,pkV2 ,NP)
MiM-OTDB(C||R)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
POutV = pkP
Figure 5.6 – Eﬀ-pkDBH . Double arrow shows the communication with H.
Theorem 5.13 (Security of Eﬀ-pkDBH). If the key agreement protocol
(GenV ,GenP,ANV ,BNV ,D) is D-AKA secure (Deﬁnition 4.2) for all ﬁxed NV ∈ {0,1}s,
then Eﬀ-pkDBH is secure in SHM.
Proof. Consider that DB = (KV ,KP,V,PHdum,B) with V and H from Eﬀ-pkDBH is MiM-
secure in PM. Actually, DB is Eﬀ-pkDB+1. Using Theorem 5.6, Eﬀ-pkDBH is secure
because Eﬀ-pkDB+1 is MiM-secure (Theorem 4.15) assuming that the key agreement
protocol (GenV ,GenP,ANV ,BNV ,D) is D-AKA secure for all ﬁxed NV ∈ {0,1}s and MiM-
OTDB is one time MiM-secure.
We see that Eﬀ-pkDBH is secure without encryption. Actually, the encryption is used
for achieving privacy. So, if privacy is not a concern, we can use Eﬀ-pkDBH without the
encryption and decryption.
Theorem 5.14 (Strong privacy of Eﬀ-pkDBH). Assuming that the key-agreement pro-
tocol (GenV ,GenP,ANV ,BNV ,D) is D-AKA
p secure (Deﬁnition 4.2) for all ﬁxed NV ∈ {0,1}n
and the encryption scheme (Enc,Dec) is IND-CCA secure, Eﬀ-pkDBH is strong private
in SHM.
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Proof. We ﬁrst show that the version of Eﬀ-pkDBp with OT-MiM is strong private in
PM. Actually, the strong privacy proof of our variant of Eﬀ-pkDBp is the same with the
proof of Eﬀ-pkDBp (Theorem 4.14) where ﬁrst it reduces the privacy game to the game
where all the encryptions are random (the reduction showed by using IND-CCA security)
and then reduces to the game where the provers use a random secret and public key pair
with BNV (the reduction showed by using D-AKA
p). Because of the equivalence of strong
privacy of a DB in SHM and its conversion in PM, we can conclude that Eﬀ-pkDBH is
strong private.
The prover algorithms of Simp-pkDBH and Eﬀ-pkDBH are not Pdum, but it can be
easily seen from the proofs of Theorem 5.11 and Theorem 5.13 that the computations in
these algorithms do not have any eﬀect on the security (i.e., the security of Simp-pkDBH
and Simp-pkDBH do not need any security assumptions on the encryption scheme with
(Enc′,Dec′) which is used by P.)
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we deﬁned a new DB with three algorithms and designed its adversarial
and communication model of SHM. According to our new model, we propose a new
security deﬁnition. We showed that the trivial attack of TF is preventable in our deﬁn-
ition. By showing implications between diﬀerent threat models, we deduced that if
a DB protocol achieves TF-security in SHM, then it is secure against all other se-
curity notions. This result cannot be applied in PM because TF-security is not pos-
sible. We also gave some security relations between PM and SHM. One of the rela-
tions shows that we can construct a DB protocol that is secure against all the threat
models including TF in SHM if its conversion into PM is MiM-secure. This result
is signiﬁcant because it shows that many MiM-secure DB protocols in the literature
[BV14, Vau13, BMV13a, BC93, HPO13, KV16, Vau15c] can be used to achieve higher
security level in our model.
We also gave two constructions which are converted from Eﬀ-pkDBp and Simp-pkDBp.
Compared to the previous models [ABK+09, ABK+11, DFKO11, BV14] which do not
have any practical and secure solution against all the threats, SHM lets us construct
more eﬃcient protocols while achieving the highest security.
75

Part II
Integrated Distance Bounding

Chapter 6
Contactless Access Control
Contactless access control (AC) systems are critical for security but often vulnerable to
relay attacks. In this chapter, we deﬁne an integrated security and privacy model for
access control using distance bounding (DB) which is the most robust solution to prevent
relay attacks. We show how a secure DB protocol can be converted to a secure contactless
access control protocol. Regarding privacy (i.e., keeping anonymity in strong sense to an
active adversary), we show that the conversion does not always preserve privacy but it
is possible to study it on a case by case basis. Finally, we provide two example protocols
and prove their security and privacy according to our new models.
The content of this chapter is published in ISC17 [KV17].
Related Works
A report from Smart Card Alliance [All03] lists the main components of an access con-
trol system (tags, readers, controllers, database) and their security requirements which
are however informal. Wongsen et al. [WKC+12] proposed an access control protocol
between doors and mobile units (e.g. smartphone), but the protocol lacks any security
proof. Some access control systems such as OPACITY [All13] and PLAIN [gDoHSD10]
mutually authenticate and establish a shared key between the terminal and card. The
security analysis of PLAIN in [gDoHSD10] is far from being formal. OPACITY [All13]
was partly analyzed by Dagdelen et al. [DFG+13] where their security model is based on
the key agreement security model of Bellare and Rogaway [BR93]. Hence, most of the
previous works do not have a comprehensive security analysis. Moreover, none of them
consider relay attacks in their security analysis. Unfortunately, these types of at-
tacks are easily implementable [Han05, Han06, FDCˇ11, RLS13, FHMM10, MFHM12],
so they violate access control.
The other problem in contactless AC is to address privacy. Informally, if an AC pro-
tocol is private then it is hard for an outside observer to identify or recognize a party who
wants to access a system. Some previous works [gDoHSD10, DFF+14, DFG+13] touched
on privacy. PLAID [gDoHSD10] claims to be private (with an informal deﬁnition) but
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Degabriele et al. [DFF+14] show that it is weaker than what it claims. Dagdelen et al.
[DFG+13] give two privacy related deﬁnitions: identity hiding and untraceability. The
problem in their privacy model is that it only considers the interaction between the card
and the reader. In reality, this may not be enough because the other interactions or
outputs of the other components (i.e., controller, database) of an AC system can violate
the privacy.
As a result, a formal security model which covers relay attacks has not been designed
for AC. In addition to this, a formal privacy model which considers whole AC system is
missing.
6.1 Our Contribution
By considering these critical issues, we design the ﬁrst security and privacy model of
an access control system which encompasses the propagation time of communication.
Intuitively, in our deﬁnitions, we mix DB and access control based on a database of
privileges. However, mixing both is not so straightforward when it comes to prove the
security in a generic composition. Current AC protocols [All13, gDoHSD10] do not
consider malicious users in their security models while DB considers malicious users.
Therefore, the natural composition of them does not necessarily achieve the security
level we need for AC protocols1. In addition, we can show that an AC protocol which
is constructed based on a private DB protocol does not achieve privacy in AC. All these
reasons obviously show the need for complete security and privacy models in AC. Our
contributions in this chapter are as follows:
• We ﬁrst deﬁne an integrated security model for AC including identiﬁcation,
access control, and distance bounding by using the same components as deﬁned in
Smart Card Alliance [All03].
• We deﬁne a new privacy model for AC which includes the time of the com-
munication. To the best of our knowledge, the time of the communication has not
been considered for deﬁning a privacy model before. Our new model covers all the
previously deﬁned privacy related deﬁnitions for access control such as identity
hiding and untraceability.
• We give a framework that clariﬁes how to use a secure DB to construct a
secure AC in our new security model. Basically, we show how to transform a man-
in-the-middle (MiM), distance-fraud (DF) and distance-hijacking (DH) secure DB
protocol into a secure AC scheme with proximity check. We also formally prove
the security of this transformation.
• We show that the same framework can be used to achieve privacy in AC with
restrictions on the database of the AC system: The framework achieves privacy if
1A malicious user can behave maliciously in an AC protocol and retrieve some information which
may help him to attack the DB protocol which is composed with this AC protocol.
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the database is trivial meaning that it is empty, or it includes all possible relations.
We give a counterexample protocol that clearly shows why the framework does not
work for non-trivial databases. This shows that privacy in distance bounding
is not always preserved when transformed into an access control system
which unfolds the need for a new model.
• We construct a speciﬁc AC scheme by using Eﬀ-pkDBp [KV16] (Section 4.4) and
prove its security and privacy with any type of database.
Structure of the Chapter: In Section 6.2, we introduce our new security and privacy
model for AC. Then, in Section 6.3, we show how we can achieve secure and private AC
protocols by using secure and private DB protocols. We conclude this chapter with
Section 6.4.
6.2 Security and Privacy Model of AC
We ﬁrst introduce the components of an access control system. In our deﬁnitions, for
simplicity, we do not consider the user who may give a PIN code or a biometric data to
authenticate himself (this would be a parallel protocol). The components of an access
control system are tag, reader, database and controller. Controller and database are in
the secure area of AC system. where it is not possible to tamper or access.
Tags (Access Cards): They hold personalized data which is used for identiﬁcation
and authentication. In an AC system, each tag T generates a secret/public key pair
(skT ,pkT ). They also store the public key of the controllers that are responsible for the
doors2 that T can access.
Reader: A reader is an interface between a tag and a door. We can consider them
as transmitters. They communicate with the tags. Each reader R has a location locR
which is important as the tag can be granted if the tag proves that it is close enough to
the reader.
Database: It contains information about tags and their rights. It stores a list of
(pkT , locR,req) triplets meaning that the tag with pkT is allowed to make the service
request req on a reader which is at location locR. For instance, a service request can be
“opening of a door”. The database is in the secure area.
The database is not necessarily a list of triplets. It can also be a predicate deciding
if a triplet belongs to it or not. A database is trivial if it is empty or if it contains all
possible triplets.
For simplicity, we consider that the content of the database is static in what follows.
2Door is a representation of the system or service that a user desires to access.
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Controller: It controls access authentication. All controllers can be connected with
multiple readers. Depending on the data which is received from one of the connected
readers and the database, they give the ﬁnal decision for the authorization.
More generally, the access control is relative to a service (such as opening a door) in a
given location. The tag T of public key pkT requests a service req to a reader at location
locR and its corresponding controller checks if the privilege (pkT , locR,req) exists in the
database. T stores req and it can change req later on. All controllers stay in the secure
area.
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Access Control (AC)). AC consists of a distance bound B, a data-
base DataB, a controller C, a reader R, and a tag T , the key generation algorithms:
GenC generating (skC,pkC) for a controller C and GenT generating (skT ,pkT ) for a tag T .
C,R, and T run the algorithms C (skC,pkC,DataB,B),R (locR) and T (skT ,pkT ,pkC,req),
respectively. In the end of the protocol, C outputs either OutC = 1 and private output
POutC = (pkT , locR,req) if the authentication succeeds or OutC = 0 if it fails. R also
publicly outputs OutR = OutC.
Deﬁnition 6.2 (Correctness of AC). We say that an AC is correct, when for all locR,
req and for all sets of keys generated by GenC and GenT , if
• T requests service req to R at location locR,
• T is within a distance at most B from locR and
• (pkT , locR,req) is in DataB,
then
Pr[OutC = 1∧POutC = (pkT , locR,req)] = 1
The probability is over the randomness in algorithms C , R and T .
6.2.1 Security of AC
In this section, we give the formal security model for an access control system.
Adversarial and Communication Model: Each party (readers, controllers, tags,
adversaries) has polynomially many instances. An instance of a party corresponds to a
protocol execution with this party at a given location and time. Each instance of our
model is as follows:
• We have the communication model of distance bounding as described in Section
2.2.1.
• Readers are all honest. They are connected to their corresponding controllers with
a secure and an authenticated channel.
• Controllers are all honest. They are the only components of the AC which can
access the database.
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• Tags are all honest. However, they can receive special signals as deﬁned in
Section 2.2.1 by replacing P with tags. We also change the input of Activate as
follows: the special signal Activate(T,req) activates the only activatable instance
of T with a speciﬁed input req3.
• Adversaries create the database. So, they can generate fake relations (p˜kT , ., .)
where ˜pkT and its corresponding secret key s˜kT are generated by an adversary.
Instances which could hold some s˜kT are called fake tags.
Except for the communication between readers and controllers, the adversary in-
stances see all communication.
Deﬁnition 6.3 (AC-Security). The game begins by setting up the components of the AC
system. The security game is as follows given the security parameter :
• Run GenC(1) → (skC,pkC) for the controller and run GenT (1) → (skTi ,pkTi) for
each tag Ti and give the public key pkC and pkTi’s to the adversary.
• The adversary creates instances of Ti at chosen locations. Each instance can start
after activation and run T (skTi ,pkTi ,pkC,req) only once.
• The adversary creates instances of readers at chosen locations locRk . They run
R (locRk) once activated by an incoming message. They communicate with an in-
stance of C over a secure channel 4. There is a distinguished instance of a reader
R. We denote by locR its location.
• The adversary sets DataB.
• The adversary creates instances of himself (fake tags). These instances run inde-
pendently and communicate.
All messages follow our communication model. The game ends when the distinguished
instance R (and its corresponding instance C) outputs some value OutR. An AC protocol
is secure, if for any such game, the adversary wins with a negligible probability. A wins
the game if OutR = 1 and POutC = (pkT , locR,req) for some pkT and req satisfying at
least one of the following conditions:
1. (pkT , locR,req) /∈ DataB,
2. pkT ∈ {pkTi}ti=1 and no active instance of the honest tag holding pkT is close to locR
during the execution of the AC protocol with C and R,
3. pkT /∈ {pkTi}ti=1 and no fake tag is close to locR during the execution with C and R.
where t is the number of public keys generated by GenT in setup.
3This can also correspond to a user who is the owner of T to input whatever requests he wants into
his tag.
4For simplicity, we assume that the instance C of the controller is at the same location as Rk but the
time of communication between Rk and C should have no inﬂuence on the result. The diﬀerence between
C and Rk only makes sense for practical reasons.
83
Remarks:
• In the third condition, we need that no fake tag is close to locR to prevent the
trivial attacks where a far away fake tag can give its secret key to a close by fake
tag. Without this condition, the adversary would always win. This would however
exclude all TF-attacks as well.
• The third condition is to prevent DF or DH attacks.
• The second condition is to have security against MiM attacks including imperson-
ation attacks and relay attacks.
In practice, the controllers are connected to multiple readers. So, it is not practical
for them to check if a tag is close. Therefore, readers are the components that can give
this decision.
Before proceeding the next part, we show that the natural composition of access con-
trol and distance bounding does not always achieve the security in Deﬁnition 6.3. Assume
that we have a MiM, DF and DH secure symmetric DB protocol DB= (K ,P,V,B). As an
AC protocol, we have an AC protocol OPACITY [All13] 5. In the natural composition,
ﬁrst, the parties run OPACITY with a minor change and then DB (the reader runs V ,
the tag runs P with the secret key K). The change in OPACITY is as follows: the reader
sends K at the end of the OPACITY protocol. Clearly, the modiﬁed version of OPACITY
is still secure AC in the security model of Dagdelen et al. [DFG+13] as K is completely
independent parameter. Unfortunately, this composition is not secure in Deﬁnition 6.3
as an adversary can win AC-game with satisfying the second condition. However, when
we look at the modiﬁed OPACITY and DB separately in their own security models, they
are secure. Therefore, the generic composition of AC and DB is not straightforward.
6.2.2 Privacy of AC
Privacy is also an important property to be achieved in access control protocols. The
deﬁnition of privacy we provide uses the same adversarial and communication model
that we use for security. It also covers the identity hiding and untraceability with the
corruption of tags. Informally, identity hiding means given an execution of a protocol
the adversary should not output the public key of the tag and untraceability means the
adversary should not decide if two executions belong to the same tag or not.
We adapt Deﬁnition 2.14 in a setting where the transmission time is important.
Deﬁnition 6.4 (AC-Privacy). The privacy game has the same setting as the game in
Deﬁnition 6.3. We ﬁrst decide to play the right r or the left l game. Diﬀerently than
the security model, each active tag instance can be paired with an another tag instance
by an adversary. The pairing happens with the signal Draw(Ti,Tj,k) which pairs Ti and
Tj by giving an index k, if the conditions below are satisﬁed:
5OPACITY is basically a key agreement protocol where the authentication of a tag is done with this
key.
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• Ti and Tj are at the same location,
• Ti and Tj have the same access privileges,
• neither Ti nor Tj is already paired and
• k is greater than the index of previous Draw signal to both Ti and Tj.
A tag instance can be paired to itself as well. The adversary lets vtag = (Ti,Tj,k) be a
virtual tag. All messages (and special signals) can only have a virtual tag as a destinator.
If we are in game l, then vtag simulates Ti and if we are in game r, vtag simulates Tj.
The signal Free(Ti,Tj,k) breaks the pair if it exists. The adversary can corrupt a tag Ti
(and actually all tags) by receiving skTi during the setup.
In the end, the adversary decides if vtag simulates game r or game l. If the decision
of the adversary is correct, then the adversary wins.
If an AC protocol is private, the advantage of a polynomial time adversary in this
game is bounded by a negligible probability.
The most important distinction of our deﬁnition is that we consider “communication
time which leaks the proximity of a party” contrarily of previous work related to privacy
[Vau07, HPVP11]. To the best of our knowledge, it has not been taken into account
before for a privacy model. It is reasonable to consider the location of a user as a privacy
leakage for the protocols where the communication time inﬂuences the output such as
DB.
As Mitrokotsa et al. [MOV14] showed that location privacy is nearly impossible to
achieve, we cannot prevent this leakage. So, our privacy game has the condition of being
at the same location which is necessary to avoid the adversary to trivially distinguish
the left or right game by checking the communication time.
Besides, the condition of having the same access privileges is necessary to prevent the
adversary to determine the left or right game by seeing the accepting or the rejecting
message by a controller.
6.3 Distance Bounding in Access Control
In this section, instead of designing a new AC protocol, we give a conceivable framework
that converts a DB protocol into an AC protocol. We prove in Theorem 6.5 that,
after conversion, the AC protocol achieves AC-security (in Deﬁnition 6.3) assuming
that the DB protocol is MiM and DH secure. However, we show that we cannot always
achieve AC-Privacy with this framework, even though the DB protocol is (strong) private
according to Deﬁnition 2.14. Therefore, we prove in Theorem 6.6 that the AC protocol
which is converted from a private DB achieves privacy, if DataB is trivial. The details
are in the following subsections.
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C (skV ,pkV ,DataB,B) R (locR) T (skP,pkP,pkV ,req)
req,locR←−−−− req←−−−−
run V (skV ,pkV )
run DB=(KP,KV ,P,V,B)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ run P(skP,pkP,pkV )
output Out and pk
if (pk, locR,req) ∈ DataB
OutC = Out
if Out= 1
POut= (pk, locR,req)
else: OutC = 0
OutC−−−−→ OutC−−−−→
Figure 6.1 – The framework to convert a DB protocol to an AC protocol
6.3.1 Secure AC with a Secure DB
If we have a public-key DB protocol (KP,KV ,P,V,B), we can construct an AC protocol
with (GenC,GenT ,C , T ,DataB,B) with the framework below:
• We match the key generation algorithms: GenC =KV , GenT =KP. So, (skC,pkC) =
(skV ,pkV ) and (skT ,pkT ) = (skP,pkP).
• We create DataB according to the access privileges of tags using the keys.
• T (skP,pkP,pkV ,req) uses P(skP,pkP,pkV ) as a subroutine. T outputs req and then
run P(skP,pkP,pkV ).
• Whenever R (locR) is activated with req, it sends req and locR to C .
• C (skV ,pkV ,DataB,B) runs V (skV ,pkV ) as a subroutine jointly with R (locR). When
V reaches the part where challenge/response is necessary to determine the distance
to locR, R steps in to check if the responses arrive on time and are correct.
Here, C may give all necessary input(s) to R so that R can check the responses.
Alternatively, C may only give the challenges, and R only determines if the re-
sponses arrive on time. Then, if they arrive on time, R can send the responses to
C so that C can check if the responses are correct. The only restriction is that R
has to decide if the responses arrive on time.
• When V (skV ,pkV ) outputs Out and the private output pkP: If (pkP, locR,req) ∈
DataB and Out = 1, it publicly outputs OutC = 1 and privately outputs POutC =
(pkP, locR,req). Otherwise, it outputs OutC = 0. In both cases, R outputs OutR =
OutC. The framework is in Figure 6.1.
An example protocol in Figure 6.2 is constructed using this framework. Before, we
prove that the framework achieves AC security if DB is MiM and DH secure.
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Theorem 6.5. Assuming that a DB protocol with (KP,KV ,P,V,B) is MiM-secure (Deﬁn-
ition 2.12) and DH-secure (Deﬁnition 2.10), then an AC protocol using this DB protocol
with the framework as described in Figure 6.1 is secure according to Deﬁnition 6.3.
Proof. Assume that there exists an adversary A which wins the game in Deﬁnition 6.3
where the output of the game is OutR = 1 and POutC = (pkTi , locR,req), then we can
construct an adversary which wins MiM-game or DH-game.
Apparently, A can win the AC-game with either second or third condition because
C outputs OutC = 0 if given (pkTi , locR,req) /∈ DataB (the ﬁrst winning condition) which
makes impossible to win with the ﬁrst condition.
Winning with the second condition: If pkTi ∈ {pkTk}tk=1 and no instance of the tag with
pkTi is close to locR during the execution of the AC protocol with C and R, then we can
construct an adversary B which wins MiM-game (Deﬁnition 2.12) of DB protocol with
(KP,KV ,P,V ).
B receives pkV and pkP from MiM-game. Then, it randomly picks i ∈ {1, ..., t} where t
is the number of (honest) tags needing to be simulated. The public key pkTi which will be
used to simulate the ith tag Ti is pkP. Here, Ti will have a role as a prover on MiM-game.
For the rest of the tags, B generates t−1 secret/public key pairs (skTj ,pkTj) with using
GenT (1n) which are the secret/public keys of Tj’s. Then, it sends pkV as the controller’s
public key and pkT1 , ...,pkTi−1 ,pkP,pkTi+1 , ...,pkTt as the tags’ public-keys in AC-game to
A . Remark that pkV and pkP are indistinguishable since they are generated with the
same key generation algorithms of controllers and tags, respectively.
At some moment, B receives DataB from A . If (pkP, ., .) /∈ DataB, then B loses the
MiM-game as in this case, there will be no chance that A wins the AC-game with this
tag. Otherwise, it locates instances of Ti (which corresponds to P’s instances in the
MiM-game) on the locations that A decides. B simulates the instances of AC-game as
follows:• Instances of Tj’s where Tj = Ti: For the signals Move(Tj, loc) and Terminate(Tj), B
just simulates. When it receives the signal Activate(Tj,req), it simulates by running
the algorithm T (skTj ,pkTj ,pkV ,req). Remark that as B knows each skTj , it can run
T .
• Instances of Ti: For the signals Move(Ti, loc) and Terminate(Ti), B moves the cor-
responding instance of P in the MiM-game to loc and halts the corresponding
instance of P in the MiM-game, respectively. Whenever it receives the signal
Activate(Ti,req), it ﬁrst outputs req and then runs (activates) the corresponding
instance of P in the MiM-game. Whatever the instance of P in MiM-game outputs,
B outputs the same.
• Instances of controller and reader: Whenever A activates R (via sending req) so
that C , B runs an instance of V .
In the end, if A picks a reader instance R which sees pkTj = pkP as a distinguished one,
B wins with the success probability below. Otherwise, B loses MiM-game as V has to
output OutV = 1 and pkP in MiM-game.
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Pr[B wins]≥ Pr[A wins∧Condition 2]× 1
t
Winning with the third condition: If pkT /∈ {pkTi}ti=1 and no instance of the adversary
is close to locR during the execution with R, then we can construct an adversary B ′ which
wins DH-game. The reduction is very similar to the previous one except we replace P
with an honest prover P′.
Pr[B ′ wins]≥ Pr[A wins∧Condition 3]× 1
t
In the end, we have
Pr[B wins]+Pr[B ′ wins]≥ Pr[A wins]× 1
t
.
As we know that the success probability of B in MiM and B ′ in DH game is negligible,
then the success probability of A is negligible as well.
Now, we give an example of an AC protocol (Eﬀ-AC) in our framework by converting
the public-key DB protocol Eﬀ-pkDB [KV16] (Section 4.4).
Eﬀ-AC: We use Eﬀ-pkDB with its variant. Its variant uses a key agreement pro-
tocol Nonce-DH [KV16] (Section 4.2) to agree on a secret S and a symmetric-key DB
OTDB [Vau15c] to run with []S. We stress that this is only one example of the gen-
eric construction of Eﬀ-pkDB. In particular, we could replace NonceDH by another key
agreement protocol which is D-AKA secure [KV16] and possibly eliminate the random
oracle assumption.
The public parameters for the key generation algorithms GenC (KV ) and GenT (KP)
are a group G of prime order q and its generator g. GenC and GenT pick skC and skT
from Zq, and set pkC = gskC and pkT = gskT , respectively. Eﬀ-AC works as follows:
The tag has the input skT ,pkT ,pkC,req, the controller C has the input skC,pkC,B,DataB
and the reader R has the input locR. T sends req to R and R sends it along with locR to
C. Then, C,R and T run Eﬀ-pkDB. Here, T runs the proving algorithm of Eﬀ-pkDB,
and C and R run the verifying algorithm of Eﬀ-pkDB, jointly. The details of these
algorithms are as follows: First, T picks a random value N from {0,1}n and sends N and
pkT . After C receives them, it computes S = H(g,pkT ,pkC,pk
skC
T ,N). Meanwhile, T also
computes S = H(g,pkT ,pkC,pk
skT
C ,N). After, C gives S and B to R so that R runs the
challenge phase. Until this part corresponds to the Nonce-DH protocol. Then, OTDB
[Vau15c] is run by R and T as follows:
R picks a value NR ∈ {0,1}2n and sends it to T . Then, R and T compute X = NR⊕S
before the n-round challenge phase begins. In each round i, R picks a challenge Qi and
starts the timer. In response, T sends Wi which is the 2i+Qthi bit of X . When R receives
it, it stops the timer. After the challenge phase, if all responses are correct and arrive
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on time (i.e. with in less than 2B), then R sets Out= 1. Then, R sends Out to C . This
is the end of Eﬀ-pkDB.
C sets OutC = Out. If Out= 1, C checks if C has the access privilege by checking if
(pkT , locR,req) ∈ DataB. If it is in DataB, it privately outputs POutC = (pkT , locR,req).
Otherwise, it sets OutC = 0. Finally, C sends OutC to R and R outputs it as OutR.
Ci(skC,pkC,B,DataB)
R (locR) T (skT ,pkT ,pkC,req)
req,locR⇐==== req←−−−− pick N ∈ {0,1}n
S =
H(g,pkT ,pkC,pk
skC
T ,N)
pkT ,N⇐==== pkT ,N←−−−− S =
H(g,pkT ,pkC,pk
skT
C ,N)
S,B
====⇒ pick NR ∈ {0,1}2n NR−−−−→ X = NR⊕S
X = NR⊕S
for i= 1 to n
start timeri
Qi−−−−→ Wi = X2i+Qi
stop timeri
Wi←−−−−
if ∀i timeri ≤ 2B
and Wi = X2i+Qi
Out= 1
if Out= 1 Out⇐====
and
(pk, locR,req) ∈
DataB
POut= (pk, locR,req)
OutC = Out
else: OutC = 0
OutC====⇒ OutC−−−−→
Figure 6.2 – Eﬀ-AC. Double arrow shows that the communication is secure and authen-
ticated while sending the message above it. The gray colored parts are Eﬀ-pkDB.
As Eﬀ-pkDB is MiM and DH-secure [KV16], Eﬀ-AC which uses Eﬀ-pkDB with
the framework in Figure 6.1 is AC-secure thanks to Theorem 6.5.
Remark: The security proof of Eﬀ-pkDB [KV16] is also valid for a variant where the
veriﬁer generates an ephemeral (skC,pkC) pair and sends pkC to the prover. So, tags do
not even need to store pkC in this variant of Eﬀ-pkDB. Therefore, a variant of Eﬀ-AC
with an ephemeral key is secure thanks to Theorem 6.5. This variant is very desirable
for practical reasons because we can allow many controllers and the tag does not need
to store all the corresponding keys.
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6.3.2 Private AC with a Private DB
The diﬃculty in proving privacy in an AC protocol which uses a private DB protocol
comes from the fact that DataB must discriminate tags. This fact may leak information
about identities. In DB, the output of V does not depend on pkP. Hence, the private
output of the veriﬁer (pkP) plays no role in the DB privacy game of Deﬁnition 2.14. We
show here a generic privacy preservation result with our framework, but only for a trivial
DataB. Trivial DataB makes POutC play no role in AC. We cannot prove the same result
for an arbitrary database. Remember, a database is trivial if it is empty or if it contains
all possible triplets.
Theorem 6.6. Assuming that the DB protocol with (KP,KV ,P,V,B) is private according
to Deﬁnition 2.14, then an AC protocol with using this DB protocol with the framework
as described in Figure 6.1 is private when DataB is trivial based on Deﬁnition 6.4.
Proof. Assuming that there exists an adversary A breaking the privacy in AC with a
trivial DataB, then we can construct an adversary B that breaks the privacy of DB.
B simulates the communication model of AC for A , except the subroutines P and V
for honest participants. For each message and signal that B receives for tags, it works
as follows:
• Receiving a signal Draw(Ti,Tj,k): It checks the necessary conditions to be paired.
If they are satisﬁed, it calls the Draw oracle in the privacy game of DB with the
inputs Ti,Tj. In respond, the Draw oracle sends vtag. B stores the information that
vtag corresponds to (Ti,Tj,k).
• Receiving a signal Free(Ti,Tj,k): It retrieves the corresponding vtag to (Ti,Tj,k). If
it exists, it calls the oracle Free with the input vtag in the privacy game of DB.
• Receiving a signal Activate or Move: It simulates them.
• Receiving a message m: It retrieves vtag and calls the oracle SendP in the privacy
game of DB with the input (vtag,m). Then, it receives a respond m′ from the
SendP oracle and sends m′ to A .
To simulate a reader receiving m, B behaves as follows:
• If it is the ﬁrst time and m= req, B calls the Launch oracle to get a session identiﬁer
π. Then, it calls SendV with π and receives an empty message m′.
• Otherwise, it calls the oracle SendV with the input (π,m) and receives m′.
If m′ is not the ﬁnal message, it sends m′ to A . Otherwise, m′ = OutV . In this case, B
assigns b = 0 if DataB is empty and b = 1 if it is not empty (meaning that it has all
possible relations). In the end, it sends OutC =OutV ∧b to A . The simulation is perfect.
So, A and B have the same advantage.
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Why only for trivial DataB: We can show that Theorem 6.6 does not work for all
DataB with the following counterexample.
Assume that we have a private DB (KP,KV ,P,V,B). From DB, we can construct
another private protocol DB’ (KP,KV ,P′,V ′,B) where P′ and V ′ work as deﬁned below:
P′(skP,pkP,pkV ) :
receive f lag
if f lag= 1 and pkP is odd
KP → (sk′P,pk′P)
(skP,pkP)← (sk′P,pk′P)
run P(skP,pkP,pkC)
V ′(skV ,pkV )
send 0
run V (skV ,pkV )
Clearly, DB’ is still private because the only change is to remove the identity of the
prover by replacing the secret and public keys with some random keys. (We recall that
pkP as a private output of V plays no role in Deﬁnition 2.14.)
Now, let’s consider the conversion of DB’ to an AC protocol with the framework. The
adversary can break the privacy of the AC protocol as follows: He ﬁrst picks two tags
T1 and T2 which have public keys with diﬀerent parities and moves them at the same
location. It also creates a DataB = {(pkT1 , locR,req),(pkT2 , locR,req)}. Then, it pairs
(T1,T2) with the signal Draw(T1,T2,0) and activates the pair. It sends a message f lag= 1
to vtag = (T1,T2,0) (by replacing the message f lag = 0 which comes from a reader R).
Then, it lets C,R and vtag execute the protocol. In the end, R outputs OutR. Depending
on the parity, the adversary can ﬁnd out the left or right game with probability 1 (e.g.,
if pkT1 is odd and OutR = 1, it means right game (T2) is simulated).
In addition, even by weakening Deﬁnition 2.14 such that the adversary does not create
a database and it is not allowed to pair tags (instead, the game does), we achieve no
privacy. In this case, the advantage of the adversary with this attack would be 12 : If the
public keys of paired parties have the same parity, then the attack does not give any
more advantage than the privacy game of DB’ gives. If they have diﬀerent parity, the
adversary wins with probability 1.
Even though we cannot use our framework to achieve privacy with all private DB
protocols, we can still have private AC using our framework with some DB protocols
where one of them is Eﬀ-pkDBp [KV16]. Now, we describe Eﬀ-ACp which is converted
from Eﬀ-pkDBp.
Eﬀ-ACp (See Figure 6.3): It is very similar to Eﬀ-AC. Diﬀerently here, the
secret/public key pair of C consists of two parts: (skC,pkC) = ((skC1 ,skC2),(pkC1 ,pkC2))
where (skC1 ,pkC1) is used for the encryption and (skC2 ,pkC2) is used for Nonce-DH (key
agreement protocol). The only change on T is that it sends the encryption of (pkT ,N)
and on C is that it retrieves pkT ,N by decrypting the encryption with skC1 . The rest is
the same with Eﬀ-AC.
Theorem 6.7. Eﬀ-ACp is a private access protocol in the random oracle model according
to Deﬁnition 6.4, assuming that the cryptosystem is IND-CCA secure (Deﬁnition 2.18)
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Ci(skC,pkC,B,DataB) R(locR) T (skT ,pkT ,pkC,req)
req,locR⇐===== req←−−−−− pick N ∈ {0,1}n
N,pkT = DecskC1 (e)
e⇐===== e←−−−−− e= EncpkC1 (N,pkT )
The same as in Eﬀ-AC←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 6.3 – Eﬀ-ACp
and GDH problem is hard (Deﬁnition 2.17).
Note that the same result applies to the generic construction of Eﬀ-pkDBp [KV16],
i.e., not only the one based on GDH and the random oracle. We could indeed replace
Nonce-DH by another key agreement protocol which is D-AKAp secure [KV16].
Proof (sketch): We adapt the proof from the privacy proof of Eﬀ-pkDBp (Theorem
4.14).
We deﬁne games Γbi below and the success probability of an adversary is pbi .
Γb0 : It is the same game that we deﬁned in Deﬁnition 6.4 where b= l meaning we are
in the left-game or b= r meaning we are in the right-game.
Γb1 : We reduce Γ
b
0 to Γ
b
1 where we simulate the controller instances without decrypting
the ciphertext that is sent by a vtag. Because of the correctness of the cryptosystem,
pb1 = p
b
0.
Γb2 : We reduce Γ
b
1 to Γ
b
2 where vtag is simulated by encrypting a random value instead
of (pkT ,N). We can easily show pb2 − pb1 is negligible by using the IND-CCA security of
the cryptosystem.
We reduce Γl2 to Γ
r
2 where we replace all secret/public keys (skl,pkl) which are the
keys of the tag in the left-side in vtag by replacing secret/public keys (skr,pkr) of its
paired tag. Using D-AKAp security of Nonce-DH (Theorem 7 in [KV16]), we can show
that pl2− pr2 is negligible.
Remark that if pkl and pkr are kept in a plaintext and used by the controller, the
replacing pkl with pkr make the same OutC result due to our assumption which says the
paired tags have the same access privileges.
So, pl0− pr0 is negligible.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we designed a security model for AC which considers the whole inter-
action between components. The security model integrates the model of DB since the
distance of the tag is important to detect the relay attacks. In our model, we preserve
the security against adversaries which can be a tag or not. We also let the adversaries
construct the database. We constructed a privacy model for AC which includes time of
communication as well.
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We gave a simple framework which securely transforms a DB to an AC. We proved a
similar result for privacy assuming that DataB is trivial. We showed why the theorem
does not work for other types of database. Finally, we constructed two AC protocols Eﬀ-
AC and Eﬀ-ACp which are adapted from Eﬀ-pkDB and Eﬀ-pkDBp [KV16], respectively.
We proved their security and privacy in our security and privacy models.
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Chapter 7
Secure Contactless Payment
A contactless payment (CP) lets a card holder execute payment without any interac-
tion (e.g., entering a PIN code or signing) between the terminal and the card holder.
Even though the security is the ﬁrst priority in a payment system, the formal security
model of contactless payment does not exist. Therefore, in this chapter, we design an
adversarial model and deﬁne formally the contactless-payment security against mali-
cious cards and malicious terminals which also deals with relay attacks. Accordingly, we
design a contactless-payment protocol and show its security in our security model. At
the end, we analyze EMV-contactless which is a commonly used speciﬁcation by most
of the mobile contactless-payment systems and credit cards in Europe.
The content of this chapter is published in ACISP18 [KV18b].
Related Works
Despite the big developments in CP, we realize that some important functionalities such
as secure processing of payments has not been considered formally. No standard security
model was provided for the contactless payment. Some pre-play attacks were detected
for EMV because of poor random generation [BCM+14, BCM+15]. Roland and Langer
[RL13] discovered a cloning attack for EMV contactless payment cards as the contactless
payment process permits an attacker to learn the necessary credit card data for cloning.
The cloned cards can then be used to perform EMV Mag-Stripe transactions at any
EMV contactless payment terminal. Another type of pre-play attack [BCM+14] was
discovered which relies on the fact that EMV standards do not impose any encryption
between a merchant and an acquirer, or between an acquirer and an issuer.
The most important attack speciﬁc for EMV-contactless (and also most of the con-
tactless applications) is relay attack which has shown up for a while ago [MFHM12,
Wei10, FHMM10, DM+07, FDCˇ11]. Chothia et al. [CGDR+15] remark that the ﬁrst
version of EMVco is vulnerable to relay attacks and provide a solution for this. The
current EMVco [emvb], therefore, take precaution partly against relay attacks using the
solution proposed by Chothia et al. [CGDR+15]. It is “partly” because the solution they
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use is software based, where the terminal does not require a speciﬁc hardware. So, it
protects against relatively trivial adversaries but does not protect against the adversaries
using a sophisticated hardware [FDCˇ11, CHKM06]. To defend this level of security that
they provide against relay attacks, Chothia et al. [CGDR+15] say that “Considering
that contactless payments are limited to small amounts, the cost of the hardware would
be a disincentive for criminals”. However, limiting to small amounts does not necessar-
ily mean that the relay attack outcome will be also a small amount. An attacker in a
crowded area (e.g., metro, concert, museum) can execute many numbers of relay attacks
and increase its outcome. In addition, some cards are limited to some small amounts
in their issued country currency, but when they are abroad, this limit is removed be-
cause the conversion from the currency in the issued country to the currency in the
current country cannot be computed. Besides this, the solution provided by Chothia et
al. [CGDR+15] for EMV-contactless does not protect against DF and DH.
7.1 Our Contributions:
Considering all these attacks and the missing formalism, we design a new security model
for contactless-payment protocols and design a secure contactless-payment protocol. In
more detail, our contributions are as follows:
• We formally deﬁne contactless payment between parties: an issuer, a terminal, a
card. Then, we give two security deﬁnitions for malicious cards and for malicious
terminals in the adversarial and communication model that we deﬁne.
• We construct a contactless-payment protocol (ClessPay) which is secure against
malicious cards and malicious terminals. ClessPay uses a distance bounding pro-
tocol to protect against relay attacks by malicious cards and MiM-adversaries. We
proved formally the security of ClessPay in our security model.
• We analyze EMV-contactless protocol in our model. We give some vulnerabilities
of EMV-contactless protocol against malicious cards. We prove the security of
EMV-contactless protocol against malicious terminal formally. This type of formal
cryptographic analysis is the ﬁrst for EMV-contactless protocol.
Structure of the Chapter: In Section 7.2, we introduce the security model for CP
where we consider security against malicious card and malicious terminal. Then, we
give our new CP construction ClessPay together with its security analysis in Section
7.3. In Section 7.4, we analyze the contactless EMV protocol in our security model. We
conclude this chapter with Section 7.5.
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Figure 7.1 – Payment System [emva]
7.2 Security Model of Contactless Payment
According to the EMV speciﬁcations [emva], a (contactless) payment system consists of
the following components:
Card Holder: It obtains the card from the issuer. It is responsible to present the card
to the devices which accept payments.
Merchant: It obtains the payment terminal from the acquirer. It also contacts with
the acquirer to receive reimbursements of the purchases by giving transmission details
of the payments.
Acquirer: It sets up payment terminals when a merchant requests. It is responsible
to pay the transactions to the corresponding merchants. After this, it communicates
with the issuer to transmit the completed transactions.
Issuer: It issues a personalized (chip) card to the card holder. The cryptographic keys
are installed to the cards by the issuer. The cards may contact with the issuer during
the payment process (in online transactions) for the veriﬁcation of the payment data. It
also gives reimbursements of completed transactions to the acquirer. Each issuer has its
policy function to approve or disapprove a transaction.
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We assume that the issuer has a database DataB which stores the card in-
formation. DataB consists of tuples (Public Key, Card Information) of each card. Card
information (CI) may consist of transaction list, the balance or the card limit.
Payment System: It is responsible to certify the issuer’s public key and operate the
online communication between the acquirer and the issuer.
Cards: They have a technology (e.g. NFC, Bluetooth) to communicate with a payment
terminal without any contact. In a contactless payment, cards are the components which
interact with the payment terminal to execute a payment with a certain amount. They
include a unique card number consisting of a Primary Account Number (PAN) and an
Expiration Date (ED). They also store a secret/public key pair in their tamper-resistant
module and the issuer’s public key. In this paper, we exclude card numbers for simplicity
and we identify the cards with their public keys only.
Terminals: In a contactless payment, terminals interact with both cards and issuers
via acquirers. They receive an order of payment from a card and validate the payment
together with the issuer of the card.
Our following deﬁnitions include neither the certiﬁcation process by the payment
system nor the communication between merchant-acquirer and terminal-acquirer. We
assume in the following deﬁnitions that the setup between payment components has
been established. For the sake of simplicity, we assume the terminal represents both the
terminal and the acquirer in the payment system and all cards are issued by one issuer.
Deﬁnition 7.1 (Contactless Payment). A contactless payment consists of algorithms
for cards, terminals and issuers and a parameter B which is the distance bound. They
respectively run the algorithms C(skC,pkC,pkI), T (pkI,τT ) and I(skI,pkI,DataB). Here,
(skC,pkC) and (skI,pkI) are the secret/public key pair of C and I, respectively. They are
generated by the algorithms GC(1) and GI(1) where  is a security parameter. DataB
is the database for cards’ information. I includes a subroutine Policy(pkC,CI,τI) where
CI represents the card information of a card with pkC. In the end, I outputs OutI ∈
{0,1} (OutI = 0 means cancel, OutI = 1 means accept the payment) and privately outputs
POutI = (pkC, idI,τI). Similarly, T outputs OutT ∈ {0,1} (OutT = 0 means cancel, OutT =
1 means accept the payment) and private output POutT = (pkC, idT ,τT ) and C privately
outputs POutC = (idC,τC). Here, τ is the transaction (τT ,τI and τC are the values seen
by the terminal , the issuer and the card), id is the identiﬁer of the transaction (idT , idI
and idC are similarly deﬁned).
The algorithm Policy depends on the policy of the transaction approval by the issuer.
Therefore, we can consider it as an algorithm which decides if a transaction τI is possible
for the card with pkC and CI.
We note that OutI and Policy(pkC,CI,τI) can be diﬀerent. OutI (similarly OutT ) shows
the result of the contactless payment which can be either accepting the payment or
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canceling the payment. However, Policy(pkC,CI,τI) shows only if the card with pkC is
able to do the payment. For example, even though the payment is canceled (OutI = 0)
by the issuer, the issuer can approve the payment (Policy(pkC,CI,τI) = 1). It means that
the card is able to this payment but the payment process is canceled (e.g., because of
malicious behaviors).
Deﬁnition 7.2 (Correctness of Contactless Payment). We say that a contactless pay-
ment is correct for all B, transactions τ, database DataB, CI, and generated key pairs
(skC,pkC) and (skI,pkI) if
• the algorithms C,T and I are run,
• T starts a transaction τ,
• there exists a C whose distance from T is at most B,
• (pkC,CI) is in DataB of an issuer I,
then there exists an id such that
Pr[(OutT =OutI =Policy(pkC,CI,τ))∧(POutT =POutI =(pkC, id,τ))∧(POutC =(id,τ))] = 1.
Note that the output of T has to depend on the output of I because actually I is in
the position to decide if the transaction is possible with the card (in fact an honest card
cannot know if the transaction is possible).
Adversarial and Communication Model: In contactless payment, we consider the
similar adversarial and communication model with the access control (AC) security
model in Section 6.2.1 [KV17]. Remember that the parties in AC: a controller, a reader,
a tag. They correspond to the parties contactless payment: an issuer, a terminal, a
card, respectively. Diﬀerently than AC, in the adversarial model of contactless payment,
terminals can be malicious. In a nutshell, the model is as follows:
• The communication between T and I is secure and authenticated. The adversary
cannot attack this part of the communication.
• The communication between the parties is limited by the speed of light.
• All parties have polynomially many instances. An instance of a party is an execu-
tion of its corresponding algorithm at a given location. Instances of honest parties
cannot be run in parallel.
• The adversaries can change the location of honest instances (but they move at a
limited speed) or can activate them (See Section 6.2.1 for details).
• Adversaries create the database.
• Adversaries can change the destination of messages between a terminal and a card.
Deﬁnition 7.3 (Security in Contactless Payment with Malicious Cards). The security
game is as follows:
• Run the key generation algorithms GI(1)→ (skI,pkI) and GC(1)→ (skCi ,pkCi) for
the issuer and each card Ci and give the public keys to the adversary.
• The adversary creates instances of cards (Ci’s) and the terminals at some locations
of his choice. There is a distinguished terminal T (T is honest).
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• The adversary sets a database DataB of the issuer. The issuer instance I which
communicates with T is the distinguished issuer.
• The adversary creates the instances of himself (malicious cards or terminals) which
can run independently and communicate together.
We denote POutI = (pk
′
C, idI,τI) and POutT = (pk
′′
C, idT ,τT ) the private outputs of I and
T . Following our communication model, the game ends when T outputs OutT . A con-
tactless payment is secure, if the adversary wins this game with negligible probability.
The adversary wins the game if OutT = 1 and at least one of the following conditions are
satisﬁed:
1. (pk′C, .) /∈ DataB,
2. pk′C ∈ {pkCi} and the distance between any C holding pk′C and T is more than B
during the execution of the protocol with idT ,
3. pk′C /∈ {pkCi} and no instance of the adversary is close to T during the execution of
the contactless payment protocol with T and I.
4. (pk′C, idI,τI) = (pk′′C, idT ,τT ),
5. pk′C ∈ {pkCi} and there exists no card with pk′C which privately outputs (idI,τI).
Remarks: The ﬁrst winning condition shows that a card which does not belong to
DataB should not authenticate. The second and the third conditions are to protect
against MiM and DH (DF as well), respectively. Finally, the last two conditions are to
be sure that the transaction that I and T approve and complete, and the transaction
that I and an honest C approve and complete are the same.
Deﬁnition 7.4 (Security in Contactless Payment with Malicious Terminals). The se-
curity game is as follows:
• Run the key generation algorithms GI(1)→ (skI,pkI) and GC(1)→ (skCi ,pkCi) for
the issuer I and each card Ci and give away public keys.
• The adversary creates instances of Ci and the terminals at some locations of his
choice. There is a distinguished instance I.
• The adversary sets a database DataB.
• The adversary creates the instances of himself which can run independently and
communicate together (as malicious cards or malicious terminals).
At the end of the game I outputs OutI and POutI = (pk′C, idI,τI). A contactless payment
is secure, if the adversary wins this game with negligible probability. The adversary wins
the game:
1. if OutI = 1 and if at least one of the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(a) (pk′C, .) /∈ DataB,
(b) pk′C ∈ {pkCi} and there exists no card with pk′C which outputs (idI,τI),
(c) pk′C ∈ {pkCi} and the instance of this card with pk′C producing the output
(idI,τI) has a distance from the adversary and any honest terminal more than
B.
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2. or if there exists an honest-card instance with pkC ∈ {pkCi} which privately outputs
POutC = (idC,τC) and there exists an issuer instance which has Policy(pkC,CI,τC) =
0 and idC.
The proximity condition (condition 1c) has not been considered by any of the pay-
ment systems before. Actually, even though we make sure the payment is completed
successfully only when the terminal is close, we still cannot prevent a malicious terminal
to execute a payment unbeknown to a card holder. For example, a malicious terminal
can be moved close to a card while the card is not in the shop. This means the proximity
condition does not prevent the malicious intention of the terminals. If we can be sure
that the terminals can be run in a certain location, then we can guarantee the security
against malicious terminals with the proximity condition. This can be possible by using
proof of location in Chapter 9, but current terminals do not support this. For simpli-
city, we ignore integrating proof of location into our security model. Therefore, in our
protocol, we eliminate 1c. We call almost-secure against malicious terminals if a
protocol is secure without the proximity condition 1c in Deﬁnition 7.4.
The condition 2 is to prevent honest cards to make payment even though the issuer
does not approve this payment. For example, this condition prevents attacks where ma-
licious terminals make the honest cards execute payment (maybe without the knowledge
of the honest card) for a big amount of money where normally the issuer would not let
this amount be paid.
7.3 Contactless Payment Protocol
In this section, we construct a secure contactless-payment protocol from a public-key
distance bounding DB=(KP,KV ,V,P,B), an encryption scheme (Enc,Dec) and a signature
scheme (Sign,Verify).
7.3.1 ClessPay
The protocol ClessPay (See Figure 7.2) starts after the terminal T creates a transaction
τ and connects with a card C. We do not give the details of τ since it depends on
the payment system. It may include the transaction details such as date, amount and
currency.
In our protocol, we use signature schemes and an encryption scheme. Therefore,
some secret/public key pairs are generated by using their key generation algorithms.
More speciﬁcally, the key generation algorithm GI generates a secret/public key pair
(skI,pkI) = ((skIs ,skIe),(pkIs ,pkIe)) where (skIs ,pkIs) is generated by the key generation
algorithm of the signature scheme used by issuers and (skIe ,pkIe) is generated by the
key generation algorithm of the encryption scheme. The key generation algorithm GC
generates a secret/public key pair (skC,pkC) using the key generation algorithm of the
signature scheme used by cards. ClessPay consists of the following phases:
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I(skI ,pkI ,DataB) T (pkI ,τ) C(skC,pkC,pkI)
Initialization pick r
KV (1)→ (skV ,pkV )
τ,pkV−−−−−→ KP(1;r)→ (skP,pkP)
id,pkC←−−−−− pick id
V (skV ,pkV )→OutV ,pkP DB←−−−−→ P(skP,pkP,pkV )
if OutV = 0: cancel
Approval
φ= ∃(pkC,CI) ∈ DataB
pkC ,pkP,id,τ←−−−−−−−
s.t. Policy(pkC,CI,τ)→ 1
if φ= False: cancel
SI = signskIs (id,τ,pkC)
SI−−−−−→ SI−−−−−→ if ¬VerifypkIs (SI , id,τ,pkC):
cancel
Completion
SC = signskC (id,τ,r)
SC,r =DecskIe (EC)
EC←−−−−− EC←−−−−− EC = EncpkIe (SC,r)
KP(1;r)→ (sk,pk) POutC = (id,τ)
if ¬VerifypkC (SC, id,τ,r)∨pkP = pk:cancel
OutI = 1
OutI−−−−−→ OutT =OutI
if OutT = 0: cancel
POutI = (pkC, id,τ) POutT = (pkC, id,τ)
Figure 7.2 – The ClessPay Protocol.
1. Initialization Phase: This phase is executed by T and C. If this phase cannot
be completed successfully, then T cancels the transaction.
T and C generate ephemeral secret/public key pairs for the distance bounding
protocol DB= (KP,KV ,V,P,B). For this, C ﬁrst picks the random coins r and runs
the deterministic algorithm KP(1;r) to generate (skP,pkP). Here, what C does
is equivalent to running KP(1). C needs to generate the random coins used in
KP(1) because they will be needed in the last phase as a one-time proof for having
generated pkP. Then T runs KV (1) to obtain (skV ,pkV ) used for distance bounding.
T sends τ and pkV to C. After receiving them, C picks an identiﬁer id and replies
with id and pkC to introduce itself.
T and C start the distance bounding protocol so that T determines the distance
of C. Therefore, T runs the veriﬁer algorithm V (skV ,pkV ) of DB and C runs the
prover algorithm P(skP,pkP,pkV ) of DB. At the end, V outputs OutV which shows
if C is close or not and private output POutP = pkP. If OutV = 0, then T cancels
the transaction. Otherwise, they continue with the next phase. Remark that, T
does not know yet if the card whose distance is determined is an authorized card
because C has not authenticated itself with its (static) public key pkC yet.
2. Approval Phase: This phase aims to check with the issuer whether the card can
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execute the transaction. T ﬁrst sends pkC,pkP, id,τ to I. I checks if the card with
pkC is in DataB. If it is in DataB, it retrieves the card information of the card
(CI) and runs the algorithm Policy(pkC,CI,τ) which outputs 1 if the card has the
privilege to execute τ1. If this algorithm returns 0, the transaction is canceled.
Otherwise, I approves the transaction.
If it is approved, I signs with skIs the message (id,τ,pkC). This signature is necessary
for cards to be sure that they are approved for the payment. Then, it sends this
signature SI to T and T relays it to C. C runs the veriﬁcation algorithm of the
signature scheme VerifypkIs (SI, id,τ,pkC) to be sure that C and I have the same
(id,τ,pkC). If C veriﬁes SI, then the next phase begins. Otherwise, C cancels the
transaction.
3. Completion Phase: In this phase, the execution of the transaction τ with id is
completed by I, T and C. First, C signs the message (id,τ,r) with skC as a proof of
execution of the payment. The reason of signing r is showing that C took part in
the distance bounding protocol. Then, it encrypts the signature SC and r by using
the key pkIe . The reason of the encryption is to hide r. At the end, C sends the
encryption (EC) to T . T relays it to I. At this point, the transaction is completed
for C and it privately outputs (id,τ).
In order to obtain SC and r, I ﬁrst decrypts EC with skIe . I veriﬁes that r generates
pkP by running KP(1;r). If it is veriﬁed, it also veriﬁes SC with VerifypkC(SC, id,τ,r).
If the signature is valid, then it sends OutI = 1 to T and privately outputs
(pkC, id,τ). Otherwise, I cancels the transaction.
Cancel the transaction: As it can be seen in the protocol, the cancellation can be done
by I, T or C. In the case of a timeout, parties cancel as well. When I cancels, it sets
OutI = 0 and sends OutI to T . Then, T cancels as well. When T cancels, it sets OutT = 0
and terminates. When C cancels, it sends a cancel message to T and terminates with
POutC =⊥.
7.3.2 Security
Theorem 7.5. Assuming that DB= (KP,KV ,V,P,B) is DF secure (Deﬁnition 2.8), DH-
secure and MiM-secure, the encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure and the signature
scheme used by cards is secure against existential-forgery, key-only message attacks (EF-
MA) secure, ClessPay is secure against malicious cards (Deﬁnition 7.3).
Proof. We assume that we have honest cards {C1,C2, ...,Ck} and their public keys are in
a set {pkCi}.
Γ0 : The instances of the issuer, terminals and cards play the game in Deﬁnition
7.3. There is a distinguished terminal instance T which privately outputs POutT =
1The Policy checks the execution right of a card depending on the bank policy. So, we do not discuss
how this veriﬁcation happens.
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(pk′′C, idT ,τT ) and POutV = pk
′
P, and a distinguished issuer I which communicates with
T and privately outputs POutI = (pk′C, idI,τI). Clearly, in Γ0, the adversary cannot win
with the ﬁrst condition in Deﬁnition 7.3 ((pk′C, .) /∈DataB) because the issuer algorithm
always cancels the transaction if (pk′′C, .) /∈ DataB.
Γ1 : It is the same game as Γ0 except that (pk′C, idI,τI) is always equal to (pk
′′
C, idT ,τT ).
Because of our secure and authenticated channel assumption between T and I and be-
cause of the honesty of T , they have the same public key, the identiﬁer and the trans-
action. Besides, T outputs 1, if I outputs 1. So, p1 = p0. In Γ1, the adversary cannot
win with the fourth condition in Deﬁnition 7.3 ((pk′C, idI,τI) = (pk′′C, idT ,τT )).
Γ2 : It is the same game as in Γ1 except that instances of honest cards do not sign and
they encrypt a random message. Basically, each stores the ciphertext together with the
identiﬁer, transaction and static/ephemeral public keys to a table. I does not decrypt
such random ciphertexts and retrieves their data from the table. More speciﬁcally, we
simulate them as follows:
C(skC,pkC,pkI)
same as in the protocol until signa-
ture generation
pick R
EC = EncpkIe (R)
store (EC, id,τ,pk,pkP) in TableEnc
send EC
POutC = (id,τ)
I (skI,pkI,DataB)
the same as in the protocol
receive EC
if (EC, id,τ,pkC, .) ∈ TableEnc:
retrieve pk where (EC, id,τ,pkC,pk)∈ TableEnc
if pk = pkP:
cancel
OutI = 1,POutI = (pkC, id,τ)
else: as in the protocol after receiving EC
We can show Γ1 and Γ2 are indistinguishable by using the IND-CCA security of the
encryption scheme. For this, we ﬁrst deﬁne a game Γ2,Cj where we simulate only the
instances of an honest card Cj’s encryption as in Γ2. Then, we deﬁne another game Γi2,Cj
where the ﬁrst i instances of Cj which we denote {C1j , ...,Cij} is simulated as in Γ1 and the
rest as in Γ2,Cj . The reason of deﬁning these games is to show that ∀ j ∈ {1,2, ...,k} Γi2,Cj
and Γi+12,Cj are indistinguishable implying that Γ1 and Γ2,Cj are indistinguishable implying
that Γ1 and Γ2 are indistinguishable.
To show the indistinguishability of Γi2,Cj and Γ
i+1
2,Cj , we use an adversary B which
plays IND-CCA game and simulates either Γi2,Cj or Γ
i+1
2,Cj against an adversary A which
distinguishes Γi2,Cj and Γ
i+1
2,Cj . B gives the public key that it received from IND-CCA
game to A as a public key of I. B simulates the ﬁrst i instance of Cj and other honest
cards’ instances as in Γ1 and the rest of Cj’s instances as in Γ2,Cj except C
i+1
j . It decrypts
ciphertexts with using IND-CCA game. When B needs to simulate Ci+1j , it generates
the signature and gives one message which is the signature and the random coin (the
message that it needs to be encrypted in Γ1) and another message which is a random
R to IND-CCA game. Then, B uses the challenge ciphertext received from IND-CCA
game as an encryption generated by Ci+1j . If IND-CCA game encrypts the ﬁrst message
B simulates Γi2,Cj and if it encrypts the random message, B simulates Γ
i+1
2,Cj . So, if A
succeeds to indistinguish the games, then B breaks the IND-CCA security. So, Γi2,Cj
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and Γi+12,Cj is indistinguishable. Using the hybrid argument, we can say that Γ1 and Γ2,Cj
are indistinguishable. Since ∀ j ∈ {1,2, ...,k} Γ1 and Γ2,Cj are indistinguishable, we can
conclude that Γ1 and Γ2 are also indistinguishable. The reason of this conclusion comes
from the fact that distinguishing Γ1 and Γ2 implies distinguishing Γ1 and either one of
Γ2,Cj . So, |p2− p1| is negligible.
Remark that the random coins of the honest cards are not used in Γ2.
Γ3 : It is the same game as Γ2 except that OutV = 0 after the execution of V (skV ,pkV )
if one of the situations happens:
1. no party is close to T ,
2. pkP is generated by the adversary and there is no adversary close to T ,
3. pkP belongs to an honest card instance but it has no instance close to T .
Γ3 and Γ2 are indistinguishable because the probability that OutV = 1 if one of the
situations above happens is negligible. OutV = 1 when the 1st situation happens with
negligible probability due to the DF-security of DB. OutV = 1 when the 2nd situation
happens with negligible probability due to the DH-security of DB. OutV = 1 when the 3rd
situation happens with negligible probability due to the MiM-security of DB. Note that
we can simulate an honest card instance in Γ3 by using a prover instance in MiM-game
because the random coins are not used by honest card instances. Therefore, |p3− p2| is
negligible.
Γ4 : It is the same game as in Γ3 except that I cancels after decrypting and obtaining
the random coins r where KP(1;r)→ (skP,pkP) and (skP,pkP) is generated by an honest
card instance.
I (skI,pkI,DataB)
the same as in the protocol
receive EC
if (EC, id,τ,pkC, .) ∈ TableEnc:
retrieve pk where (EC, id,τ,pkC,pk)∈ TableEnc
if pk = pkP: cancel
OutI = 1,POutI = (pkC, idT ,τT )
else:
SC,r = DecskI (EC)
KP(1;r)→ (sk,pk)
if (sk,pk) is generated by an honest instance:
cancel
else: the same as in protocol after running KP
We can easily prove that if there exists an adversary with pkC in Γ3 which obtains
a randomness r generating the secret/public key pair used by an honest instance, then
we can construct another adversary which breaks the MiM-security of DB. Clearly,
during the simulation of Γ3, if I gets r, then it generates the corresponding secret key
of the prover in MiM-game and breaks the MiM-security. Because receiving such r in
Γ4 happens with negligible probability, Γ3 and Γ4 are indistinguishable. So, |p4 − p3| is
negligible.
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Now, we show that the adversary cannot win with the third condition in Γ4. If the
adversary wins with the third condition in Γ4, then it means that pk′C /∈ {pkCi} and no
instance of the adversary is close to T during the execution of the contactless payment
protocol with T and I . Due to the condition 2 in the reduction of Γ3, pkP must be
generated by an honest card (otherwise, T cancels) . However, in Γ4, it is not possible
to have OutI = 1 while pkC /∈ {pkCi} and pkP is generated by an honest card instance
(check the dashed underlined parts in the simulation of I in Γ4). So, it is not possible
that OutI = 1, if the game is in the third condition of Deﬁnition 7.3.
As conditions 2 and 5 of Deﬁnition 7.3 only remained to win in the game, we can
assume that pkC ∈ {pkCi}.
Γ5 : It is the same game as Γ4 except we simulate Verify algorithm with Verify′ such
that it only accepts the signature of malicious cards. It does not accept the signatures
of honest cards’ instances as they never sign any message in this game.
Verify′pkC(S, id I , τI , r)
if pkC ∈ {pkCi}: return 0
else: return VerifypkC(SC, idI,τI,r)
The only diﬀerence in Verify and Verify′ is in the case of pkC ∈ {pkCi}. In this case,
while Verify returns the output of the veriﬁcation of the signature, Verify′ returns 0. In Γ5
and Γ4, no honest cards’ instances generate a signature. So, the only diﬀerence between
Γ4 and Γ5 happens when I obtains a forged signature of an honest card instance.
Now, we show that forging a signature of any honest cards’ instances happens with a
negligible probability to prove that Γ5 and Γ4 are indistinguishable: We use an adversary
B playing EF-MA game and simulating Γ5 against the adversary A . EF-MA game gives
a public key pkC. B picks one of the card Ci. In B’s simulation, pkC corresponds to the
public key of Ci which will be seen by the distinguished issuer instance I . Therefore, in
key generation of cards, B generates secret/public keys (skCj ,pkCj) for all honest cards
except Ci. It gives {pkCj} and pkC to A . Remark that Ci never signs a message so we can
simulate it perfectly. If the distinguished instance I does not receive pkC, then B loses
EF-MA game. Otherwise, at some point, if B receives a valid signature S, it ﬁrst checks
if S is veriﬁed with pkC. If it is veriﬁed with pkC, B outputs S to EF-MA game and wins.
Otherwise, it loses. Clearly, the success probability of B is probability that A forges a
signature divided by poly(k) where poly is a polynomial. Because of the EF-MA security
of the signature scheme, the success probability of B is negligible. So, probability that
A forges a signature is negligible, and Γ5 and Γ4 are indistinguishable meaning that
|p5− p4| is negligible.
Remark that in Γ5, I have OutI = 1, if and only if (EC, idT ,τT ,pk′C,pk′P) is in TableEnc.
So, we can assume that (EC, idT ,τT ,pk′C,pk
′
P) ∈ TableEnc.
If the adversary wins with the second condition in Γ5, it means that pk′C ∈ {pkCi} and
the distance between any C holding pk′C and T is more than B during the execution of
the protocol with idT . Due to condition 3 in Γ3, pk′P should not been generated by this
honest card. Then, (EC, idT ,τT ,pk′C,pk
′
P, .) cannot be in TableEnc which contradicts with
our assumption. Hence, the adversary cannot win with the second condition.
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If the adversary wins with the ﬁfth condition, then it means that pk′C ∈ {pkCi} and
there exists no card with pk′C which privately outputs idI,τI. Then, it means that
(EC, idT ,τT ,pk′C,pk
′
P, .) /∈ TableEnc as no honest card instance has (idT ,τT ). This con-
tradicts with our assumption. Therefore, the adversary cannot win with the ﬁfth
condition.
Remark that in Γ5, the adversary cannot win the game So, p5 is negligible meaning
that p0 is negligible.
Theorem 7.6. Assuming that the signature schemes used are existential forgery chosen
message attack (EF-CMA) secure then ClessPay is almost-secure against malicious
terminal (Deﬁnition 7.4).
Proof. We recall that in almost-security, we do not need to consider condition 1c of
Deﬁnition 7.4 .
Γ0 : The instances of the issuer, terminals and cards play the game in Deﬁnition 7.4.
We have a distinguished issuer instance I which outputs (pk′C, idI,τI). Remark that in
Γ0, the adversary cannot win with condition 1a ((pk′C, .) /∈ DataB) because I rejects
the cards which are not in DataB.
Γ1 : It is the same game as Γ2 except that no id selected by an honest card instance
repeats. Clearly, |p1− p0| is negligible.
Γ2 : It is the same game as Γ1 except that we simulate I and its instances while
generating the signature and honest cards’ instances in the veriﬁcation of this signature
as follows:
I(skI , pkI ,DataB)
SI = signskIs (id,τ,pkC)
store (SI, id,τ,pkC) in Table1
send SI
Verify′pkIs (S, id , τ, pkC)
if (S,pkI, id,τ,pkC) in Table1
return 1
else: return 0
|p2− p1| is negligible.
The output of issuer instance is the same as issuer instances in Γ1. Therefore, we have
a perfect simulation for it. The only diﬀerence happens when honest cards’ instances in
Γ1 receive a valid signature veriﬁed by pkIs and not in Table1. In this case, honest cards
in Γ1 verify the signature but they do not in Γ2. Otherwise, the simulations of them are
perfect. We can easily show that the probability of generating a valid signature which is
not in the Table1 is negligible in Γ2 thanks to EF-CMA security of the signature scheme.
We can use the public key received from the signing game as a public key of the issuer
and simulate signatures of issuer instances by using the signing game. Note that skIs is
not used in the simulation but the signature generation, so we can simulate the rest of
the protocol perfectly. Therefore, |p2− p1| is negligible.
The adversary cannot win the game with condition 2 in Deﬁnition 7.4 (there exists
an honest card instance with pkC ∈ {pkCi} which privately outputs POutC = (idC,τC) and
there exists an issuer instance which has Policy(pkC,CI,τC) = 0 and idC). Assume that
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the adversary wins with condition 2. It implies that (., idC,τC,pkC) /∈ Table1 as idC is
unique. So, no honest card instance outputs (idC,τC) in this case.
Γ3 : It is the same game as Γ2 except that we simulate honest cards’ instances while
generating the signature and I in the veriﬁcation of this signature as follows:
C(skC , pkC ,DataB)
SC = signskC(id,τ,r)
store (SC,pkC, id,τ,r) in Table2
EC = EncpkIe (SC,r)
send EC
Verify′′pkC(S, id I , τI , pkC , r)
if (S,pkC, id,τ,r) in Table2
return 1
else: return 0
The only diﬀerence is the output of Verify′′ and Verify when a forged signature received.
To show the indistinguishability of Γ2 and Γ3, we can use the similar reduction in the
reduction of Γ4 to Γ5 in the proof of Theorem 7.5. The only diﬀerence in this reduction is
using EF-CMA game and simulate the signature generation by using the signing oracle
in EF-CMA game. We need a signing oracle here because we do not encrypt a random
message instead of the signature as in Γ5 in the proof of Theorem 7.5.
Remark that in this game, the adversary cannot win with the condition 1b (pk′C ∈
{pkCi} and there exists no card with pk′C which outputs (idI,τI)). If I outputs (pk′C, idI,τI),
it means that an honest card instance with pk′C added (S,pk
′
C, idI,τI, .) in Table2 and
outputted (idI,τI).
Hence, in Γ3, the adversary cannot win. So, p0 is negligible.
We recommend using Eﬀ-pkDB [KV16] as a public-key distance bounding in ClessPay
as we see in Chapter 4, it is the most eﬃcient public-key distance bounding protocol hav-
ing the necessary security requirements for ClessPay. It only requires one exponentiation
and hashing.
The assumption on the signature scheme used by cards diﬀer in Theorem 7.5 (EF-MA)
and Theorem 7.6 (EF-CMA). Hence, it looks like to have security against both terminals
and cards we need DF, DH, MiM-secure DB protocol, IND-CCA secure encryption
scheme, and EF-CMA secure signature schemes. However, we could have the almost
security against malicious terminal if we have the following assumptions in Theorem
7.6: the encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure and the signature scheme used by cards
is EF-MA secure. In this case, the proof of Theorem 7.6 would need the same games
Γ2 and Γ5 in the proof of Theorem 7.5 instead of Γ3 in the proof of Theorem 7.6. So,
actually, to have full security in ClessPay, we need DF, DH, MiM-secure DB protocol,
IND-CCA secure encryption scheme, EF-CMA secure signature for issuers, and EF-MA
secure signature for cards.
7.4 EMV Analysis
EMV key setting is diﬀerent than our contactless-payment key setting because it has a
symmetric key shared between the card and its issuer as well as asymmetric keys.
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I(SI ,PI ,MKAC) T (PIC) C(PIC,SIC,PI ,MKAC)
Initialization
retrieve τ τ−−−−−→
{ED,PAN,PIC}←−−−−−−−−
Relay Resistance protocol
pick R1
R1−−−−−→ pick R2
check RTT
R2,timings←−−−−−−
Data Authentication and Transaction
pick UNT
UNT−−−−−→ ATC ← ATC++
SKAC ← Gen(MK,ATC)
SKAC ←
Gen(MK,ATC)
EARQC←−−−−− ARQC←−−−−− ARQC =
MACSKAC (lblARQC,UNT ,ATC,τ)
if
Verify(ARQC,SKAC)
ARC = 1
else: ARC = 0
ARPC =
MACSKAC (ARQC,ARC)
ARPC−−−−−→ ARPC−−−−−→ if ARC = 1 and
Verify(ARPC,SKAC):
TC =MACSKAC (lblTC,UNT ,ATC,τ)
else:
AAC =MACSKAC (lblAAC,UNT ,ATC,τ)
pick UNC
if
Verify(PIC,SDAD):
SDAD,TC←−−−−−− SDAD=
signSIC (TC,UNC,UNT ,R1,R2, timings)
Perform approval
else: Perform
decline
Figure 7.3 – The Simpliﬁed EMV protocol
An issuer I has a secret/public key pair SI/PI. It also has a master symmetric key
MKAC. A card C shares MKAC with its issuer I. It has a secret/public key pair PIC and
SIC. PIC is signed by I’s private key SI. C stores certiﬁed PI. We assume that the terminal
T knows the public key of the certiﬁcate authority (CA) to verify PI and so PIC. We also
assume that the channel between I and T is authenticated.
For the sake of simplicity, in Figure 7.3 and in our description, we assume that C
knows all terminal related information such as TCC, authentication method and also
terminal knows the card related information such as AID, PDOL and the elements in
CDOL1 and CDOL2 (See Appendix D for EMV abbreviations). The full protocol is in
Figure D.1 in Appendix D.
EMV contactless session consists of four phases without card holder (user) veriﬁcation
method (i.e., Online PIN, Signature):
• Contact Establishment with NFC card: T detects C.
• Transaction Initialization: T sends the transaction τ to C. Then, C responds with
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its public key PIC and card information such as PAN and expiration date (ED). If
T veriﬁes PIC, it continues to the next phase.
• Relay Resistance Protocol [emvb]: This protocol is executed if C and T support it.
Here, we assume that they support this feature. T picks a random number R1 and
sends this to C. C responds with another random number R2. It also sends timing
estimates (timings): Min Time For Processing Relay Resistance Protocol, Max
Time For Processing Relay Resistance Protocol, Device Estimated Transmission
Time For Relay Resistance Protocol. Then, T checks if the total time passed after
sending R1 exceeds the limit (let’s call it B). If the total time does not exceed B,
then the next phase begins. Otherwise, the transaction is canceled.
• Data Authentication: There are three type of authentication methods in EMV:
Static Data Authentication (SDA), Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) and
Combined Data Authentication (CDA). Because of some weaknesses in SDA and
DDA (replay attacks and wedge attacks), we consider CDA which is combined
with the next phase.
• Transaction: T sends a random number UNT to request a cryptogram generation
from C. In EMV, there are three type of cryptograms: Transaction Certiﬁcate
(TC), Authorization Request Cryptogram (ARQC), Application Authentication
Cryptogram (AAC). Here, we consider the online veriﬁcation where T requests
ARQC for an online veriﬁcation by the issuer. TC is used for the oﬄine veriﬁcation
by the issuer and AAC is used to cancel the transaction.
– Online Veriﬁcation: C increases its counter ATC and generates a secret key
SKAC by using ATC and the master secret key MKAC. Then, it generates the
cryptogram ARQC: a MAC of UNT ,ATC,τ (list of objects in CDOL1) with
using the secret key SKAC. C sends the cryptogram AC to T and T relays it to
I along with the card information. I veriﬁes the MAC and possibly validate
the information of C. If the cryptogram passes veriﬁcation and the card is
validated for the transaction, then I makes ARC = 1 and generates a MAC
of ARQC and ARC with the secret key SKAC. This MAC is called as ARPC.
After, it sends ARPC with its message to T and T relays it to C if ARC = 1.
Otherwise, it cancels the transaction.
C veriﬁes ARPC. If the veriﬁcation and ARC is true then C generates the
second cryptogram which is TC. TC is a MAC of CDOL2’s objects with SKAC
(See [emvc], Table 26)2 in order to show transaction is complete. Additionally,
it picks a random number UNC and generates a signature of UNC,UNT , ATC,
TC, timings,R1,R2. C signs it with SIC and sends the signature SDAD and the
signed message to T .
2Even if CDOL1 and CDOL2 list the same objects, some terminal related objects change because the
payment process continues (e.g., TVR) [Rad03].
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– Terminal checks if the signature and the data signed are valid. Later, the
terminal contacts with the issuer to receive the reimbursement and gives TC
as a proof of transaction completion by the card. In this case, the issuer
veriﬁes TC to execute the reimbursement.
EMV in Our Model: We use the following maps to match the EMV protocol with
Deﬁnition 7.1:
(skC,pkC) = ((MKAC,SIC),PIC), (skI,pkI) = ((MKAC,SI),PI), id = ATC,
Policy(pkC,CI, id,τ) = ARC, OutT = approval/ decline, OutI = Verify(TC,UNT ,ATC,τ),
POutI = (PIC,ATC,τ), POutT = (PIC,ATC,τ) and POutC = (ATC,τ).
7.4.1 Security Against Malicious Terminal in EMV
Clearly, the EMV protocol is not secure according to Deﬁnition 7.4 as the terminal can
approve relay resistance protocol however close C is. However, it is almost-secure against
malicious terminals. We prove it this in the following theorem. This proof is the ﬁrst
security proof for the EMV payment system.
Theorem 7.7. Assuming that MAC is EF-CMA secure and Gen is a pseudo-random
permutation, then EMV protocol is almost-secure against malicious terminals (Deﬁnition
7.4).
Proof. Γ0 : The instances of the issuer, terminals and cards play the game in Deﬁnition
7.4. We have a distinguished issuer instance I which outputs (PIC,ATC,τI).
In Γ0, there exists at most one card instance with PIC having ATC because ATC is a
counter and incremented by each new card instance. Let’s call this instance as C .
Γ1 : It is the same game with Γ0 except that the honest card instances picks a random
SK′AC instead of generating it with Gen(MK
′,ATC) and stores the random SK′AC in Table1
as (MK′,ATC′,SK′AC). If an issuer instance receives a card information belongs to an
honest card then it retrieves SK′AC from Table1. As Gen is a pseudo-random permutation,
|p1− p0| is negligible.
Γ2 : It is the same game with Γ1 except that we simulate MAC generation of honest
cards and veriﬁcation of MACs of honest cards’ instances by the issuer as follows:
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I(P′IC, S
′
IC,P
′
I ,MK
′
AC)
ATC′ = ATC′+1
pick SK′AC
store (MK′AC,ATC
′,SK′AC)
ARQC =MACSK′AC(lblARQC,UNT ,ATC
′,τ)
store (SK′AC,UN
′
T ,ATC
′,τ′,ARQC) in TableARQC
rest is the same until TC/AAC generation
if ARC = 1 and Verify(ARPC′,SK′AC):
TC =MACSK′AC(lblTC,UNT ,ATC
′,τ)
store (SK′AC,UN
′
T ,ATC
′,τ′,TC) in TableTC
else:
AAC =MACSK′AC(lblAAC,UNT ,ATC
′,τ)
store (SK′AC,UN
′
T ,ATC
′,τ′,AAC) in TableAAC
Verify′(AC, SKAC)
if (SKAC,UNT ,ATC,τ,AC) in TableAC
return 1
else: return 0
Γ2 is indistinguishable from Γ1 thanks to the security of MAC. The similar reduction
in the proof of Theorem 7.5 from Γ4 to Γ5 can be used to prove the indistinguishably.
So, |p2− p1| is negligible.
Γ3 : It is the same game with Γ2 except that I generates ARPC and then stores it to
TableARPC (similar storing as in Γ2). Then, the honest cards verify ARPC by checking if
it is in the TableARPC. Γ3 is indistinguishable from Γ2 because of the security of MAC.
So, |p3− p2| is negligible.
Clearly, in Γ3, the adversary cannot win with the condition 1b because I privately
outputs (PIC,ATC,τ) if and only if the card with PIC outputs ATC,τ.
In addition, it cannot win with the condition 2 because if ARC = 1, then no honest
card outputs ATC,τ and if an honest card receives a valid ARPC having ARC = 1, then
it means that ARPC is in TableARPC. So, I has (PIC,ATC,τ).
Since the adversary cannot win in Γ3, p0 is negligible.
However, there exists another problem in EMV related to ATC which we do not
consider in our security deﬁnition. It can be explained as follows: ATC is 16-bit number
and incremented at the beginning of each session. If ATC reaches the limit which 65535,
then the card is not valid anymore because EMV speciﬁcation does not let rotating the
counter due to the security reasons. According to EMV speciﬁcation [emvc] if cards
are used normally, it will approach the limit (65,535) transaction limit not so fast (60
per day every day for a 3-year card). However, an attacker who does not aim to make
a payment but aims to invalidate the card can trigger the card at most 65,535 times.
Then, the card cannot be used anymore.
7.4.2 Security Against Malicious Card in EMV
Unfortunately, EMV is not secure against malicious cards. In the following, we show
that an adversary can win with the second, third and fourth condition in Deﬁnition 7.3.
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Fake Transaction Attack: This attack comes from the fact that T cannot validate
TC in the signature SDAD because it does not have SKAC. Therefore, a malicious card
can generate an invalid TC′ in the last cryptogram generation process and use this
cryptogram while generating this signature. Then, the terminal will approve the payment
because the signature is correct. However, TC′ is not valid. So, when T contacts with I,
I cannot validate TC′. In this case, the malicious card succeeds to break the security of
EMV with breaking the fourth condition in Deﬁnition 7.3 because I cancels while T
does not.
Distance Fraud Attack: A malicious card can initiate a payment process with T ,
while it is not close T . In this case, it can send R2 before seeing R1 in order to reply early
enough. In this case, T thinks that the card is close. Here, the malicious card succeed to
break the security of EMV with breaking the third condition in Deﬁnition 7.3. This
type of attack is dangerous for an EMV payment because the malicious card can claim
later that it does not do the payment by showing that it was in somewhere else.
MiM Attack: The relay resistance protocol in EMV constructed to prevent relay at-
tacks by a MiM-adversary. In this attack scenario, a MiM-adversary relays the messages
between the card and the terminal to do the payment without the card’s consent. Re-
lay resistance protocol aims to prevent it by checking the distance of the card. The
assumption on its security based on the fact that the adversary cannot relay the mes-
sages faster than the speed of light. Therefore, the adversary cannot succeed to pass
the relay resistance protocol because it cannot guess R2 before R2 is picked by the card.
However, it has been shown that with guessing attacks [CHKM06] the security against
relay attacks is breakable for the protocols with single challenge/response exchanges. In
addition, Chothia et al. [CGDR+15] have already explained this vulnerability.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we concentrated on the formalism of contactless-payment system.
In this direction, we ﬁrst analyzed the components (issuers, terminals and cards)
of a contactless-payment system from EMV speciﬁcation [emva] which majority of
contactless-payment systems follow. Then, we formally deﬁned contactless payment
by deﬁning the inputs and outputs of the algorithms of issuers, terminals and cards.
Based on this deﬁnition, we gave two security deﬁnitions against malicious cards and
malicious terminals. We also considered relay attacks in our security deﬁnitions which
are very common attacks in contactless payment.
We constructed a contactless-payment protocol ClessPay in our model. In this pro-
tocol, the terminal determines the distance of the card by using a secure public-key
distance bounding protocol to prevent the relay attack and then the rest of the protocol
continues with the authentication of the card and the issuer. We proved the security of
ClessPay against malicious cards and malicious terminals formally.
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Finally, we analyzed current EMV-contactless protocol [emvd] in our model. We
realized that it is not secure against malicious cards because MiM-attack and DF-attack
which are based on relay attacks. In addition to this, we formally proved that EMV-
contactless protocol is secure against malicious terminals. Our analysis is the ﬁrst formal
cryptographic analysis of EMV-contactless protocol.
If we compare ClessPay and EMV contactless in regard to cryptographic computations
executed by the cards, we see that EMV contactless is slightly more eﬃcient since public-
key operations are less in EMV contactless. A card in EMV contactless has to compute
two MAC, verify one MAC and generate one signature. While a card in ClessPay has
to compute one public-key encryption, generate one signature and verify one signature.
However, to have the highest level of the security, it is the price to pay and with a
dedicated hardware on smart cards, this price is not so high. As a future work, assuming
that changing completely EMV speciﬁcation is very hard, we can recommend some
adaptations on EMV contactless to have full security without changing too much the
basic structure of the protocol.
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Part III
Positioning

Chapter 8
Formalism on Localization
A positioning system is used to help in determining the location of an object. Positioning
systems are widely used in our world. Global Positioning System (GPS) is the most
popular one among existing ones. Some applications of positioning systems such as
military, emergency (e.g, medical), and prison are very critical because any inconsistent
result may be very harmful. Therefore, the security of these systems becomes more of
an issue because they are run in a malicious environment. In this chapter, we consider
one of the problems related to positioning systems which is localization. In localization,
a user aims to ﬁnd its position by using a wireless network. We formally deﬁne the
problem of localization and construct a formal security model. We describe algorithms
and protocols for localization which are secure in our model.
Related Works Global Positioning System (GPS) [ME06] is a widely used positioning
system consisting of satellites above earth. A GPS receiver on earth receives signals
from at least four satellites and computes its distances from these satellites in order to
locate itself. GPS is vulnerable to spooﬁng attacks [Sco01, NLD+12, TPRCˇ11, PJ08]
by impersonating the signals or delaying the signals. Kuhn [Kuh04] proposed to use
asymmetric cryptography to have the integrity on signals of navigation systems (e.g.,
GPS). However, the problem related to delay of signals is not considered. Ranganathan
et al. [RO´Cˇ16] introduced SPREE which is a spoof resistant GPS receiver.
Some other positioning systems are based on wireless networks which work locally
(e.g., indoor areas). Therefore, this type of positioning mechanisms is called localization
in the literature. A localization system consists of multiple bases which help a user to
locate itself. These bases know their own location and a user computes its own location
by referencing the locations of bases. Bases are called beacon nodes, locators or anchors
in the literature but we call as bases in this chapter. In such a system, the aim of an
adversary is to make a user output a wrong location.
There are some techniques used to determine a location. We can divide them into
two categories: range-dependent [LPCˇ05, NN03a, CˇH05a, LND05b, SHS01] and range-
independent [RL+02, NN03b, SPS02, LP04, LP06] techniques. Range-dependent al-
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gorithms require measurement of distances by using the time of arrival as used in GPS,
the time diﬀerence of signal arrival or the angle of arrival. In general, distance bounding
(DB) [BC93] is the main method to measure distances in range-dependent algorithms.
Range-independent algorithms do not require distance measurement. They estimate the
location using properties of the networks such as hop counts, a topology of the network.
Compared to range-dependent ones, their accuracy is low but they do not require a
special hardware.
There exist many localization algorithms based on diﬀerent assumptions. We mention
here some important ones. For more details about previous works, there exist surveys
by Srinivasan and Wu [SW07] and Zeng et al. [ZCH+13]. Lazos and Poovendran con-
structed a range-independent localization protocol SeRLoc [LP04] and HiRLoc [LP06]
without malicious base assumption and with malicious base assumption, respectively.
They have an analysis against wormhole attacks [ZCH+13] and sybil attacks [NSSP04].
In order to protect SeRLoc and HiRLoc against wormhole attack, they assume that the
adversary cannot jam the communication which weakens their security model. Lazos et
al. [LPCˇ05] constructed a protocol called ROPE by combining SeRLoc with a method
called veriﬁable multilateration by Cˇapkun and Hubaux [CˇH05a]. Veriﬁable multilatera-
tion uses distance bounding [BC93] in order to verify the computed location. Diﬀerently
than SeRLoc, this protocol is not aﬀected by communication jamming but still has a
weaker security model because of the honest base assumption.
Liu et al. [LND05a] proposed a localization algorithm with using a detection mech-
anism to detect the cheating bases. They assume that there are some honest detecting
bases which are indistinguishable from users. Liu et al. [LND05b] constructed a location-
estimation scheme based on ﬁltering the malicious bases. Zhang et al. [ZLFW06] pro-
posed a method where bases execute multiple times distance bounding with a user to
detect delays in signals by analyzing inaccurate changes in the distance bounding phase.
So, they rely on some mistakes and malfunctioning on the adversary’s side which is an
underestimation of the adversary. In addition, they assume that the bases are honest.
Cˇapkun et al. [CˇCˇS06] introduced a model in which part of the bases are either hidden
from users or mobile. This is meant to avoid the generic attack by preventing attackers
to position properly for a localization attack to work. The model is relatively simple but
Chandran et al. [CGMO09] showed that the locations of hidden bases can be discovered
if a user is allowed multiple executions of the protocol and gets feedback on whether its
position claim was accepted or not.
Diﬀerently, Zhong et al. [ZJUQ08] analyzed the tolerance of a robust localization
algorithm against the maximum number of malicious bases. They proved that it is not
always possible to accurately output a location if half of the bases or more than half of the
bases are malicious. They proposed two localization algorithms. Both of them have cubic
polynomial complexity in a two-dimensional space, but one of them has better average
complexity. However, in their complexity analysis, they do not consider the complexity
of testing collinearity although they have an assumption related to this. Comparing to
Zhong et al. [ZJUQ08], we do not let our algorithms output a location if some malicious
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behaviors are detected. Instead, they can be rerun after ﬁltering the malicious nodes for
robustness. We have this approach because outputting a wrong location can have some
bad consequences depending on the application. In addition, thanks to this diﬀerence,
we have more tolerant localization algorithms against malicious bases.
Although there exists a lot of research on this topic, the security analyses are informal,
or a speciﬁc attack-based (e.g., wormhole attack, sybil attack) or has no precise formal
security model. For example, none of the mentioned protocols (except Zhong et al.
[ZJUQ08]) take into account the collinearity of locations. Collinear locations of bases,
as we discuss in Section 8.3.1, give a very good advantage to an adversary and even
aﬀect the correctness of the algorithm. The protocols [CˇCˇS06, LPCˇ05, ZLFW06] using
distance bounding do not discuss about the security requirement on DB. The distance
bounding protocol suggested to use the veriﬁable multilateration method [CˇH05a] is not
secure against distance hijacking so it lets a malicious base shorten the actual distance.
Therefore, the localization algorithms [LPCˇ05, CˇCˇS06] using this method is not secure
if this level of DB used since their security analysis is based on the assumption that the
attacker cannot shorten the distance.
8.1 Our Contribution
In this chapter, we contribute to the formalism of localization. We deﬁne a security
model and construct protocols. In more detail, our contributions can be enumerated as
follows:
• We deﬁne two notions, non-interactive and interactive localization, with precise
inputs and outputs. The former is given to have a concrete deﬁnition of a local-
ization algorithm which outputs a location given some inputs. The latter is given
to describe an interactive protocol between bases and a user who wants to learn
its location. Our localization deﬁnitions based on trilateration method which uses
distances to output a location.
• We integrate the adversarial and communication model of distance bounding with
interactive localization. As we see in Part I, distance bounding is a well studied
problem in cryptography [ABK+11, DFKO11, BMV13a, BMV13b, BMV15, BV14].
Therefore, instead of deﬁning a new model, we beneﬁt from the DB model
[BMV13a] that we give in Section 2.2.1. Accordingly, we deﬁne the security of
non-interactive and interactive localization considering malicious bases. We have
a stronger security model compared to previous work because we give more power
to adversaries such as replacing honest bases and users to any place that they want
and running them polynomially many times. This is a realistic power to be given
to the adversary because an adversary can change the place of honest bases in the
real life even though it cannot corrupt them.
• We analyze the circumstances under which we are guaranteed to ﬁnd the correct
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locations of the users. Consequently, we prove that if at least half of the bases are
honest then we can always output a correct location of a user.
• We construct three non-interactive localization algorithms with diﬀerent levels of
resistance against malicious bases. We give a general protocol for an interactive
localization protocol which uses a secure non-interactive localization algorithm.
We show that an instance of this generic protocol is secure against delays on
communication for certain regions.
Structure of the chapter: In Section 8.2.1, we give formal deﬁnitions for localization
and its security. In pursuit of this, we introduce distance estimate protocols in Section
8.2.2 which is used to output a distance of a party. In Section 8.3.1, we give three non-
interactive localization algorithms and analyze their security. Then, in Section 8.3.2, we
describe the framework for an interactive positioning with a security proof and show an
instance of it with one of our non-interactive localization algorithms. We conclude this
chapter with Section 8.4.
8.2 Deﬁnitions
Notations: We useM as an aﬃne space of dimension t and d as the Euclidean distance.
Given locx ∈M, S(locx,dx) is called t-sphere and deﬁned as follows:
S(locx,dx) = {loc ∈M : d(locx, loc) = dx}
We use Conv(loc1, loc2, ..., locm) to describe the convex hull constructed by
loc1, loc2, ..., locm ∈M.
Independent locations: A set of locations are independent if and only if their com-
binations span the entire space M. For this, we use a function dep :Mm →{0,1} to check
if given m locations are dependent or not. If they are dependent it outputs 1. Otherwise,
it outputs 0.
The function dep can be computed as follows: Let’s take loc1 as an origin and−−−−−→
loc1loc2,
−−−−−→
loc1loc3, ...,
−−−−−→
loc1locm as vectors. The m locations are dependent if and only if
these vectors are linearly dependent. For this, dep function can check if the rank of a
matrix whose columns or rows are these vectors is less than or equal to m−1.
8.2.1 Localization
Localization aims at allowing a user to compute its location with the help of a number of
bases. We deﬁne two variants: Non-Interactive Localization and Interactive Localization.
We call a location and distance pair (locBi ,di) is correct if the distance between the
location of a user and locBi is di.
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Deﬁnition 8.1 (Non-Interactive Localization (NIL)). An NIL consists of a parameter n,
a metric space M and one probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm NIL. n corres-
ponds to the number of bases B1,B2, ...,Bn with respective locations locB1 , locB2 , ..., locBn ∈
M. NIL uses the locations of bases locB1 , locB2 , ..., locBn and the distance of these loca-
tions to the user’s location d1, . . . ,dn, respectively, as an input. At the end, NIL outputs
a location locU ∈M or ⊥.
Correctness: NIL is correct for all M, locations and distances, if all location/distance
pairs are correct and there exists no t + 1 dependent locations, NIL always outputs a
correct location of the user.
Deﬁnition 8.2 (Interactive Localization (IL)). An IL consists of a tuple
(KB,KU ,B,U,n,M) where KB and KU are key generation algorithms, U is a user al-
gorithm, B is a base algorithm, n is the number of bases and M is a metric space.
KB outputs a secret/public pair (skB,pkB) for the base algorithm B and KU outputs a
secret/public key pair (skU ,pkU) for the user algorithm U . Each base Bi runs B inter-
actively with the input (skBi ,pkBi ,pkU , locBi) where locBi ∈M is the location of a base Bi.
A user runs U interactively with the input (skU ,pkU ,pkB1 ,pkB2 , ...,pkBn). At the end, U
outputs locU ∈M or ⊥.
Correctness: An IL is correct for all secret/public key pairs, locBi ’s of which no t+1
are dependent, n and M if under honest execution of B and U , U always outputs a
location locU which is the location of the user in M.
NIL/IL and robust localizations diﬀer with the outputs. Robust localization al-
gorithms always output a location while the output of NIL/IL may be an abort message
⊥. Zhong et al. [ZJUQ08] analyzes the maximum number of malicious bases which can
oﬀer resistance. By allowing the ⊥ output, we obtain tolerance to a larger number of
malicious bases. Indeed, we give an algorithm (NIL2 in Section 8.3.1) which securely
works even if the number of malicious inputs is more than the half of the bases.
We ﬁrst give the security of an NIL algorithm. In this deﬁnition, we cover that a
secure NIL algorithm never outputs wrong location if at most k location/distance pairs
are wrong.
Deﬁnition 8.3 (k-secure NIL). We deﬁne the security of NIL by a game. In this game,
the adversary generates n-pairs (locBi ,di) and locU where each locBi ∈M and locU ∈M
and each number of t + 1-locations are independent. Up to k pairs (locBi ,di) can be
incorrect. The adversary wins if the NIL algorithm outputs loc′U such that loc
′
U =⊥ and
locU = loc′U . An NIL protocol is k-secure if for any such game an adversary cannot win.
Remark that in k-security of NIL, we consider an NIL algorithm secure even if the
algorithm outputs ⊥. With the following deﬁnition, the adversary wins if it also achieves
to make a NIL algorithm output ⊥.
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Deﬁnition 8.4 (k-full-secure IL). The game is deﬁned as in k-secure IL. The adversary
wins if the NIL algorithm outputs loc′U such that locU = loc′U . An NIL protocol is k-full-
secure if for any such game an adversary cannot win.
Now, we give the adversarial and communication model that we consider for IL pro-
tocols.
Adversarial and Communication Model: We adopt the adversarial and commu-
nication model for distance bounding [BMV13a] described in Section 2.2.1. The provers
in the DB model corresponds to bases in the localization model and the veriﬁers in
the DB model corresponds correspond to the users in the localization model. Diﬀer-
ently than DB, we have the following assumption in our model. Bases can retrieve their
location correctly to input the algorithm B.
Deﬁnition 8.5 (k-secure IL). We deﬁne the security of IL by a game. The game consists
of a number of n-bases. In the game, the adversary chooses the corrupted bases. Let us
denote the set of bases by B and the set of corrupted bases by C ⊂ B with |C | ≤ k.
Next, we generate secret/public key pairs of honest bases {(skB,pkB)}B∈B\C with KB and
secret/public key of user (skU ,pkU). The adversary generates the secret/public key of
corrupted bases {pkB}B∈C by using {pkB}B∈B\C and pkU as an input. The adversary can
create multiple instances of U and bases and it can move them any location in M. At the
end of the game, one instance of U outputs loc′U . The adversary wins if loc
′
U = ⊥ and
locU = loc′U . IL protocol is k-secure if for any such game the probability of the adversary
to win is negligible.
In k-security game of IL, we let the adversary run user and base algorithms at any
location multiple times by corrupting at most k-malicious bases. If one of the instances
of U outputs a wrong location, then the adversary breaks the k-security. None of the
previous work considers such security model. Diﬀerently, we give to the adversary the
power of replacing honest instances as it wishes.
We note that we can also deﬁne k-full-secure IL, by replacing the winning condition
loc′U =⊥ and locU = loc′U with loc′U = locU only.
8.2.2 Distance Estimate Protocols
In range dependent localizations, a user algorithm U needs to know its distance relative
to some known locations. Therefore, we need a protocol which outputs the distance
between two locations. The idea is to use distance bounding protocols to provide U with
the distance estimates. DB protocols [BC93] only output an accept/reject bit. Here, we
deﬁne a slight variant of DB that we call distance estimate (DE) protocols. DE protocols
output d, an upper-bound on the distance between V and the prover. We also adapt
the MiM-security of DB to DE which will be used to prove the security of IL protocols
based on distance estimate protocols.
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Deﬁnition 8.6 (Public-key DE Protocol). A distance estimate protocol is a two-party
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) protocol and it consists of a tuple (KP,KV ,V,P).
(KP,KV ) are the key generation algorithms of P and V , respectively. Their outputs are
KP(1)→ (skP, pkP) and KV (1)→ (skV , pkV ). P is the proving algorithm, V is the veri-
fying algorithm where the inputs of P and V are (skP, pkP) and (skV , pkV ) as described.
P(skP, pkP, pkV ) and V (skV , pkV ) interact with each other. At the end of the protocol,
V (skV , pkV ) outputs a ﬁnal message OutV which is either a distance or ⊥ and a private
output POutV = pkP.
A DE protocol is correct if and only if under honest execution, whenever a veriﬁer V
and a prover P lie at a distance D from each other, V always outputs OutV = D.
To deﬁne the security of DE protocols we, adapt the man-in-the-middle (MiM) security
of DB to the security of DE.
Deﬁnition 8.7 (Modiﬁed MiM Security (mMiM-security)). The game begins by running
the key setup algorithms KV and KP, which output (skV , pkV ) and (skP, pkP) respectively.
The adversary receives pkP and pkV . The game consists of several veriﬁer instances
including a distinguished one V , an honest prover P and an adversary. The adversary
wins if OutV = ⊥ and there is no prover instance at distance OutV or less from V . A
DE protocol is mMiM-secure if for any such game, the adversary wins with negligible
probability.
We can easily derive a DB protocol from a DE protocol with the following transform-
ation.
Deﬁnition 8.8 (T transformation). Let pDE = DE(KP,KV ,P,V ) be a DE protocol. In
the end, V outputs d: a distance estimate or abort message. We transform pDE into a
DB protocol pDB= DB(KP,KV ,P,V ′,B) with the following veriﬁer algorithm V ′:
V ′(skV ,pkV )
run V (skV ,pkV )→ OutV ,POutV
if OutV =⊥ and OutV ≤ B:
output OutV = 1
else:
output OutV = 0
We use the notation T (pDE,B) = pDB to show this transformation.
It may not be always possible to have a transformation from a DB protocol to a DE
protocol. However, we can show that the MiM-security of the transformed DB protocol
and the mMiM-security of DE protocol is equivalent.
Theorem 8.9 (MiM-security ⇔ mMiM-security). A DE protocol pDE =
DE(KV ,KP,V,P,B) is mMiM-secure according to Deﬁnition 8.7 if and only if for
any B, T (pDE,B) is MiM-secure (Deﬁnition 2.12).
Proof. mMiM-secure ⇒ MiM-secure: Consider a MiM game Γ for pDB= T (pDE,B).
We deﬁne the mMiM-game Γ′ for pDE by simulating Γ. Whenever Γ succeeds, we have
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OutV < B and no honest prover instance at a distance up to B. So, Γ′ succeeds as well and
Pr[Γ succeeds] ≤ Pr[Γ′ succeeds]. If pDE is mMiM-secure, Pr[Γ′ succeeds] is negligible.
So, Pr[Γ succeeds] is negligible.
mMiM-secure ⇐ MiM-secure: Consider an mMiM game Γ′ for pDE. Let B be the
distance from V to the closest instance. Consider the same game Γ for pDB= T (pDE,B).
Whenever Γ′ succeeds, we have OutV < B so Γ succeeds as well. Thus, Pr[Γ′ succeeds]≤
Pr[Γ succeeds]. If pDB is MiM-secure, those probabilities are negligible.
8.3 Localization Protocols
8.3.1 Non-Interactive Localization
In a t-dimensional M, given number of t+1 independent locations locB1 , locB2 , ..., locBt+1 ∈
M and their corresponding distances d1,d2, ...,dt+1 to a certain location locU ∈M, we can
compute locU as
I = {locU}= S(locB1 ,d1)∩S(locB2 ,d2)∩ ...∩S(locBt+1 ,dt+1).
We can see that for all i ∈ {1,2, ..., t+1}, locU ∈ S(locBi ,di). Therefore, it is clear that
we can ﬁnd locU by intersecting spheres. Now, we show why we need at least t + 1
spheres.
Lemma 8.10. In a t-dimensional Euclidean space M, the intersection of t+ 1 spheres
with independent centers has a cardinality at most 1.
Proof. Let’s take locB1 as an origin and let x=
−−−−−−−→
locB1 loclocU be a vector which is equivalent
to locU . We have the following equation:
d2i −d21 = d(locU , locBi)2−d(locU , locB1)2
= ||−−−−−−→locU locBi ||2−||
−−−−−−→
locU locB1 ||2
= ||−−−−−−→locB1 locU −
−−−−−−→
locB1 locBi ||− x · x
= (x−−−−−−−→locB1 locBi) · (x−
−−−−−−→
locB1 locBi)− x · x
=
−−−−−−→
locB1 locBi · (
−−−−−−→
locB1 locBi −2x) (8.1)
So, x is a solution of system of equations as in Equation (8.1) for all i ∈ {2,3, ..., t +
1}. All −−−−−−→locB1 locBi ’s are linearly independent vectors since locB1 , locB2 , locB3 , ..., locBt+1 are
independent. Therefore, this system of equations can have at most one solution x.
Note that for the intersection of t spheres, the linear system gives a line. The intersec-
tion between a line and a sphere has cardinality limited to two. Thus, the intersection
of t-spheres with independent centers gives at most two points.
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Figure 8.1 – Dependent locations locBu , locBv and locBw in 2-dimensional metric space.
The spheres intersect on two points so it is not possible to decide which one is locU .
The NIL algorithm is essentially ﬁnding the intersection of t + 1 spheres. However,
the crucial point of an NIL algorithm is to see if we can ﬁnd the correct location locU
with an NIL algorithm, which takes n-location/distance pairs as input, given that k of
those are wrong. Clearly, if n = t+1 and k > 0, it is not possible to have a correct NIL
algorithm. Therefore, n > t+ 1 is a necessary requirement. However, we need to know
what is the requirement on k in order to obtain locU with a correct NIL algorithm.
The following lemma shows under which circumstances we can be sure that we obtain
locU from the possible intersection points.
Lemma 8.11. Given number of n spheres {S(locBj ,d j)}ni=1 where at least n− k of them
include a location locU ∈M (equivalently, the distance between locBj and locU is d j), let
us deﬁne the following score for all locx ∈M:
#i(locx) = |{i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}|locx ∈ S(locBi ,di)}|.
Given that any number of t+1 of locBi’s are independent and n≥ 2k+ t, then for any
locx ∈M, we have the following results:
• if locx = locU , then #i(locx)≥ n+t2 and
• if #i(locx)> n+t2 , then locx = locU .
Proof. Let’s analyze the cardinality of #i(locx) for locx = locU and locx = locU .
If locx = locU , from the assumption, #i(locU)≥ n− k.
If locx = locU , locx ∈ S(Bj,d j) for at most number of t spheres which also include locU
due to Lemma 8.10. Besides, if locx = locU , locx ∈ S(Bj,d j) for at most number of k
spheres which do not include locU . Thus, if locx = locU , #i(locx)≤ k+ t.
• We prove that if locx = locU then #i(locx)≥ n+t2 :
If locx = locU , we know that #i(locU)≥ n− k. Since n≥ 2k+ t implies that n− k ≥
n+t
2 , we can conclude that #i(locU)≥ n− k ≥ n+t2 .
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• We prove that if locx = locU , then #i(locx) ≤ n+t2 : Since n ≥ 2k+ t implies that
k+ t ≤ n+t2 , #i(locx)≤ k+ t ≤ n+t2 .
Lemma 8.11 implies that locx = locU is equivalent to #i(locx)> n+t2 when any number
of t+1 locBi ’s are independent and n> 2k+ t. If n+ t is odd locx = locU is equivalent to
#i(locx)> n+t2 when any number of t+1 locBi ’s are independent and n≥ 2k+ t
Using the result of Lemma 8.11, we construct an NIL-1 algorithm.
NIL-1: We describe NIL-1 in Algorithm 1. Here is an overview of it.
Let L= {locBj}nj=1 be the set of diﬀerent positions in M and let {d j}nj=1 be the distance
between locBj and a location locU ∈M, n> t, n≥ 2k+ t if n+t2 is odd and n> 2k+ t if n+22
is even.
With each location/distance pairs (locBu ,du), NIL-1 outputs either locU or abort mes-
sage ⊥ by trilateration using spheres.
In order to guarantee a certain security level, NIL-1 has to check independence of each
number of t+1-locations. Therefore, it ﬁrst runs a dependency test function dep. If dep
outputs 1 for a t + 1 location tuple, the NIL-1 aborts and outputs ⊥. As the security
can be corrupted with dependent locations, the algorithm does not continue.
If there exists no dependent t + 1 locations, it continues as follows: To avoid
enumerating every sphere, it starts by ﬁrst picking t diﬀerent locations of bases
locBu1 , locBu2 , ..., locBut ∈ L at random such that the intersection of the spheres
{S(locBui ,dui)}ti=1 is not empty. At this point, the intersection I includes at most two
locations. Then, NIL-1 keeps track of the number of spheres which are diﬀerent than
{S(locBui ,dui)}ti=1 and which include the location(s) in I. Whenever it ﬁnds a location
which is on more than n+t2 spheres, then it outputs this location as locU .
Correctness: If all inputs are correct and there exists no t + 1 dependent locations,
then locU ∈ I at the ﬁrst iteration of the for all loop. So, count[locU ] = t at this point.
Then, the algorithm continues to intersect I with the rest of spheres. As all location/dis-
tance pairs are correct and locations are independent, the rest of the intersections include
only locU . Therefore, count[locU ] = n. Since, we have n> n+t2 , NIL-1 always outputs locU .
Complexity: We consider the dependency test and the intersection computation in
our complexity analysis. Dependency test and intersection are counted as O(t3) which
is the complexity of classical Gaussian Elimination. Therefore, the best, worst and
expected complexity is O(nt+1t3) which is a polynomial. In real life cases, dimension two
or three is used so the complexity is O(n3) and O(n4), respectively.
Theorem 8.12 (k-security of NIL-1). If n ≥ 2k+ t, NIL-1 is k-secure (as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 8.3).
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Algorithm 1 NIL-1(locB1 , . . . , locBn ,d1, . . . ,dn)
1: for all possible t+1-tuple (locBu1 , locBu2 , ..., locBut+1) do
2: if dep(locBu1 , locBu2 , ..., locBut+1)→ 1 then
3: return ⊥
4: end if
5: end for
6: for all possible t-tuple (locBu1 , locBu2 , ..., locBut ) do
7: I ←∩ti=1S(locBui ,dui) (comment: |I| ≤ 2)
8: if I = /0 then
9: for locx ∈ I do
10: count[locx] = t
11: end for
12: for locBut+1 ∈ L\{locBu1 , locBu2 , ..., locBut} do
13: {locx}← I∩S(locBut+1 ,dut+1) (comment: |{locx}| ≤ 1)
14: if {locx} = /0 then
15: count[locx]← count[locx]+1
16: if count[locx]> n+t2 then
17: return locx
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: end if
22: end for
23: return ⊥
Proof. Assume that there exists locx = locU such that count[locx] > n+t2 (which is the
only case that an adversary wins). Remark that n+t2 < count[locx] ≤ #i(locx). From
Lemma 8.11, we know that given n ≥ 2k+ t and independence of every t+1 location, if
#i(locx)> n+t2 , then locx = locU which contradicts our assumption.
Theorem 8.13 (k-full-security of NIL-1). If n ≥ 2k+ t and n+t2 is odd, NIL-1 is k-
full-secure (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 8.4) and if n > 2k+ t and n+t2 is even, NIL-1 is
k-full-secure (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 8.4).
Proof. We need to prove that NIL-1 always outputs locU . We prove in Theorem 8.12
that if NIL-1 outputs a location locx =⊥ then locx = locU .
Now, we show that NIL-1 never outputs ⊥. Let’s assume that NIL-1 outputs ⊥. It
means that for all locx ∈⋃ I, #i(locx) = count[locx]≤ n+t2 .
• If n ≥ 2k+ t and n+t2 is odd, n− k ≥ n+t2 . Since n+t2 is an odd number, actually,
n−k> n+t2 because n−k is a positive integer. We also know from Lemma 8.11 that
#i(locU)≥ n− k > n+t2 which contradicts with our assumption.
• If n > 2k+ t and n+t2 is even, n− k > n+t2 . We also know from Lemma 8.11 that
#i(locU)≥ n− k > n+t2 which contradicts our assumption.
127
NIL-1 is secure and always returns the right location (if there are no dependent t+1
locations) as long as n> 2k+t and n+t2 is even or n≥ 2k+t and n+t2 is odd. We now propose
another algorithm whose resistance to corrupted pairs is higher but which returns ⊥ as
soon as malicious inputs are detected.
NIL-2: We give NIL-2 in Algorithm 2. NIL-2 ﬁrst has to check the independence of
each t+1-locations as NIL-1. Therefore, it ﬁrst runs a dependency test function dep. If
dep outputs 1 for a t + 1-location tuple, NIL-2 aborts and outputs ⊥. As the security
can be corrupted with dependent locations, the algorithm does not continue.
If there exists no dependent t+1 locations, it picks a t+1-location tuple at random
and intersects the spheres constructed from these location. Note that the intersection
has at most one location. Then, NIL-2 checks if the rest of the spheres includes the
location in this intersection. If one sphere does not include it, it outputs ⊥. Otherwise,
it outputs the location in the intersection.
Algorithm 2 NIL-2(locB1 , . . . , locBn ,d1, . . . ,dn)
1: for all possible t+1-tuple (locBu1 , locBu2 , ..., locBut+1) do
2: if dep(locBu1 , locBu2 , ..., locBut+1)→ 1 then
3: return ⊥
4: end if
5: end for
6: pick a tuple (locBw1 , locBw2 , ..., locBwt+1)
7: {locx}← ∩t+1i=1S(locBwi ,dwi) (remark that |{locx}|= 1 or I = /0)
8: if {locx}= /0 then
9: return ⊥
10: end if
11: for all locBi ∈ L\ tuple do
12: if locx /∈ S(locBi ,dI) then
13: return ⊥
14: end if
15: end for
16: return locx
Correctness: If all inputs are correct and there exists no t + 1 dependent locations,
clearly, the algorithm always outputs locU .
Complexity: The worst case and the best case complexity of NIL-2 is O(nt+1t3). Here,
we consider dependency test, intersection computation and checking if a sphere contains
location in our complexity analysis. In real life cases, dimension two or three is used so
the complexity is O(n3) and O(n4), respectively.
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Theorem 8.14 (k-security of NIL-2). If n > k+ t, NIL-2 is k-secure (as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 8.3).
Proof. Assume that NIL-2 is not k-secure when n > k+ t. So, the adversary wins k-
security game for NIL-2. In line 7 of Algorithm 2, if I = {locU}, then the adversary
cannot win. So, we can assume that NIL-2 computes I = {loc′U} where locU = loc′U when
the adversary wins.
NIL-2 outputs loc′U if all spheres include it. From Lemma 8.11, we know that we can
have at most t correct spheres which include loc′U . So, if n > k+ t, there exists a sphere
which does not include loc′U and NIL-2 outputs ⊥. Therefore, the adversary cannot win
k-security game when n > k+ t. This contradicts our assumption. So, NIL-2 is k-secure
when n > k+ t.
NIL-2 is not k-full-secure because if there exists an incorrect location whose sphere
does not intersect with any other spheres, then NIL-2 outputs ⊥.
We give a variant of NIL-2 which has lower computational complexity and have the
same security level with an extra assumption.
NIL-3: We give NIL-3 in Algorithm 3 with the assumption that n> k+t and any t+1-
locations which have correct distances are independent. NIL-3 ﬁrst picks t+1-locations.
If they are dependent, then it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it intersects the spheres constructed
from t+1-independent location-distance pairs. If the intersection is not empty, then it
checks if the spheres constructed from other location-distance pairs includes the location
in the intersection. If all spheres include, NIL-3 outputs this location. Otherwise, it
outputs ⊥.
Algorithm 3 NIL-3(locB1 , . . . , locBn ,d1, . . . ,dn)
1: pick a tuple locBu1 , locBu2 , ..., locBut+1 ∈ L
2: if dep(locBu1 , locBu2 , ..., locBut+1)→ 1 then
3: return ⊥
4: end if
5: {locx}←⋂locBui∈tuple S(locBui ,dui) (remark that |{locx}|= 1 or I = /0)
6: if {locx}= /0 then
7: return ⊥
8: end if
9: for all locBi ∈ L\ tuple do
10: if locx /∈ S(locBi ,dI) then
11: return ⊥
12: end if
13: end for
14: return locx
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Theorem 8.15 (k-security of NIL-3). Assuming that any t + 1-locations which have
correct distances are independent and n > k+ t , NIL-3 is k-secure (as deﬁned in Deﬁn-
ition 8.3).
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 8.14. The only case that
the adversary can win the k-security game is when tuple = {locx} = {locU}. Therefore,
assume that NIL-3 is in this case. NIL-3 outputs locx if all spheres includes it. From
Lemma 8.11, we know that we can have at most t correct spheres which include locx as
any t+1-locations which have correct distances are independent. So, if n > k+ t, there
exists a sphere which does not include locx and NIL-3 outputs ⊥.
Correctness: If all inputs are correct and there exists at least one t+1 independent
locations, clearly, the algorithm always outputs locU .
Complexity: In our complexity analysis, we take into account the dependency test,
the intersection computation and checking if a sphere includes a location. The complexity
of NIL-3 is O(t3+nt) because it does one dependency check and checks whether number
of n-spheres include locx.
Remarks: NIL-3 is the most eﬃcient algorithm comparing to NIL-1 and NIL-2 as long
as there exists at least one correct t + 1-independent location/distance. NIL-3 can be
useful if location of bases are designated considering their independency. However, if it
is not the case, NIL-2 and NIL-1 are better options. NIL-1 is k-full secure algorithm
while NIL-2 is secure (not full) with more incorrect pairs. However, it does not correct
bad inputs as much as NIL-1 does. It rather outputs ⊥ instead of trying to correct.
Therefore, diﬀerently than robust localization [ZJUQ08], with our localization deﬁnition
(Deﬁnition 8.1), we can achieve higher security. By using NIL-2, we give an IL protocol
which is secure in a given area with unlimited delay attack.
8.3.2 Interactive Localization
A user algorithm in an IL protocol does not have locations of bases and distances between
bases’ locations and the user’s location as an input. However, they can be deduced during
the protocol. Once U obtains locations and distances, it can use a k-(full)-secure NIL
algorithm (e.g., Algorithm 1, 2 and 3) which outputs the location of the user.
Apparently, a secure DE protocol can be used to learn the distances once U learns the
locations of bases. However, if some locations are not correctly obtained (due to dragging
attacks) or if some precise delays are introduced during the DE protocol execution (by
delay attacks), then security problems occur. In more details, these attacks which cause
problems on security are as follows:
Delay Attack on DE (See Figure 8.2 and 8.3): It is not possible to prevent
delays on arrival of messages in a DE protocol. If a distance computation is based
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Figure 8.2 – No adversary delays. Points
without label are honest bases. B4 is honest.
U M
locA
B
4
delay
Figure 8.3 – Points without label are
honest bases, B4 is honest. B4 is
delayed.
on communication time in a DE protocol, delays cause incorrectness. For example,
consider an adversary which actively involve in m-rounds challenge/response phase and
delays the communication time. More speciﬁcally, in each round i, the adversary delays
the exchange of challenge/response in total by 2ΔA amount of time so that the response
arrives V at 2dP + 2ΔA instead of 2dp. At the end, V outputs the distance as dP +ΔA
where there is no prover at this distance. If the adversary executes the delay attack to
a DE protocol between the user and the base, then the pair (locBi ,di) will be corrupted
as di is not correct.
Dragging Attack (See Figure 8.4):
Our adversarial model lets a malicious base run an arbitrary algorithm B∗. So, B∗ may
use an arbitrary location loc′B as if loc
′
B is its location instead of its real location locB
(e.g., d(locU , locB) < d(locU , loc′B)). If U obtains the correct distance di = d(locU , loc
′
B)
with an incorrect location loc′B, this eﬀectively shortens the perceived distance to locBi .
We call this attack dragging attack, as it seems as if Bi moved away while dragging U
behind. This is illustrated in Figure 8.4.
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Figure 8.4 – Dragging Attack. M1 convinces U that it is closer to locM1 than it really is
by pretending to be at loc′M1 .
Generic Construction: We propose a generic construction for an IL protocol in
Figure 8.5. First, U generates a random nonce N and broadcasts it. After receiving N,
each base Bi generates a signature SBi of the message (N, locBi) with their secret key skBi
and sends the signature to U . U veriﬁes the signature to be sure that the locations are
sent by the bases. If all signatures are valid, then U starts a DE protocol with each base
Bi sequentially in order to obtain its distance to each bases’ locations. U runs the veriﬁer
algorithm of the DE protocol and Bi runs the prover algorithm of the DE protocol. At
the end, U has all (locBi ,di) pairs and obtains its location by running an NIL algorithm
(e.g., NIL-1, NIL-2, NIL-3).
U(skU ,pkU ,{pkBi}) Bi(skBi ,pkBi ,pkU , locBi)
pick N ∈ I N=========⇒
if VerifypkBi
(SBi ,N, locBi)→ False
SBi ,locBi←−−−−−−−−− SBi = SignskBi (N, locBi)
cancel
run V (skU ,pkU)→ di DE←−−−−−−−−→ run P(skBi ,pkBi ,pkU)
run NIL({locBi},{di})→ locU
output locU
Figure 8.5 – The generic construction of an IL protocol. Double arrow represents broad-
casting (i.e., all bases receive N).
Theorem 8.16 (k′-security). Assume that number of k bases out of n bases are malicious
and number of  honest bases have their communications delayed (but not modiﬁed) by
the adversary during the execution of IL, and k′ ≥ k+ . If the signature scheme is EF-
CMA secure, the underlying DE protocol is mMiM-secure and NIL is k′-secure then IL
in Figure 8.5 is k′-secure (as in Deﬁnition 8.5).
Proof. Γ0: Instances of bases and instances of the user play the game in Deﬁnition 8.5
with our assumptions.
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Γ1: We reduce Γ0 to Γ1 where (locBi ,N) pairs do not repeat. With u queries, the
probability that (locBi ,N) repeats in Γ0 is at most
u
|I| , which is negligible if I is large
enough. Therefore, |p1− p0| is negligible.
Γ2: We reduce Γ1 to Γ2 where we simulate honest bases’ instances and the veriﬁcation
algorithm Verify with Verify′ as follows:
Bi(skBi , pkBi , pkU , locBi)
receive N
SBi = signskBi (locBiN,τ,r)
store (SBi ,pkBi ,N, locBi) in Table
send SC, locBi
run P(skBi,pkBi ,pkU )
Verify′pkBi (SBi ,N , locBi)
if (SBi ,pkBi ,N, locBi) in Table
return 1
else: return 0
The diﬀerence occurs between Γ1 and Γ2 when U receives a valid and forged signature.
In this case, U in Γ2 outputs ⊥ while U in Γ1 continues. Therefore, to prove that the
diﬀerence between Γ1 and Γ2 is negligible, we assume the existence of an adversary A that
makes U receive a forged signature in Γ1 with probability p. We can then build B that
simulates the k′-security game (Γ1) to win the EF-CMA game for a given public key pk
as follows. B ﬁrst sets up keys for the honest bases and generates n−k−1 secret/public
key pairs. It selects a base Bi among the honest bases at random and assigns pk as its
public key. Then, it gives all public keys. It then simulates the k′-security game for A .
The simulation ofU is as in IL protocol and the simulation of the bases is as follows: If A
sends Ni to Bi, B sends (locBi ,Ni) to the EF-CMA signature oracle, and replies with the
signature from the oracle. Otherwise, B simulates each honest Bj = Bi as in IL protocol.
Whenever U receives a signature σ for a loc′Bj = locBj that was not asked in previous
queries, B uses it as a forgery attempt. The probability that the forged signature was
produced using pk is 1n−k′ and A produces a valid signature with probability p. Thus,
B wins the EF-CMA game with probability pn−k′ . As the signatures scheme is EF-CMA
secure, pn−k′ is negligible. So, |p1− p2| is negligible.
Remark that in Γ2, the location of honest bases are always correct.
Γ3: We reduce Γ2 to Γ3 where the algorithm V run by a user instance cancels if
the estimated distance di of an honest base from U is such that di < d(locBi , locU). To
prove that the diﬀerence between Γ2 and Γ3 is negligible, we assume the existence of
an adversary A that makes U output a distance di < d(locBi , locU) with probability p′
in Γ2. Then, we can build B, an mMiM adversary, with the advantage p
′
n . Let V be
the distinguished veriﬁer instance for B’s mMiM-security game. B simulates U using
veriﬁer instances and the bases using prover instances. B picks a base Bi and executes
the DE protocol with V . The rest of the DE protocols are executed with other veriﬁer
instances. With probability 1n , the protocol executed with V is the one targeted by A
and V outputs di < d(locBi , locV ) with probability p
′. Thus, B wins with probability p
′
n .
As the DE protocol is mMiM-secure, this probability and |p3− p4| are negligible.
In Γ3, number of n− k− = n− k′ honest bases’s location/distance pair is correct and
U obtains locU using the NIL algorithm. So, Γ3’s security is equivalent to k′-security of
NIL algorithm. As we know that the NIL algorithm is k′-secure, Γ3 is k′-secure as well.
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The main problem in the IL protocol is that the number of honest bases whose com-
munication is delayed is independent from the number of malicious bases. Even if there
exists no malicious base, all honest bases’ communication can be delayed. So, it is im-
possible to achieve secure IL in Theorem 8.16 if we do not limit the number of delays.
Remark that in Theorem 8.16, we have the assumption that k′ ≥ k+  to limit the num-
ber of delays. Therefore, we give another theorem in which we do not need to limit the
number of delays. We start with some preliminary lemmas:
Lemma 8.17 ([CˇH05a]). For any two points locU and loc′U (locU = loc′U) located within
a Conv(locBi , locBj , locBk), at least one, but not more than two, of the following inequalities
hold:
di > d′i ;d j > d
′
j;dk > d
′
k
where di represents the distance between locU and locBi and d
′
i the distance between loc
′
U
and locBi.
Lemma 8.18. (Lemma 8.17’s extension) For all B1, . . . ,Bh and for all locU , loc′U ∈
Conv(B1, . . . ,Bh), there exists Bi such that d(locBi , loc
′
U)< d(locBi , locU).
Proof. Let B1, . . . ,Bh be arbitrary, locU ∈ Conv(B1, . . . ,Bh) and loc′U = locU such that
∀i,d(locBi , loc′U) ≥ d(locBi , locU). We will prove loc′U /∈ Conv(B1, . . . ,Bh). Let Π be the
half space of all P’s such that d(locP, loc′U) ≥ d(locP, locU). We have ∀i,Bi ∈ Π, so
Conv(B1, . . . ,Bh)⊆Π. Since loc′U /∈Π we have loc′U /∈Conv(B1, . . . ,Bh).
Let us call the IL protocol which uses NIL-2 as IL-2 protocol. In the following theorem,
we prove that IL-2 is k-secure in a speciﬁc area.
Theorem 8.19 (k′-security of IL-2). Let H be the set of honest bases. Let O=Conv(H )
be the convex hull of honest bases.
Assuming that a user located at locU ∈O, if the signature scheme is EF-CMA secure,
the underlying DE protocol is mMiM-secure and NIL-2 is k′-secure then U of IL-2 outputs
loc′U in the security game in Deﬁnition 8.2 such that:
Pr[loc′U ∈O∧ locU = loc′U ]< δ
where δ is negligible.
Proof. Let = |{Bi ∈H |d(locBi , loc′U)≥ d(locBi , locU)}|.
Γ0: The adversary plays a very similar game to the k-security game from Deﬁnition 8.5
with the following change: the adversary wins this game if U outputs loc′U ∈O, locU =
loc′U .
We use the reductions from Theorem 8.16 to produce a game Γ3 such that |p0− p3| is
negligible.
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In Γ3, all di’s are such that di ≥ d(locBi , locU) and at most number of k′ location/dis-
tance pairs are incorrect.
Now, we are in k′-security game for NIL-2. We know from Lemma 8.18, there exists Bj
such that d j = d(locBj , loc
′
U)< d(locBj , locU)≤ di. NIL-2 outputs loc′U ∈O if and only if
all spheres including S(locBj ,d j) has loc
′
U . In Γ3, all di’s are such that di ≥ d(locBi , locU).
So, NIL-2 never outputs loc′U .
8.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed formal model for the security of localization. We ﬁrst
deﬁned the security of a localization algorithm and a localization protocol by integrating
the communication and adversarial model of distance bounding. Then, we analyzed the
number of corruption on bases in order to guarantee outputting the correct location of the
user. Thanks to this result, we constructed a secure localization algorithm NIL-1 which
does not need to enumerate all t-tuples after checking the independence of locations.
Then, we described another algorithm NIL-2 which works securely with more number
of incorrect locations. We also constructed NIL-3 which is more eﬃcient comparing
to NIL-1 and NIL-2 with an extra assumption of having at at least t + 1-independent
correct location/distance pairs. However, NIL-2 and NIL-3 are not full-secure as they
directly aborts if they ﬁnd some inconsistency. On the other hand, NIL-1 is secure with
less numbers of incorrect locations but it is also full secure. Then, we constructed an
interactive localization protocol between bases and a user. This protocol consists of a
secure distance estimate protocol, a secure signature scheme and a secure localization
protocol. We ﬁrst analyzed its security in case of limited delay attack executed by
adversaries. Second, we showed that our protocol is secure in certain areas without
limitation on delay attacks.
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Chapter 9
Proof of Location
Chandran et al. [CGMO09] bring a novel approach to cryptography which is using the
position of a person as a credential because the location of a person may also deﬁne
the identity of this person (e.g., we trust a bank teller behind the window without
checking her identity because of her location). One of the fundamentals of position-based
cryptography is secure positioning, where a party convinces multiple veriﬁers that (s)he
is at a certain location. Unfortunately, it is not possible to achieve secure positioning in
Vanilla model as shown in [CGMO09]. Because of this, we propose a diﬀerent model.
We build our new model that we call proof of location (PoL). PoL is constructed on top
of secure hardware model (SHM) for distance bounding as described in Chapter 5, and
our localization model given in Chapter 8. In this integrated model, we assume that
the secure hardware is the part of the prover but it is always honest while the prover
can be malicious. We do not have any key set up for the prover. It only authenticates
himself with its location by using his hardware. Our model can ﬁt in real life situations.
For instance, consider that only people in an oﬃce can access printers and the prover
who wants to print has to show that he is at the oﬃce. In this case, the prover using
his hardware can prove his position. Consider a pizza company which has a delivery
service. This pizza company can produce its hardware to be distributed to people who
use the delivery service. Later on, whenever a person orders a pizza, this person can also
prove his location to be veriﬁed with a given address. Thus, the company can prevent
fraudulent people who order pizza just for the denial of service.
Related Works Secure positioning is a well-studied problem in wireless security.
Sastry et al. [SSW03] give a secure positioning protocol which uses an echo distance
bounding. The veriﬁers aim to understand if the prover is in a claimed area. They as-
sume that the veriﬁers are always honest but this assumption weakens the security model
comparing to other works. There are other secure positioning protocols [ZLFW06, SP05]
in this weaker model as well.
Cˇapkun and Hubaux [CˇH05b] introduce a mechanism called Veriﬁable Multilateration
(VM) consisting of at least three veriﬁers (in two-dimensional space) which have constant
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location, an authority and a prover. The veriﬁers determine the proximity of the prover
by using a distance bounding protocol. Then, the authority runs a test protocol between
them to validate the distances learned. If any delay attack is detected, the validation
fails. The validation detects delays due to the fact that a prover inside the triangle
which is consisted of three veriﬁers cannot prove diﬀerent position without delaying.
The adversarial model of VM is consisting of an external attacker and compromised
nodes. The main drawback of VM is informal security analysis. For example, their
security analyzes are based on that the attacker cannot shorten its distance but the DB
protocol used in VM actually lets a compromised node shorten its distance with distance
hijacking attacks. Perazzo and Dini [PD15] discuss about the negative eﬀect of non-ideal
distance bounding against VM as implementing an ideal DB is hard.
Cˇapkun et al. [CˇCˇS06] also introduced a model in which part of the infrastructure
bases are either hidden from users or mobile. This is meant to avoid the generic attack
by preventing attackers to position properly for the attack to work. The model is rel-
atively simple but Chandran et al. [CGMO09] show that hidden bases’ positions can be
discovered if a user is allowed multiple executions of the protocol and gets feedback on
its position claim was accepted or not (both reasonable assumptions). Another attack
with constant probability of success is described to defeat the protocol based on mobile
stations.
Delae¨t et al. [DMRT11] consider stronger adversarial model than previous works,
where each node in a wireless sensor network does not have any information about the
other nodes. This means that a node can cheat on its location. They give an algorithm
which detects faking nodes and analyze their algorithm in which cases the algorithm
works correctly. In the similar adversarial model, Hwang et al. [HHK07] propose a
faking node detection algorithm which works probabilistically.
Secure positioning is a problem of vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). Song et al.
[SWL08] propose a method to detect and prevent spooﬁng attack by using an honest
neighbor node. So, the adversarial model is rather limited.
Chandran et al. [CGMO09] brings a novel cryptographic approach to the secure
positioning and introduce position-based cryptography. They also propose to use the
position for cryptographic protocols such as a secure key exchange. They prove that
secure positioning is impossible in the Vanilla model. Therefore, they provide a new
model for secure positioning with a bounded storage. However, this model is limited
because its security is based on the adversary has a limited storage. There are also
quantum approaches [CFG+10, BK11, BCF+14, LL11] for position-based cryptography.
Lastly, Akand and Safavi-Naini [ASN18] introduced region authentication. Here, a
prover proves that it is in a region instead of in a speciﬁc location. In their setup,
prover has a secret key and identiﬁed with this so it cannot apply to position-based
cryptography.
138
Proof of Location
9.1 Our Contribution
• We deﬁne the problem of secure positioning in a diﬀerent way in order to obtain
an achievable security. We consider a model which integrates localizations and
tamper-proof devices for proof of location. Our model for the proof of location is
based on the secure hardware model [KV18a] and localization model.
• In our model, the prover does not have any credential than its location as suggested
by Chandran et al. [CGMO09].
• We propose a protocol which is constructed on top of a weak variant of distance
bounding and localization algorithm. We formally prove its security according to
our security model.
Structure of the Chapter: In Section 9.2, we give the deﬁnition of proof of knowledge
(PoL) and its security model. Then, we propose a PoL protocol and prove its security
in Section 9.3. We conclude this chapter with Section 9.4.
9.2 Deﬁnitions
We ﬁrst give the deﬁnition of a proof of location and then show the security model.
Deﬁnition 9.1 (Proof of Location (PoL)). A proof of location protocol PoL consists of a
tuple (KH ,Vl,Pl,Hl) and an IL tuple (KB,KU ,B,U,n,M) as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 8.2. KH
is the key generation algorithm outputting (skHl ,pkHl ). Vl is the algorithm of a location
veriﬁer with the input pkHl , Pl is the algorithm of a location prover with no input and Hl
is the algorithm of the prover’s hardware with the input (skHl ,pkHl ,{pkBi}). At the end
of the interactions between these algorithms, Vl outputs a location loc ∈M or ⊥.
Correctness: A proof of location protocol with secure hardware is correct for all
locBi ’s, secret/public key pairs, n and M if Vl,Pl,Hl and B run correctly, Vl always outputs
the location of Pl.
Remark that in our model for PoL, we do not require a key setup for the prover. The
veriﬁer identiﬁes the prover according to his location and the key of the hardware is not
related with the prover’s credential.
Adversarial and Communication Model: Our adversarial and communication
model for PoL is integrated from localization model in Section 8.3.1 and the secure
hardware model (SHM) for DB in Section 5.2. In PoL model, we add the following as-
sumptions related to the SHM in addition to those from the localization model explained
in the previous sections.
• Hardware are always honest.
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• Provers can be corrupted by an adversary and corrupted provers can run an arbit-
rary algorithm P∗l .
• Each prover possesses a secure hardware.
We note that we do not have the assumption ‘the secure hardware of an honest prover
can only communicate with its prover and they are both at the same location’ of the SHM
in our PoL model. We do not want a location prover to have any other credential or
identity other than its location. If we had this assumption, then the hardware would be
the part of the location prover’s credential, which is equivalent to having a key setup for
the location prover. So, our model can be imagined as there are some hardware which
help any party to prove its location as veriﬁers in secure positioning.
Deﬁnition 9.2 ((k,ε)-PoL Security). The game is played with an IL protocol. It begins
with the same game set up as in Deﬁnition 8.2. It also runs the key generation algorithm
KH . The adversary can create polynomially many instances of the location prover Pl, the
hardware Hl and the location veriﬁer Vl. If one of the location-veriﬁer instances outputs
loc ∈M message while d(loc, locP) > ε for all locations of Pl’s instances locP, then the
adversary wins the game. We say PoL is secure if for any such game the probability of
an adversary to win is negligible.
We now give a diﬀerent DB deﬁnition than the one we see until now. We remove the
key setup of DB and obtain Keyless DB. This type of DB lets us construct PoL without
any key setup on the location-prover side.
Deﬁnition 9.3 (Keyless DB). A keyless distance bounding protocol is a two-party prob-
abilistic polynomial-time (PPT) protocol and it consists of a tuple (V,P,ε). P is the
proving algorithm with no input, V (1) is the verifying algorithm where  is the security
parameter. At the end of the protocol, V (1) outputs a ﬁnal message OutV ∈ {0,1}.
A Kless DB protocol is correct if and only if under honest execution, whenever a
veriﬁer V and a prover P lie at most a distance ε from each other, V always outputs
OutV = 1.
Deﬁnition 9.4 (Security of Keyless DB). In keyless DB game, the adversary can run
multiple instances of V and P. If one of the instances of V outputs 1 while there exists
no instance close to V , then the adversary wins. A keyless DB is secure, if the success
probability of an adversary in this game is negligible.
We give an example of a keyless DB protocol in Figure 9.1. In the protocol, V ﬁrst picks
randomly a bit string C whose each bit corresponds to challenges. Then, in the challenge
phase, V sends the challenge ci (ith bit of C). P responds with the same challenge. At
the end, V checks if all responses ri are equal to ci and if all arrived on time.
Theorem 9.5. Echo is a secure keyless DB.
Proof. Lemma 3.4 implies that the echo protocol is secure. So, the success probability
of the adversary is at most 12 .
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V (1) P
pick C ∈ {0,1}
challenge phase
for i= 1 to 
ci =C[i], start timeri
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ receive ci
stop timeri
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = ci
veriﬁcation phase
check timeri ≤ 2ε,ri =C[i] OutV−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 9.1 – Echo Protocol for Keyless DB
9.3 Proof of Location Protocol
We can achieve PoL with secure hardware by the following protocol PoLH (See Figure
9.2). It is straightforward due to our hardware assumption. First, the hardware checks
if a party is around it, learns its own location and executes the proof by sending the
signature of its location. The details are below.
Hl(skHl ,pkHl ,{pkBi}) Pl Vl(pkHl )
Distance Bounding
N ←N
N←−−−−− N←−−−−− start timer
run V (1)→OutV KlessDB←−−−−→ run P
if OutV = 0:
cancel Localization
with all Bi
run U(skU ,pkU{pkBi})→ loc
IL←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ run B(skBi ,pkBi ,pkU , locBi)
Proof
Vl(pkHl )
σ= signskS(locH ||N)
σ,loc−−−−−→ σ,loc−−−−−→ stop timer
if VerifypkS(σ,N, loc)→ 0
or timer > T :
output ⊥
else:
output loc
Figure 9.2 – PoLH
PoLH : In the key setup of PoLH , KH ﬁrst generates a secret/public key pair (skU ,pkU)
by running KU of an IL protocol and generates another pair (skS,pkS) by using the
key generation algorithm of a signature scheme. At the end, it outputs (skH ,pkH) =
((skU ,skS),(pkU ,pkS)). Here, we assume that there exits n bases which have secret/public
key pairs {(skBi ,pkBi)} generated by KB of an IL algorithm.
In the ﬁrst stage of the protocol, V picks a nonce N and sends it to the location prover
Pl. It also starts the timer. Then, Pl sends the nonce N to H. After receiving N, the
hardware and the location prover start to run a keyless DB protocol so that the hardware
makes sure that there exists a party in ε-neighborhood of it. Here, the hardware runs
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V (1) of KlessDB and the location prover runs P. If the location prover proves that it
is in ε-neighborhood, then the hardware starts to learn its own location. To do so, it
starts an IL protocol with n bases. During localization, it runs U(skU ,pkU ,{pkBi}) and
obtains a location loc ∈M. Then, the proving phase begins. The hardware generates
the signature of the message N||loc by skS. Then, it sends loc and the signature σ to the
veriﬁer via the location prover. The veriﬁer stops the timer and veriﬁes both the nonce
and the signature. If the signature passes the veriﬁcation and if timer is not more than
expected (timer < T )1, the veriﬁer outputs loc. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Theorem 9.6. If the signature scheme is EF-CMA secure and IL protocol is k-secure
and KlessDB is secure (Deﬁnition 9.4), then PoLH in Figure 9.2 is secure with the
presence of at most k malicious bases.
Proof. Γ0: This is the PoL’s security game with the protocol PoLH .
Γ1: We reduce Γ0 to Γ1 where (locU ,N) pairs do not repeat. With r queries, the
probability that (loc,N) repeats in Γ0 is at most r|N | , which is negligible if N is large
enough. Therefore, |p0− p1| is negligible.
Γ2: We reduce Γ1 to Γ2 where the location veriﬁer always rejects if the signature
received is not generated by Hl. We can easily show that the case which diﬀers Γ2 and
Γ3 happens with negligible probability by using the EF-CMA security of the signature
scheme. So, |p2− p1| is negligible.
Γ3 : We reduce Γ2 to Γ3 where the location that Hl learns cannot be wrong. We can
show that if H obtains a wrong location, we can construct an adversary which breaks
the security of IL by simulating the bases in IL. Therefore, |p3− p2| is negligible.
In Γ3, locations received by all veriﬁer instances are correct.
Γ4 : We reduce Γ3 to Γ4 where we simulate the hardware instance by canceling the
protocol if there exists no close party which has a distance at most ε.
We show that if there exists an instance Pl which is further than ε and its matching
instance Hl do not cancel, then we can construct a keyless DB adversary A . A simulates
the hardware against Pl by V in keyless DB security game. A behaves same Pl against
keyless DB security game. If Pl succeeds, then A succeeds. Therefore, |p4 − p3| is
negligible.
So, in Γ4, the hardware continues if there exists a party in ε-neighborhood of loc which
is the location of the hardware. In this case, the adversary cannot win Γ4.
9.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we described a security model for the proof of location problem. In our
model, we considered the existence of honest hardware which are possessed by provers
who want to prove their location. There exists no key setup for the prover. The PoL
1T can be considered as the maximum time given to H in order to execute the Keyless DB and
localization protocols.
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model is the combination of localization and secure hardware DB models. We construc-
ted a protocol where the hardware obtains the location of the prover and prove this
location to a veriﬁer. We proved that this protocol is secure in our model. Our PoL
model is achievable and so far the only alternative to the bounded memory assumption
which is used in [CGMO09].
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Chapter 10
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we focused on the role of position in cryptography. So, we solved some
existing problems related to distance bounding, we provided security models for speciﬁc
applications of proof of proximity with distance bounding, and we constructed localiza-
tion algorithms and secure positioning protocols.
First, we concentrated on the theory of distance bounding. We considered diﬀerent
structures for DB and analyzed the optimal security bounds for it. In one of the struc-
tures called sync structure, we included the prover in time computation of the challenge
phase. We obtained better optimal security bounds for MiM-security with the prover’s
involvement. In the other structure, we randomized the time of sending challenges by
the veriﬁer. We added this change to the veriﬁer in the common structure and the sync
structure and obtained better security bounds for MiM and DF security. Then, we con-
structed the most eﬃcient public-key distance bounding protocol in its security level.
Our eﬃcient protocol Eﬀ-pkDB and its private variant Eﬀ-pkDBp is a generic construc-
tion which consists of a D-AKA secure key agreement protocol and a one-time secure
symmetric DB protocol. We also provided a variant of it which requires less security
from the symmetric DB. In the end, we compared the eﬃciency and the security of our
protocols and we saw that our protocols are better in terms of eﬃciency and security.
Moreover, we constructed a model called the secure hardware model by considering the
problem of deﬁning the terrorist-fraud security. With this model, we showed that the
terrorist-fraud security is possible. We also showed some relations between SHM and
plain model.
Second, we integrated distance bounding with contactless access control and contact-
less payment. These applications need a proof of proximity for their security. So, our
integration provided full security. For contactless access control, we constructed a secur-
ity and a privacy model. In the AC-security model, we used the same adversarial and
communication model as distance bounding and provided a security deﬁnition which
covers MiM-attacks, DH-attacks, and impersonation attacks. In the privacy model, we
considered the same adversarial and communication model and we provided a privacy
deﬁnition which takes into account timing as the AC security model. We showed how
145
to convert a distance bounding protocol into an AC protocol securely. However, this
conversion does not preserve privacy so we suggested analyzing privacy before using the
conversion. For contactless payment, we provided a security model considering the ma-
licious terminal and malicious card. We constructed a new secure contacless payment
protocol ClessPay. Besides, we proved the security of the contactless EMV-protocol
against malicious terminals in our model. We show some vulnerabilities of contactless
EMV against malicious cards.
Third, we focused on localization and secure positioning. We considered the secur-
ity of localization algorithms and the security of interactive-localization protocols. We
designed three secure localization algorithms. We constructed a generic protocol for
interactive localization which consists of a distance estimate protocol (equivalent to dis-
tance bounding), a signature scheme and a localization algorithm. Then, we considered
secure positioning. Instead of using the structure of the existing secure positioning pro-
tocols, we deﬁned the new one and called proof of location. The security model of proof
of location consists of the combination of the secure hardware model and the localization
model. In the end, we constructed a proof of location protocol and proved its security.
Future Work: Privacy in symmetric DB has not been considered formally. It can
be an interesting issue to work because the prover who runs a symmetric DB may
need privacy as much as the prover who runs a public-key DB. Beyond the theory
of DB, there are still issues for implementing distance bounding even though we have
some developments on it [CHKM06, SLCˇ17, HK05, RCˇ10, HK08]. This is an important
problem to solve.
In IL, we consider a perfect environment in which the user always obtains the correct
distance from distance estimate protocols in an honest environment. However, in real
life, this is not always the case. The messages may arrive later than they are supposed
to arrive owing to some communication traﬃc. In such environments, our protocols
do not work because they always output ⊥. As a future direction, the IL security can
be deﬁned considering an imperfect environment and an error margin can be suggested
considering the security of IL protocols.
Another future work can be about how to adapt PoL in position-based cryptography
introduced by Chandran et al. [CGMO09]. For example, PoL can be considered for the
position-based secure communication or the position-based decryption.
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Appendix A
Review of Public-Key DBs
A.1 Brands and Chaum Protocol [BC93]
Brands and Chaum [BC93] introduced the ﬁrst DB protocol in Figure A.1.
The veriﬁer V knows the public key (pk) of the prover, and the prover P has the
corresponding secret key (sk). P picks a random n-bits message a and commits on it
(let’s denote the commitment by A). V picks an n-bits challenge c as well. P sends the
commitment A to V . Then, the challenge phase begins which consists of n rounds. V
sends a challenge ci in each round i which is the ith bit of c. P sends the response ri
which is ai⊕ci where ai is the ith bit of a. In the veriﬁcation phase, P signs the transcript
c1|r1|...|cn|rn with sk. Finally, P sends the decommitment of A which is a,ρ and the
signature σ. Then, V accepts P if the following conditions hold:
• σ is valid which means that c1|r1|...|cn|rn is signed by P.
• a,ρ is correct which means A= Commit(a;ρ).
• Each response ri is correct which means that mi = ri⊕ ci for all i ∈ {1, ...,n}.
• Each response ri is received on time (for a round trip at distance B).
Security: The protocol in Figure A.1 is DF-secure and MiM-secure [BC93]. The
security proofs are based on the secure signature and commitment schemes. It is not
TF-secure [BC93] and not DH-secure [CRSCˇ12]. Clearly, this protocol does not cover
privacy because the signature makes the identity of the prover clear.
A probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary breaks DF-security and MiM-
security of the Brands-Chaum protocol with the probability ( 12)
n.
We prove the DF and MiM security of the Brands-Chaum protocol in the model
deﬁned in Chapter 2.
Theorem A.1. If Commit is computationally binding, then the Brands-Chaum protocol
is DF-resistant. More precisely, any DF attack has a probability of success bounded by√
2−n+negl.
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Veriﬁer Prover
input: pk (sk,pk)
initialization phase
pick a ∈ Zn2
A←−−−−−−−−−−−−− A= Commit(a;ρ)
challenge phase
for i= 1 to n
pick ci ∈ Z2
start timeri
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ receive ci
receive ri, stop timeri
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = ai⊕ ci
veriﬁcation phase
Verifypk(σ,transcript), verify A= Commit(a;ρ)
a,ρ,σ,c,r←−−−−−−−−−−−−− σ= Signsk(transcript)
check timeri ≤ 2B,ri = ai⊕ ci OutV−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure A.1 – The Brands-Chaum Protocol [BC93].
Proof. We consider a DF attack. The prover picks some random tape t then succeeds in
the attack with probability p(t) over the distribution of ci’s. We simulate the attack by
picking r then running the attack twice with the same r and thus the same commitment
A= Commit(a;ρ). In the ﬁrst attack, the challenges seen are c. In the second run, if one
ci changes, then the challenges seen is c′ = c. For the ﬁrst ci changed, the view of the
prover is unchanged at the time the prover must release ri, so ri = r′i. In this case, the
value on which to open the commitment must change as well. If the two runs succeed
and if the veriﬁer did not select the same set of challenges, then a′ = r′ ⊕ c′ = r⊕ c = a
is changed so we break the binding property. This happens with probability at least
E(p(t)2)− 2−n. Hence, by assumption, we must have E(p(t)2) = 2−n + negl. The DF
attack succeeds with probability E(p(t)). Due to the Jensen inequality, we have
E(p(t)) = E(
√
p(t)2)≤
√
E(p(t)2)≤
√
2−n+negl
Theorem A.2. If Commit is computationally hiding and the signature scheme resists
to existential forgery under chosen message attacks, then the Brands-Chaum protocol is
MiM-secure.
Proof. We consider a MiM game with winning probability p. First, we reduce to a game
in which no two prover instances select the same a value. The winning probability is
at least p− poly · 2−n where poly is some polynomial. Second, we reduce to a game in
which the signature accepted by V is not a forgery. The winning probability is at least
p−poly ·2−n− pforge. We have pforge = negl thanks to the security of the signature.
For each i, we deﬁne a gamei in which winning implies that a veriﬁer instance receives
the signature produced by the ith instance of the prover. Let pi be the winning probability
of gamei. We have p ≤ poly · 2−n + pforge+∑i pi. The number of i’s is polynomial. To
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bound pi, we remark that the ith instance of the prover and the matching veriﬁer instance
must see the same c and r because otherwise, the signature will not be valid and so the
veriﬁer instance will reject the prover (gamei fails). This deﬁnes a= c⊕ r. We can then
reduce gamei to a game in which the adversary is given the signing key to simulate all
other prover instances except the ith one. For the ith one, the adversary cannot use the
signing key because the winning condition is that the signature has to come from ith
prover instance. So, the ith instance commits to a random value a′ and the adversary
runs a man-in-the-middle attack between this instance and V which succeeds only if
he gets the right a = a′. We let m be the number of c′i that the adversary sends to
this prover instance before receiving the corresponding ci from V . Remark that the
adversary should send c′i before receiving the ci to be able to receive the response from
the prover on time. For the attack to succeed, the adversary must guess ci = c′i. So, this
works with probability 2−m. For the remaining n−m rounds, the adversary must guess
the ai from the commit value only to compute ri correctly. Guessing ai is easier than
guessing ci from an information theoretic view point as the adversary has a clue A on
a. So, we could assume m = 0 without loss of generality. The game reduces to guessing
a completely which is impossible due to the computationally binding property. So pi is
negligible. Hence, pi ≤ 2−n+negl.
Performance: The prover commits on n-bits message and signs 2n-bits message. In
return, the veriﬁer checks the commitment and the signature.
A.2 HPO [HPO13]
Hermans et al. [HPO13] constructed a public-key DB protocol (Figure A.2).
The veriﬁer V and the prover P use elliptic curve cryptography in this protocol. There-
fore, the domain parameters of the protocol are an elliptic curve E deﬁned over the ﬁeld
Zp and its subgroup G which has prime order , a generator G ∈G.
V and P have secret-public key pairs (skV ,pkV = skVG), (skP,pkP = skPG), respectively.
In the initialization phase, V and P agree on a secret key. For this, P selects two
ephemeral secret keys r1,r2 ∈Z∗ and sends the ephemeral public keys R1 = r1G,R2 = r2G.
Similarly, V selects his ephemeral secret key r3 ∈Z∗ and sends R3 = r3G. In the end, both
agree on the secret key a0|a1 = a′0|a′1 = [xcoord(r1R3)]2 = [xcoord(r3R1)]2 which is the
ﬁrst 2 bits of xcoord function. xcoord function maps a point U = (Ux,Uy) to Uxmod.
Then, V selects an element e ∈ Z∗ and the ﬁrst n bits of e represent the challenge bits ci.
Next, the challenge phase which consists of n rounds begins. In each round i, P
computes the response fi = a′ci,i when he receives challenge ci from V . Here, a
′
ci,i is the
ith bit of aci .
In the veriﬁcation phase, V veriﬁes if the responses arrived on time and whether they
are correct. If so, V sends e and P checks if it is consistent with c. Then, P computes
a blinding factor (for privacy) xcoord(r2pkV) and s= skP+er1+ r2+xcoord(r2pkV ) and
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Veriﬁer Prover
(skV ,pkV ) (skP,pkP)
input: pkV
initialization phase
pick r1,r2 ∈ Z∗
pick r3,e ∈ Z∗
R1 ,R2 ,pkP←−−−−−−−−−−−−− R1 = r1G, R2 = r2G
R3 = r3G
R3−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
a0‖a1 = xcoord2n(r3R1) a′0‖a′1 = xcoord2n(r1R3)
challenge phase
for i= 1 to n
ci = biti(e)
start timeri
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
stop timeri
fi←−−−−−−−−−−−−− fi = a′ci ,i
veriﬁcation phase
check timeri ≤ 2B, fi = aci ,i e−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ check biti(e) = ci
s←−−−−−−−−−−−−− s= skP + er1 + r2 +xcoord(r2pkV )
pkP = (s−xcoord(skVR2))G− eR1 −R2 OutV−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
private output: pkP
Figure A.2 – The Hermans-Peeters-Onete (HPO) Protocol [HPO13].
sends s. After receiving s, V computes pkP = (s− xcoord(skVR2))G− eR1 −R2. In the
end, pkP is the private output of V and V outputs OutV .
Security: The HPO protocol is DF-secure, MiM-secure and weak-private (proofs are
in [HPO13]) in the security model of Du¨rholz et al. [DFKO11] (which is diﬀerent than
the model in Section 2.2). It is not strong private [Vau15b] and not TF-secure [HPO13]
and not DH-secure because of the attack explained below.
The assumptions on the security and privacy of HPO are “One More Discrete Logar-
ithm (OMDL) [BNPS03]”,“x-Logarithm (XL) [BG07]”,“Diﬃe Hellman (DH)”,“extended
Oracle Diﬃe Hellman (eODH) [HPO13]” and “Conjecture 1 [HPO13]”. Some are ad-hoc
assumptions.
A PPT adversary breaks the DF-security of HPO with the probability ( 34)
n and MiM-
security of HPO with the probability (12)
n.
DH-attack to HPO: Our DH-attack is shown in Figure A.3. The malicious prover
P knows the public key pkP′ of an honest and close prover P′. So, he picks his public
key pkP as pkP′ −K where K = kG and k is selected from Z∗ . P does not involve into the
interaction between V and P′ in the initialization phase and the challenge phase and sees
all transcripts between them. After the challenge phase, P replaces s generated by P′
with s′ = s−k. When V receives s′, he computes (s′ −xcoord(skVR2))G−eR1−R2 which
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Veriﬁer Honest Prover Malicious Prover
(skV ,pkV ) (skP′ ,pkP′ ) pkP = pkP′ − kG,G
input: pkV
initialization phase
pick r1,r2 ∈ Z∗
R1 = r1G, R2 = r2G
R1 ,R2−−−−−−−−→
pick r3,e ∈ Z∗
R1 ,R2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
R3 = r3G
R3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
R3←−−−−−−−−
a0‖a1 = xcoord2n(r3R1) a′0‖a′1 = xcoord2n(r1R3)
challenge phase
for i= 1 to n
ci = biti(e)
start timeri
ci−−−−−−−−→
stop timeri
fi←−−−−−−−− fi = a′ci ,i
veriﬁcation phase
check timeri ≤ 2B, fi = aci ,i e−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
check biti(e) = ci
e←−−−−−−−−
s= skP + er1 + r2 +
xcoord(r2pkV )
s−−−−−−−−→ s′ = s− k
s′←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
pkP = (s′ −
xcoord(skVR2))G− eR1 −R2
OutV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
private output: pkP
Figure A.3 – The DH-attack to the HPO Protocol [HPO13].
[CGMO09]
equals pkP and accepts P due to the following equation:
(s′ −xcoord(skVR2))G− eR1−R2 = (s− k−xcoord(skVR2))G− eR1−R2
= sG− kG−xcoord(skVR2)G− eR1−R2
= (skP′ + er1+ r2+ xcoord(r2pkV ))G
− kG−xcoord(skVR2)G− eR1−R2
= pkP′ − kG= pkP
One drawback of this attack is that the malicious prover does not hold any secret key
corresponding to his pkP. Depending on how the protocol infrastructure is implemented
in practice, key registration may thus fail. However, our general deﬁnition for DH allows
considering this type of attack in which a malicious prover succeeds to register any public
key, as long as it diﬀers from the public key of P′.
Performance: The HPO protocol requires 4 EC multiplications both in the prover and
the veriﬁer side. Multiplication on EC group corresponds to exponentiation operation
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in modular arithmetic and it is more eﬃcient.
A.3 GOR [GOR14a]
Veriﬁer Prover
secret key: skV secret key: skP
public key: pkV = skVG public key: pkP =
1
skP
Q
input: Q input: pkV
initialization phase
pick r1,r2 ∈ Z∗ , R1 = r1G, R2 = r2G,
pick HEnc,HDec
pick r3,e ∈ Z∗ , R3 = r3G
R1 ,R2 ,HEnc,h,π←−−−−−−−−−−−−− h=HEnc(pkP),π=NIZK(h)
check π, h′ = r ∗h R3 ,h
′
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
a0‖a1 = xcoord2n(r3R1) a′0‖a′1 = xcoord2n(r1R3)
challenge phase
for i= 1 to n
ci = biti(e)
start timeri
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
stop timeri
fi←−−−−−−−−−−−−− fi = a′ci ,i
veriﬁcation phase
e−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ check biti(e) = ci
check timeri ≤ 2B, fi = aci ,i S←−−−−−−−−−−−−− S = skPHDec(h′)+ eR1 +R2 + r2pkV
check rQ= S− skVR2 − eR1 −R2 OutV−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure A.4 – The Gambs-Onete-Robert protocol (GOR) [GOR14a].
The GOR protocol [GOR14a] in Figure A.4 is similar to HPO, but adapted to provide
anonymous authentication: the veriﬁer does not identify the prover but rather checks
that he belongs to a given group. The secret/public key (skV ,pkV ) setup of the veriﬁer
(V ) and secret key skP of the prover (P) is the same, only diﬀerence is in the public key
pkP of the prover which is
1
skP
Q . Here, Q = skP∏k−1i=1 skPi and each skPi is the secret key
of a prover Pi and k is the number of provers in the system.
The other diﬀerences are in the initialization and the veriﬁcation phases. In the
initialization phase, the prover computes R1,R2 as in HPO and additionally uses a ho-
momorphic encryption algorithm HEnc and its decryption algorithm HDec. He encrypts
his public key pkP with the key pkV and obtains h. In the end of the initialization phase,
he sends R1,R2,h and π which is a non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) that h is well
formed. After receiving all values, V computes R3 as in HPO. Additionally, he checks
if π is valid. If everything is valid, V sends R3 and h′ = r ∗ h where r ∈ Z∗ . The rest
of the GOR is the same with HPO until the veriﬁcation phase. Here, P computes and
sends S= skPHDec(h′)+eR1+R2+ r2pkV . V accepts if S− skVR2−eR1−R2 equals rQ, all
responses are correct and on time.
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Security: GOR is DF-secure and MiM-secure [GOR14a] but it is not TF-secure. As it
is constructed to be anonymous to the veriﬁer, it is not DH-secure but this is purposely
done. It is constructed to have strong-privacy but unfortunately, it is shown in [Vau15b]
by an attack that it is neither strong-private nor weak-private. Subsequently to this
attack, GOR was modiﬁed. The modiﬁed version of GOR [GOR14b] is resistant the
attack in [Vau15b]. Some attacks following the DF game work with probability
(3
4
)n
.
Some attacks following the MiM game work with probability
(1
2
)n
.
The assumptions for DF-security are the DDH assumption, sound NIZK proof and the
discrete logarithm assumption. The assumptions for privacy Replayable CCA security
(IND-RCCA) and Indistinguishability of Keys against CCA (IK-CCA) security.
Performance: The prover in GOR does 4 EC multiplications, 1 encryption and 1
NIZK. The veriﬁer veriﬁes the NIZK and does 4 EC multiplications. The EC operations
do not require a lot of computations, but NIZK is expensive for a DB protocol.
What is proven in NIZK in GOR is not explained in a clear statement in both versions.
However, it is critical as it may cause an authentication problem. The prover has to prove
that he constructed the encryption correctly and also the public key in the encryption
belongs to {pk1, ...,pkk}. If this proof is not considered in GOR in this case any arbitrary
participant can authenticate himself without knowing any ski. Otherwise, it is very costly
because the prover needs to do k times OR-proof (e.g. the public key in HEnc includes
pk1 or pk2 or ... or pkk).
A.4 ProProx [Vau15d]
Vaudenay [Vau15d] constructed a public-key protocol in Figure A.5. The protocol spe-
ciﬁcations are the following:
The veriﬁer (V ) has the public key pk = ComH(sk) of the prover. ComH is a set
commitments. Each commitment commits the hash of each bit of the input sk where H
is a hash function. sk is the secret key of the prover P. P ﬁrst picks {ai, j ∈Z2}n,si=1, j=1 and a
corresponding random value ρi, j. Then, he commits all ai, j’s and gets Ai, j =Com(ai, j;ρi, j).
After, he sends all Ai, j’s.
The challenge phase consists of ns rounds. In each round (i, j) ∈ {1, ...,n}×{1, ...,s},
V sends ci, j ∈ Z2. As a response, P sends ri, j = ai, j ⊕ ci, jbi, j ⊕ ci, jsk j. where sk j is the jth
bit of sk.
In the veriﬁcation phase, V ﬁrst checks if all responses arrived on time. If everything
goes well, P and V run zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) to show that the responses are
consistent with Ai, j and pk j for each (i, j) where pk j is the jth bit of pk. The details of
ZKP is showed in Figure A.6.
Security: ProProx is DF-secure, MiM-secure, extractor based TF-secure [BV14] and
DH-secure as shown in [Vau15d]. However, it is not strong private or weak private. Some
attacks following the DF game work with probability
(
1√
2
)ns
. Some attacks following the
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Veriﬁer Prover
input: pk pk= ComH(sk) (sk,pk)
initialization phase
for i= 1 to n and j = 1 to s
pick ai, j ∈ Z2, ρi, j
Ai, j←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Ai, j = Com(ai, j;ρi, j)
challenge phase
for i= 1 to n and j = 1 to s
pick ci, j ∈ Z2
start timeri, j
ci, j−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ receive ci, j
receive ri, j, stop timeri, j
ri, j←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri, j = ai, j ⊕ ci, jbi, j ⊕ ci, jsk j
veriﬁcation phase
check timeri, j ≤ 2B
zi, j = Ai, j
(
θbi, jpk j
)ci, j θ−ri, j ZKPκ(zi, j :ζi, j ;i∈I j , j=1,...,s)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ζi, j = ρi, jH(sk, j)c′i, j
OutV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure A.5 – ProProx: a Sound and Secure PoPoK. [Vau15d]
Veriﬁer Prover
input: z z= ζ2 (ζ,z)
pk←−−−−−−−−−−−−− generate sk, pk= Gen(sk)
pick e ∈ Z2, pick r
Commitpk(e;r)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
h←−−−−−−−−−−−−− pick g ∈ G, h= g2
e,r−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ open commitment
check ze = 2h−1, pk= Gen(sk) ,sk←−−−−−−−−−−−−− = gζe
OutV−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure A.6 – ZKP(z : ζ): a Sound and Zero-Knowledge Proof for z Being a Square.
MiM game work with probability
( 1
2
)ns
. Some attacks following the DH game work with
probability
( 1
2
)ns
. Some attacks following the TF game work with probability
(
1√
2
)ns
.
ProProx is secure under the assumptions that Com is a homomorphic bit commitment,
Com is a perfectly binding and computationally hiding, ZKP is sound and computation-
ally zero-knowledge proof of membership.
Performance: ProProx has heavy computations both on the prover and the veriﬁer
side. The prover computes ns commitments, ns exponentiations for ZKP. Similarly, the
veriﬁer computes n(s+1) exponentiations and ns inversions.
Now, we explain a version of ProProx which is called as eProProx [Vau15a].
Variant: eProProx [Vau15a] is a variant of ProProx. It has an extra phase showed
in Figure A.7 for privacy before the initialization phase of ProProx. In this phase, the
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Veriﬁer Prover
(skV ,pkV ) (skP,pkP)
input: pkV
pick δ= (δ1, . . . ,δs)
δ‖pk=DecskV (B)
B←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− B= EncpkV (δ‖pkP)
pk′j = pk jCom(0;δ j) H ′(., j) = H(., j)δ j
ProProxH′ (pk′)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
private output: pk
Figure A.7 – eProProx: a Privacy Extension for ProProx.
Veriﬁer Prover
(skV ,pkV ) (skP,pkP)
input: pkV
pick N N−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ pick s, σ= SignskT (N)
s‖pk‖σ=DecskP (e)
e←−−−−−−−−−−−−− e= EncpkV (s‖pkP‖σ)
Verifypk(σ,N)
OTDB(s)←−−−−−−−−−−−→
private output: pk
Figure A.8 – privDB: Private Public-Key DB [Vau15c].
prover ﬁrst picks δ1, ...,δs and encrypts all δi’s concatenated with pkP all with pkV . Then,
sends the encryption B to V . V decrypts B and gets δi’s and pk= pkP. Then, he commits
each bit of pk and gets pk′j = pk jCom(0;δ j). Meanwhile, P computes H ′(., j) = H(., j)δ j.
In the end, they run ProProxH ′(pk
′).
Security: eProProx preserves the security of ProProx and additionally it is strong
private as shown in [Vau15a].
Performance: eProProx does not improve the performance of the ProProx. Con-
versely, it adds extra s commitments and 1 encryption on the prover side. It also adds
extra s commitments and 1 decryption on the veriﬁer side.
A.5 PrivDB [Vau15c]
PrivDB is introduced by Vaudenay [Vau15c]. The veriﬁer (V ) and the prover (P) have
their own private/public key pairs (skV ,pkV ) and (skP,pkP), respectively. First, V picks
N and sends it to P. P picks a secret s and signs N with skP. Then, he encrypts s||pkP||σ
with pkV where σ is the signature. After, he sends the encryption e to V . V ﬁrst decrypts
e and learns s, pk= pkP and σ. He veriﬁes the signature and if the veriﬁcation is ok then
V and P run the OTDB protocol which is shown in Chapter 2, in Figure 2.1 with s.
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Security: PrivDB is DF-secure, MiM-secure, DH-secure as shown in [Vau15c]. Addi-
tionally, PrivDB is strong private [Vau15c]. However, it is not TF-secure.
The assumptions on the security of PrivDB are EF-CMA secure signature scheme and
IND-CCA secure encryption scheme.
A PPT adversary breaks DF-security of PrivDB with the probability (34)
n and MiM-
security and DH-security of PrivDB with the probability ( 12)
n.
Performance: PrivDB requires computation of a signature and an encryption on the
prover’s side. It requires a decryption and a veriﬁcation of the signature on the veriﬁer’s
side.
A.6 TREAD [ABG+17]
The protocol TREAD is constructed by Avoine et al. [ABG+17]. It has symmetric and
public-key variants but we explain the protocol with the public-key variant.
The initialization phase of TREAD is very similar to PrivDB [Vau15c]. The prover
P picks a bit string α||β from {0,1}2n and signs it with its secret-key skP. Then, he
encrypts the signature σP, his identity idP and α||β with the public key of the veriﬁer
pkV and sends the encryption to the veriﬁer V together with idP. The veriﬁer decrypts
the encryption and then veriﬁes if the signature is valid. If it is not valid, he aborts.
Otherwise, he picks a message m from {0,1}2n and sends it to P. Then, the challenge
phase begins. In each round i, V sends a challenge bit ci. If ci = 0, P replies with a
response ri = αi. Otherwise, it replies with ri = βi⊕mi. Here, αi and βi are the ith bits
of α and β, respectively. In the veriﬁcation phase, V checks if all responses arrived on
time and correctly.
Security: TREAD is DF, DH and MiM secure. It is also claimed to be simulator based
TF (SimTF) secure in the DFKO model [DFKO11]. However, we ﬁnd problems in its
SimTF proof. Therefore, their claim is not correct until the correct proof is provided.
We give more details about it below.
It is strong private and if the signature scheme is a group signature and idP is the
identiﬁer of a group then it is anonymous as well.
The assumptions are IND-CCA security on the encryption scheme and EF-CMA se-
curity on the signature scheme.
The security and privacy proofs are in [ABG+17]. A PPT adversary can break the
MiM, DH and DF security with the probability (34)
n.
Performance: Its performance is the same with PrivDB [Vau15c].
Problems in the SimTF-security Proof of TREAD: We ﬁrst deﬁne a tainted
session which is used in the deﬁnition of SimTF-security. Each session of a distance-
bounding protocol is associated with a unique identiﬁer sid. The sessions can be between
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Veriﬁer Prover
(skV ,pkV ) (skP,pkP)
input: pkV
Initialization Phase
α||β ∈ {0,1}2n
σP = SignskP(α||β||idP)
α||β||idP||σP = DecskV (e)
e,idP←−−−−−−−−− e= EncpkV (α||β||idP||σP)
if VerifypkP(σP)→ 0: abort
pick m ∈ {0,1}2n m−−−−−−−−−→
Challenge Phase
for i= 1 to n
pick ci
start timeri
ci−−−−→ if ci = 0,ri = αi
stop timeri
ri←−−−− else ri = βi⊕mi
store timeri
Veriﬁcation Phase
if |{i : ri and timeri correct}|= n
OutV = 1
OutV−−−−−−−−−→
Figure A.9 – TREAD [ABG+17]
the prover and the veriﬁer, the prover and the adversary, and the adversary and the
veriﬁer. Let us deﬁne a function clock(., .) where it has inputs session id and a message
and where it outputs the arrival time of the message to the receiver party in the session.
Consider a veriﬁer and adversary session sid and consider consecutive messages mk,mk+1
for k ≥ 1 with mk is received by the adversary in challenge phase of sid. sid is called
tainted, if there exists a prover-adversary session sid′ such that for any mi
clock(sid,mk)< clock(sid′,mi)< clock(sid,mk+1)
Basically, a session is tainted if the adversary communicates with the prover after
receiving a challenge.
Now, we give the exact deﬁnition of SimTF that the authors used in [ABG+17].:
Deﬁnition A.3 (SimTF Security [ABG+17]). “For a DB authentication scheme DB,
a (t,qV ,qP,qobs)-terrorist fraud adversary pair (A ,P) and a simulator S running in time
tS, the malicious prover P and his accomplice A win against DB if A authenticates in at
least one of qV adversary-veriﬁer sessions without tainting it with probability pA , and if S
authenticates in one of qV sessions with the view of A with probability pS, then pA ≤ pS.”
Note that the missing quantiﬁers in SimTF-deﬁnition makes hard to analyze the
SimTF-security proof. So, we assume that for all (t,qV ,qP,qobs)-terrorist fraud adversary
pair (A ,P), there exists a simulator S running in time tS as deﬁned in the deﬁnition. There
are two theorems related to SimTF-security of TREAD in [ABG+17].
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• The proof of Theorem 4 in [ABG+17] is not correct. Theorem 4 states that “if
the challenges are drawn uniformly at random by the veriﬁer, TREAD is SimTF-
resistant’ and prove that for any (A ,P), they can construct a simulator where
pS = pA . We show that for the following attack by (A ,P) in Figure A.10, pS = pA .
In the attack, the malicious prover sends e, idP as in the protocol to A . Then,
P receives m sent by the veriﬁer. At this point, P guesses the ﬁrst k challenges
c˜1, c˜2, ..., c˜k and sends their corresponding responses r˜1, r˜2, ..., r˜k to A . Then, the
challenge phase begins. The adversary replies the ﬁrst k challenges with the given
responses. Note that, if the guessed challenge by P is not the same with the
challenge sent by the veriﬁer, the response may not be correct. Before receiving
k+ 1st challenge, A sends all the challenges received from the veriﬁer c1,c2, ...,ck
to P. P checks if c1,c2, ...,ck is equal to guessed challenges c˜1, c˜2, ..., c˜k. If they are
equal, then P gives correct responses R0 = r0k+1, ...,r
0
n and R
1 = r1k+1, ...,r
1
n where r
b
i
is the response for the challenge ci = b. Otherwise, it aborts and A may continue
the next n− k rounds by guessing the responses.
Let us analyze the success probability of (A ,P) when qV = 1:
pA =
k
∑
i=0
Pr[(A ,P) wins∧ i challenges out of the ﬁrst k chalenges guessed]
=
k−1
∑
i=0
(1
2
)n(k
i
)(1
2
)k−i
+
(1
2
)k
=
(1
2
)n((3
2
)k
−1
)
+
(1
2
)k
=
(3
4
)k(1
2
)n−k
−
(1
2
)n
+
(1
2
)k
Remark that pA is equivalent to
(
1
2
)k
for k ≈ λn where λ≤ log2log3 .
We consider the simulator described in the proof of Theorem 4 in [ABG+17].
The simulator’s view diﬀers according to the abort by the prover. The view of the
simulator from the adversary-prover session where the prover aborts is e,m and the
responses of the adversary r¯1, r¯2, ..., r¯k, r˜k+1, ..., r˜n. The view of the simulator from
the adversary-prover session which the prover does not abort e,m, r¯1, r¯2, ..., r¯k,R0,R1.
The simulator runs number of qS session with the veriﬁer. In each session, it sends
e to the veriﬁer and receives m′ from the veriﬁer. In the challenge phase, the
simulator responds to each ﬁrst k-challenge as follows: if ci = 0, it responds with
r˜i, otherwise, it responds with r˜i ⊕mi ⊕m′. For the rest of the n− k-challenges,
the simulator having the view of the adversary where the prover aborts replies
randomly. The simulator having the view of the adversary where the prover did
not abort responds with R0[i] if ci = 0 and R1[i]⊕mi⊕m′i if ci = 1. Below, we upper
bound pS for any simulator using qS sessions.
Let’s analyze pS. We denote Pr[S wins one of qS-sessions|P aborts] by pS1 and
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Pr[S wins one of qS-sessions|¬P aborts] by pS2 . So, pS is as follows:
pS = pS1Pr[P aborts]+ pS2Pr[¬P aborts])
For any S, we have pS1 ≤ qS
(
1
2
)n−k
as the simulator having the view from the
aborted adversary does not have any information about the last n− k-responses.
We take λ= 13 , so k ≈ n3 , hence pS1 is negligible against pA .
The simulator having the view of the non-aborted adversary replies the last n− k
rounds correctly. However, it still needs to reply correctly to the ﬁrst k-challenges
since it only knows how to answer the challenges c˜1, c˜2, ..., c˜k. After j-sessions with
the veriﬁer, we let i denote the number of challenges which are diﬀerent from the
one known. Let d,e be a constant between 0 and 1. As j is polynomially bounded,
we assume that n is large enough so that e2dn > j. If i ≤ d.n, the probability of
success is bounded by 1. If i > dn, the simulator has tried up to j combinations
of out of 2i, so the probability of success is bounded by 12i− j , thus by
1
(1−e).2i .
Therefore, the success probability of the simulator after j attempts can be bounded
as follows:
p j ≤ ∑
i>dn
(
k
i
)(1
2
)k 1
2i(1− e) + ∑i≤dn
(
k
i
)(1
2
)k
≤∑
i
(
k
i
)(1
2
)k 1
2i(1− e) +Pr[i≤ dn]
=
(3
4
)k
(1− e)−1+Pr[i≤ dn]
We take d such that d < 12 . So, p j is negligible. As pS2 ≤ ∑ j≤qS p j, pS2 is negligible
too. Now, we have
pS = pS1Pr[P aborts]+ pS2Pr[¬P aborts])≤ pS1 + pS2
(1
2
)k
Since pA is equivalent to
(
1
2
)k
, pS1 is negligible against pA, and pS2 is negligible,
pS is negligible against pA. This contradicts with Theorem 4 in [ABG+17].
• The proof of Theorem 5 in [ABG+17] is not correct. Theorem 5 states this: “For
any adversary A authenticating with the help of a prover with non-negligible prob-
ability, there is an algorithm amplify using the internal view of A and oracle access
to a veriﬁer such that after polynomial number of steps, Pr[amplify authenticates] =
1, almost surely. ”.
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Veriﬁer Adversary Malicious Prover
(skV ,pkV )
input: pkV
α||β ∈ {0,1}2n
σP = SignskP (α||β||idP)
α||β||idP||σP =DecskV (e)
e,idP←−−−−−−−−− e,idP←−−−−−−− e= EncpkV (α||β||idP||σP)
if VerifypkP (σP)→ 0: abort
pick m ∈ {0,1}2n m−−−−−−−→ m−−−−−−−→ pick c¯1, c¯2, ..., c¯k
r¯1 ,r¯2 ,...,r¯k←−−−−−−− compute responsesr¯1, r¯2, ..., r¯k
Challenge Phase
for i= 1 to k
pick ci
start timeri
ci−−−−−−−→
stop timeri
r¯i←−−−−−−−
store timeri
c1 ,c2 ,...,ck−−−−−−−→ if c¯i = ci for i= 1,2, ...,k
for i= k+1 to n
R0 ,R1←−−−−−−−
pick ci
start timeri
ci−−−−−−−→
stop timeri
ri←−−−−−−− deduce ri from R0,R1
store timeri
for i= k+1 to n else:abort
pick ci
start timeri
ci−−−−−−−→
stop timeri
ri←−−−−−−− pick r′i
store timeri
Figure A.10 – A TF-attack that contradicts with the Sim-TF-security of TREAD.
Consider another TF attack where the malicious prover gives all responses R0,R1
to A when n is even and gives no response when n is odd. In this case, pA is 1 when
n is even and 12k when n is odd. So, pA is not negligible as assumed in Theorem 5.
However, we cannot construct an ampliﬁer as described in the proof of Theorem
which makes the success probability of the an algorithm amplify 1 for every n. The
problem in the proof of Theorem 5 comes from the fact that two quantiﬁers have
been exchanged when dealing with the “non-negligible” notion.
Remark: All of the protocols reviewed above are considered in a noiseless channel
which means that the prover always receives the challenge sent by the veriﬁer and the
veriﬁer always receives the response sent by the prover in the challenge phase. However,
in real world, a noiseless channel is hard to achieve. This problem in DB protocols was
introduced by Singele´e and Preneel [SP07]. All of the public-key DB protocols can be
adapted to noisy channels by changing number of correct response from n to τ to be
accepted by the veriﬁer. τ can be determined based on the noise probability.
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Appendix B
More results about D-AKA security
model
The Extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) Security Model [LLM07]
The eCK security model consists of t parties with their certiﬁcated public keys. The
key exchange protocol is executed between two parties A and B. When A starts a key
exchange protocol with B, it is called as a session and A is the owner of the session
and B is the peer. A (initiator) starts the protocol by sending a message MA, then B
(responder) responds with a message MB. The session id sid corresponds to an instance
of A or B.
There is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A controlling all commu-
nication and some instances. The activation of the parties starts by Send(A,B,message)
(or Send(B,A,message)). Besides Send, A can do following queries:
• Long-Term Key Reveal(A): Outputs the long term public-key of A.
• Ephemeral Key Reveal(sid) Outputs an ephemeral key of a session sid.
• Reveal(sid): Outputs the session key of a completed session sid.
KA Protocol Eﬃciency Security
MQV [LMQ+03] 2.5 unproven
HMQV [Kra05] 2.5 CK
KEA+ [LM06] 3 CK
NAXOS [LLM07] 4 eCK
CMQV [Ust08] 3 eCK
Nonce-DH 1 D-AKA
Table B.1 – Existing KA protocols with their security and eﬃciency. Eﬃciency column
shows the number of exponentiation done by per party.
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• Test(sid): If sid is clean then outputs s by running the query Reveal(sid). If
b= 1, outputs s←{0,1}λ if b= 0 (λ is the size of the session key).
The advantage is the diﬀerence of the probability that A gives 1 for b = 0 and
b= 1.
A clean session is basically a session where winning the game for A is not trivial. See
[LLM07] for more details.
Theorem B.1. If a key agreement protocol is eCK secure [LLM07], then it is D-AKA
secure.
Proof. Let’s assume that there is an adversary A playing D-AKA game. We construct
an adversary B simulating the D-AKA game and playing the eCK game. B receives all
the public keys in the eCK game. B ﬁrst picks two parties A and B. Then, he creates a
session sid between them by sending the query Send(A,B, message) and he assigns the
ephemeral public key of B as a nonce N. Then, he sends the query Test(sid) and receives
sb. Finally, he sends sb,N,pkB,pkA to A . Whenever A calls the oracle OB(pkA′), B creates
a new session sid′ with A′ on behalf of B as explained above. Similarly, he assigns the
ephemeral public key of B as a nonce N′. After, he sends the query Reveal(sid′) and
receives the session key s′. As a response of OB(pkA′), he sends s′,N′ to A . In addition,
whenever A calls the oracle OA(pkB′ ,N′′), ﬁrst, B checks if (pkB′ ,N′′) equals (pkB,N). If it
is not equal, he creates a new session sid′′ on behalf of B′ with the ephemeral public key
N′′ and calls the oracle Reveal(sid′′) to receive the session key s′′. Then, he responds to
A with s′′. In the end, B outputs whatever A outputs. The simulation of D-AKA game
is perfect. So the advantage of B equals to the advantage of A . Therefore, because the
advantage of B is negligible, the advantage of A is negligible as well.
As a result of Theorem B.1, we can conclude any eCK secure key agreement protocol
can be used in Eﬀ-pkDB. However, we suggest using D-AKA secure key agreement
protocols as they may require less public-key operations.
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Appendix C
Security implications in SHM and PM
First, let us deﬁne “Null conversion”. It is a transformation of a protocol DB’ with
(K ,V,P′,B) in PM into another protocol DB with (K ,V,P,B,H) in SHM where P and H
are described below1:
P
ask key
receive K
run P′(K)
H(K)
send K
This conversion shows that, if we have a counterexample protocol in PM which is X-
secure but not Y-secure (X,Y ∈ {DF, DH, MiM, TF}), then the same counterexample
applies for its null conversion. Hence, any non-implication in PM is correct for
SHM as well.
We have already explained that TF-security implies DF, DH and MiM security in
SHM and PM. Now, we show the other relations between these security notions. We
give our counterexamples in PM for simplicity.
DH → DF: It is clear that DH-security implies DF-security in SHM and also in PM.
But, there is no such relation between DF/DH-security and MiM-security as explained
below.
DF  DH and DF  MiM: A simple counterexample for a DF-secure protocol
which is neither MiM nor DH-secure is an ‘echo’ protocol.
In an ‘echo’ protocol, the prover authenticates itself and then the challenge phase
begins. P receives a challenge(s) from V and P responds with the challenge(s) itself. If
P replies with the same challenge(s), V computes the elapsed time between the sending
the challenge and receiving the response. Thus, V can decide if the proximity of P is
less than B. Clearly, this is DF-secure because P cannot correctly reply before seeing
the challenge. So, P cannot show itself closer than its proximity. But, echo protocol is
not DH and MiM-secure. It is not DH-secure because a far-away and malicious prover
1Remark that H leaks the key in Null conversion because its algorithm is designed like this. This
exempliﬁes that in our model we do not have any restriction (e.g., no leakage of a key) about H’s
algorithm.
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V (skV ,pkV ) P(skP,pkP,pkV )
initialization phase
N ← D(1n)
A(skV ,pkV ,pkP,N)→ s
N,pkP←−−−−−−−−− B(skP,pkP,pkV ,N)→ s
pick m ∈ {0,1}2n m−−−−−−−−−→ a= s⊕m
a⇐=========
challenge phase
for i= 1 to n
pick ci ∈ {0,1}, start timeri ci−−−−−−−−−→ ri = a2i+ci−1
stop timeri
ri←−−−−−−−−−
veriﬁcation phase
a= s⊕m,
checktimeri ≤ 2B,ri = a2i+ci−1 OutV−−−−−−−−−→
output pkP
Figure C.1 – An example DB protocol in PM which is DH-secure but not MiM-secure
can authenticate itself and let the close and honest prover respond to the challenge(s).
So, V decides that the malicious prover is close. It is not MiM-secure, because a MiM-
adversary responds the challenge(s) itself in the challenge phase and, in the rest, he
relays the messages between the (far-away) prover and the veriﬁer.
MiM  DF and MiM  DH: MiM-symDB in Chapter 5 (Figure 5.4) is MiM-
secure but not DF-secure. So, it is not DH-secure either.
DH  MiM: We show a DB protocol which is DH secure in PM but not MiM-secure
in PM in Figure C.1 below.
MiM  TF and DH  TF: Eﬀ-pkDB [KV16], PrivDB [Vau15c] are MiM and DH
secure. However, they are not TF-secure (they are not even TF’-secure in PM).
DH-secure but not MiM-secure DB protocol: We modify the Eﬀ-pkDB protocol
[KV16] as in Figure C.1. We let the prover send the secret a before challenge phase.
The rest is the same.
This protocol is still DH-secure because of the following proof sketch: Eﬀ-pkDB is DH
secure as shown in [KV16]. In the proof, it has been shown that the secret s1 generated
by P′ (close and honest) is independent from s generated by malicious P. It shows that
P does not know anything about s1 just after it is generated before a1 is released. When
we consider modiﬁed Eﬀ-pkDB, we observe that even if P sends m himself, a that P has
and a1 that P′ has will be independent. Therefore, with the same arguments of DH-proof
of Eﬀ-pkDB, we can show that modiﬁed Eﬀ-pkDB is DH secure.
On the other hand, it is not MiM secure because an adversary knows the responses
beforehand. When we convert it to SHM where P behaves as Pdum, we have the same
security properties as well.
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Appendix D
Full EMV
Here are some abbreviations used in the protocol:
• AID: Application Identiﬁer. It deﬁnes each new execution of EMV protocol.
• AFL: Application File Locator. It is a list of ﬁles used in transaction. Application
Expiry Date, PAN, CDOL1, CDOL2 are mandatory ﬁles.
• AIP: Application Interchange Proﬁle. It indicates the supported features of the
card (i.e., terminal risk management and authentication methods: SDA, DDA,
CDA, card holder veriﬁcation, issuer authentication, relay resistance protocol)
• ATC: Application Transaction Counter
• CDA: Combined Application Data. It is an authentication method combined in
transaction phase.
• CDOL: Card Risk Management Object List. CDOL1 and CDOL2 lists the objects
that the card needs to generate the ﬁrst cryptogram and the second cryptogram,
respectively.
• CidD: Cryptogram Information Data.
• DDA: Dynamic Application Data. It is a sign of dynamic data.
• SDA: Static Application Data. It is a sign of static data.
• PDOL: Processing Data Object List. It specify which information the card wants
from the terminal.(e.g. terminal country code (TCC), amount (τ))
EMV contactless session consists of four phases without card holder (user) veriﬁc-
ation method (i.e., Online PIN, Signature):
– Contact Establishment with NFC card: T detects C.
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– Transaction Initialization: C picks an application identiﬁer AID and sends it
to T . Then, they exchange their data to continue to the next phase. C asks
for some information of the terminal (PDOL). Then, T sends its PDOL data
with a command (GET-PROCESSING-OPTIONS). C responds with its all
supported features (AIP) and the card information needed for the transaction
(AFL).
– Transaction Initialization: C picks an application identiﬁer AID and sends it
to T . Then, they exchange their data to continue to the next phase. C asks
for some information of the terminal (PDOL). Then, T sends its PDOL data
with a command (GET-PROCESSING-OPTIONS). C responds with its all
supported features (AIP) and the card information needed for the transaction
(AFL).
– Relay Resistance Protocol [emvb]: This protocol is executed if the card and
the terminal supports it. Here, we assume that they support this feature. The
terminal picks a random number R1 and sends this to the card with a com-
mand EXCHANGE-RELAY-RESISTANCE-DATA. The card responses with
another random number R2. It also sends timing estimates (timings): Min
Time For Processing Relay Resistance Protocol, Max Time For Processing
Relay Resistance Protocol, Device Estimated Transmission Time For Relay
Resistance Protocol. Then, the terminal checks if the total time passed after
sending R1 exceeds the limit. If the limit does not exceeds, then the next
phase begins. Otherwise, the transaction is canceled.
– Data Authentication: There are three type of authentication methods in
EMV: Static Data Authentication (SDA), Dynamic Data Authentication
(DDA) and Combined Data Authentication (CDA). Because of some weak-
nesses in SDA and DDA (replay attacks and wedge attacks), in this paper,
we consider CDA which is combined with the next phase.
– Transaction: T sends a command (GENERATE-AC) to C for the application
cryptogram. This command includes: the type of cryptogram T requires, a
CDA request, a list of values in CDOL1 that C needs from T to compute AC
and a random number UNT picked by T .
In EMV, there are three type of cryptograms: Transaction Certiﬁcate (TC),
Authorization Request Cryptogram (ARQC), Application Authentication
Cryptogram (AAC). Here, we consider the online veriﬁcation where T re-
quests ARQC for online veriﬁcation by the issuer. TC is used for the oﬄine
veriﬁcation by the issuer and AAC is used to cancel the transaction.
∗ Online Veriﬁcation: C increases its counter ATC and generates a secret
key SKAC by using the counter and the master secret key MKAC. Then,
it generates the cryptogram: a MAC of UNT ,AIP,ATC,τ,TCC and some
details of the transaction (See [emvc], Table 26) with using the secret key
SKAC. C sends the cryptogram ARQC to T and T relays it to I along
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with card information. I veriﬁes the MAC and possibly validate the
information of C. If the cryptogram passes veriﬁcation, then I generates
a MAC of ARQC and ARC with the secret key SKAC. This MAC is
called as ARPC. After, it sends ARPC to T and T relays it to C with the
second GENERATE-AC command for the generation of TC if ARC is
true. Otherwise, it sends GENERATE-AC command for the generation
of AAC to cancel the transaction.
C veriﬁes ARPC. If the veriﬁcation and ARC is true then C generates the
second cryptogram which is TC. TC is a MAC of CDOL2’s objects with
SKAC (See [emvc], Table 26)1 in order to show transaction is complete.
Additionally, it generates a signature of unpredictable numbers, ATC,
TC,timings,R1,R2 and CDOL-PDOL data. C signs it with SIC.
∗ Terminal checks if the sign and the data signed are valid. Later, the ter-
minal contacts with the issuer to receive to reimbursement. In this case,
the issuer veriﬁes the signature and TC to execute the reimbursement.
1Even if CDOL1 and CDOL2 list the same objects, some terminal related objects change because the
payment process continues (e.g., TVR) [Rad03].
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